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3INTRODUCTION
There has traditionally been a wide divide between the study of the politics of Islam in the Middle East and in the West. Middle East-focused research in American political science has focused in 
great depth on issues such as political mobilization, social service provision, electoral performance, 
and Islamist ideologies.   American research on Islam in the West, by contrast, has often focused on 
cultural conflicts, immigration, terrorism, and anti-Islamic campaigns. 
The European media debate about Islam has for years been dominated by the disagreement among 
Gilles Kepel, Olivier Roy, and François Burgat. For Kepel, the challenge of Islam is rooted in religion, 
transmitted from the Middle East through networks of migration, and reshaping the Muslim lower 
classes in dangerous ways. For Roy, the rise of fundamentalism is an eﬀect of globalization and 
the disconnection between religion and culture that makes religiosity more rigid and codified. 
Importantly, he argues, this transformation concerns all religions, and not just Islam (see the rise of 
Evangelical fundamentalism globally). For Burgat, the challenge begins from socioeconomic exclusion 
and political grievance due to the unresolved postcolonial trauma of migrant populations, with Islam 
providing the idiom for political dissent rather than the explanation.
But despite the focus on the media, the three positions have unequally influenced the academic 
production of younger generations of European scholars of Islam. While the scholarship of Roy 
and Burgat has inspired numerous studies of Muslims’ renewed modes of practice and Islamic 
moblizations, very few scholars today endorse the approach of Kepel without qualifying it and 
contextualizing it. Today’s European scholarship on Islam distinguishes itself by a wide spectrum of 
methods, topics, and fieldworks, with a trend toward strong ethnographic research. Over the last two 
decades,  a prolific and pluralist field of scholarship on Islam and Muslims in Europe and the U.S. has 
emerged and brought to the fore innovative perspectives and understudied topics. 
One major trend of European scholarship, inspired by anthropologists Talal Asad and Saba Mahmoud 
and political theorist Charles Taylor, has used the study of practices and claims of second generation 
Muslims in Europe and the U.S to further interrogate the binary between religion and secularism. 
Rejecting exceptionalist treatment of Islamic practice, scholars have explored quotidian forms of 
religiosities, in various fields such as eating, fashion, arts, dating, school pedagogy, and fatwa issuance 
(Jouili, Peter, Shirin-Moazami, Fadil, Caeiro). A second major trend of scholarship has focused 
more specifically on the way in which European and American Muslims engage with politics. It has 
examined forms of mobilization, institutionalization, and authority production in the context of 
increasingly tensed relations with Western states. 
There are good reasons to bring these divergent American and European literatures on the 
Middle East and the Western context into greater conversation. The divide in the literature is not 
necessarily reflective of the analytical overlaps across these very diﬀerent contexts, however.  In 
both contexts, Islam has become a vernacular of politics which has informed political organization, 
mobilization, and thought.  Middle Eastern Islamism takes place within authoritarian, Muslim-
majority systems, while in the West it involves Muslim minorities and democratic systems. Common 
questions emerge about the relationship between Islam and the state, the ability of Islamists to 
capture the representation of Islam within the political system, and the degree to which Islam oﬀers 
organizational advantages for political and social mobilization. 
4On June 28, 2018, POMEPS and Sciences Po CERI convened a workshop with a dozen scholars of 
Islam and politics in Europe and North America to explore these similarities and diﬀerences. The 
scholars in this workshop engage with these various perspectives.  Their work illustrates the richness 
of the field of the politics of Islam in Europe and the U.S. 
Several key themes emerged from these discussions and papers. 
 There is great diversity across Muslim communities. For all the recent discussions of transnational 
and global Islam allegedly erasing local particularities, the papers in our collection suggest that 
national diﬀerences and identities persist despite the rhetoric of a global Islam. Both within and across 
countries, our participants observed significant diﬀerences in social organization, religious practice 
and political orientation along national lines.  In some cases, those divisions overlap with sectarian 
diﬀerences, and can be exacerbated by rising global trends in Sunni-Shi’a tensions.  In others, the 
divisions have to do with diﬀerent rates and moments of migration,  as with the persistent diﬀerences 
among Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian Muslim communities in France. In yet others, the divide is 
ethnic and linguistic, as with the Turkish and Kurdish communities in Germany, or the South Asian-
Arab divides in the United Kingdom.  
A generational divide can be seen almost everywhere. Participants highlighted the importance 
of generational divides in almost every context. The new forms of religiosity and views of political 
authority emerging in younger generations challenged very diﬀerent existing institutional structures 
in strikingly similar ways.  The younger generations engaged diﬀerently with political parties and 
oﬃcially sanctioned Islamic organizations, showing less deference to putative leaders and greater 
initiative in seeking out their own authorities. The eﬀects of such autonomy varied widely, however, 
empowering new leaders as diﬀerent as the jihadists of the Islamic State, radical artists, and lifestyle-
focused “soft” Islamic preachers. 
The state is deeply involved in regulating and shaping Islamic politics.  The role of the state 
in defining the terms of Muslim participation in politics emerged as a central theme in almost 
every essay in the collection.  The alienation of Muslim communities from states has been a central 
theme in recent political discussion, but in fact the relationship between these communities and 
the state is far more complex.  In some cases, national legislation or the politicization of Islam as a 
polarizing campaign issue directly aﬀected Muslim communities. In others, it took the form of state 
actors changing the political organization of Muslim communities through their seeking out of – 
or, in some cases, active construction of – authoritative interlocutors. Seemingly mundane urban 
zoning regulations have had tremendously significant eﬀects on the construction of mosques and 
the formation of collective identities around them.  Terrorism has had a particularly acute impact, 
defining Muslim integration as a security issue and dramatically expanding the reach of the state 
into the policing and surveillance of those communities.   This has generated cooperative relations 
between Muslim institutions and the state, in a common eﬀort to police communities against 
extremism, but also new forms of youth activism and resistance to what is viewed as state overreach 
and drift into racist practices and rhetoric. 
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Islamic authority is rapidly evolving.  The case studies in the collection demonstrate in evocative 
ways how the nature of Islamic authority has evolved and changed.  New religious authorities have 
emerged, often from non-traditional sources.  New media forms have been especially important for 
raising the profile and the authority of these new types of preachers and religious figures.   The contest 
between traditional religious authorities and these new figures plays out across generational lines, 
with significant implications for political organization and ideological orientations.  From a security 
viewpoint, these new Islamic authorities are often viewed as dangerous pathways towards extremism, 
and as such represent a force to be confronted and regulated.  But from other vantage points, the new 
religious authorities represent positive forces of change from within challenged communities. 
Politics can be a source of both integration and alienation.  The case studies and empirical analysis 
in the collection reveal the dual edged nature of Muslim political participation in these Western 
democracies. Muslim communities able to organize eﬀectively to win elections and influence state 
policy oﬀer a traditional route for the political integration of minority communities. But that very 
success generates backlash, as can be seen in the anti-Muslim populist campaigns which have risen 
in prominence across Europe and the United States.  The wide variation in political participation 
across these countries allows for useful datasets to test competing propositions about alienation and 
participation. Throughout diﬀerent contexts, we see Muslims struggling with recurrent challenges 
and dilemmas. We observe similar debates about what exactly counts as Islamic mobilizations, 
institutions, or forms of authority in non-Muslim contexts where Muslims inevitably borrow from the 
methods and principles of existing groups such as leftist parties or civil rights organizations. Muslims’ 
various forms of political engagement also lead to internal disputes about whether engaging with local 
politics will lead to a dilution of the Islamic identity and cooptation or can actually subvert the current 
normative understanding of Islam as a threat. 
The essays in this collection bring out some of the outstanding new research on Muslim politics in 
Europe and North America and oﬀer an intriguing window into an emerging interdisciplinary body 
of scholarship.   We are delighted to present POMEPS Studies 32, The Politics of Islam in Europe and 
North America. 
Marc Lynch, George Washington University and Director of POMEPS 
Nadia Marzouki, Sciences Po CERI 
December 2018
6French Muslim authorities as social troubleshooters
Margot Dazey, University of Cambridge
Anthropologists of secularism and sociologists of 
Islam have concerned themselves with the paradoxical 
governance of religion in secular states.  Grounded in 
binaries of improper versus proper versions of Islam, state 
eﬀorts of architecting domestic forms of Islam in Western 
Europe consist in discouraging “extremist” practices 
and encouraging “moderate” ones through a range of 
security pressures and political prescriptions (Agrama 
2012, Fernando 2014, Laurence 2012, see also Aguilar, 
Khemilat and Talpin in this collection). This essay uses 
a case study of a French Muslim organization to analyze 
the ways normative expectations of a “civil Islam” (Peter 
2006, Sèze 2016) both constrain and enable the political 
agency of actors claiming authority within French Muslim 
communities. It argues that while governmental demands 
incentivize Muslim authorities to adopt dominant scripts 
about a moderate and peaceable Islam, this process works 
both ways as Muslim authorities also draw on their own 
textual traditions to justify the civic role of religion in 
the public sphere. Revivalist Islamic actors, in particular, 
are well-equipped to posit the social appeasement 
functions that religion can serve in public life. In short, the 
promotion of a “civil Islam” in France can be, at times and 
quite paradoxically, the product of a converging agenda 
between state authorities and certain conservative Muslim 
actors. 
This essay builds on an in-depth case study of the 
Union des organisations islamiques de France (Union of 
Islamic Organizations of France, UOIF)—a prominent 
Muslim umbrella organization in the French Islamic 
landscape, founded in 1983 and drawing its ideological 
and organizational inspiration from the Muslim 
Brotherhood. It focuses on two significant episodes 
which took place in the mid-2000s and illustrated how 
the right-wing government then in oﬃce and UOIF 
1   Lhaj Thami Breze quoted in Le Figaro, 30 August 2004 “Ces ravisseurs sont des ennemis de l’islam”.
2   Fatiha Ajbli quoted in La Croix, 31 August 2004 “Les enlèvements en Irak”.
activists coincidentally concurred in using religion as a 
tool for social and political quieting. Importantly, these 
episodes laid out the ambivalent roles of community 
brokers and social troubleshooters endorsed by some 
representative Muslim organizations in the context of the 
institutionalization of Islam into government-initiated 
Islamic councils.
The hostage crisis, summer 2004
The first episode that encapsulated these convergences in 
encouraging the peacekeeping role of Muslim authorities 
occurred when two French journalists were taken hostage 
in Iraq during the summer of 2004. In response to the 
captors’ demands to repeal the newly-passed law banning 
the wearing of headscarves in French public schools 
(March 2004), the reaction of the UOIF was threefold.
Firstly, UOIF leaders vigorously opposed the abduction, 
with the president of the organization Lhaj Thami Breze 
arguing that “today all Muslims are being taken hostage” 
and that “the abductors are enemies of Islam”,1 while 
participating in a solidary march in Paris. In the aftermath 
of a joint meeting with other Muslim representatives at 
the Ministry of the Interior, UOIF member Fatiha Ajbli 
eloquently declared that she was ready to volunteer to 
replace the journalists taken hostages. In her own words: 
“I am afraid that my headscarf could become associated 
with these people. I don’t want my headscarf to be stained 
with blood.”2 These various public interventions served a 
common purpose, staging UOIF leaders as reliable and 
obliging spokespersons of the Muslim populations in 
France.
Secondly, UOIF general secretary, Fouad Alaoui, suggested 
“out of a sense of responsibility” that a Muslim delegation 
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should be sent to Baghdad to help secure the release of the 
journalists.3 His proposition was met with enthusiasm by 
state authorities, and three representatives of the principal 
Muslim organizations in France were sent to Iraq with 
the mission of contradicting the religious arguments 
advanced by the abductors. Upon his return, Fouad Alaoui 
commented on his meeting with Iraqi Sunni authorities 
and underscored how the religious nature of his delegation 
had been politically expedient in the negotiations:
We were struck by the fact that all our interlocutors 
stressed that they were expecting our visit. They told 
us expressly that our initiative was likely to succeed, 
because we were Muslims of France and the abductors 
claimed that they were advancing the protection of 
French Muslims in their claims.4 
Thirdly, UOIF leaders turned the regular Friday prayer at 
the organization’s headquarters in La Courneuve into a 
“national prayer” for the release of the hostages (Bowen 
2007: 145). In his sermon, UOIF preacher Mokhtar 
Jaballah sought to balance the hesitant mobilization of his 
organization against the law banning headscarves in public 
schools with a declared concern for national cohesion. To 
this end, he expounded on a Quranic verse concerning 
ethnic and national diﬀerences in order to call for mutual 
respect and understanding, while ranking the hostages’ 
right to life above the veiled students’ right to religious 
expression.5 This religious repertoire of action further 
epitomized the ways in which UOIF leaders couched their 
role of political mediators in Islamic terms.
Overall, the French government applauded the sense of 
civic responsibility displayed by UOIF representatives. The 
Minister of Education interpreted the reactions of UOIF 
leaders as a conciliatory move towards the acceptance of 
3   Interview with Fouad Alaoui, La Courneuve, 2016.
4   Fouad Alaoui quoted in Le Monde, 3 September 2004 “La visite du CFCM à Bagdad a été bien accueillie”.
5   Le Monde, 4 September 2004 “’Prière nationale’ musulmane à La Courneuve pour concilier solidarité et revendication du voile”.
6   François Fillon quoted in Le Point, 2 September 2004, “Le nouveau visage de l’islam de France”. 
7   Le Monde, 4 September 2004, “Avec la crise des otages et la rentrée, le Conseil français du culte musulman a assis sa légitimité”.
8   Bruno Etienne quoted in La Croix, 1 September 2004.
9   The fatwa was issued on the 6th November 2005 by Dar al Fatwa, a Fatwa council attached to the UOIF and created in 1988.
the banning of headscarves in public schools: “The UOIF 
had, until now, pursued a legal rationale to circumvent the 
law on the headscarf. In the aftermath of this weekend, 
the organization has embraced a republican rationale.”6 
Meanwhile, the steps undertaken by the organization to 
solve the crisis strengthened its credibility as a reliable 
partner in the eyes of the Minister of Interior,7 while 
enhancing its legitimacy in the broader public sphere.8 
To summarize, the self-positioning of UOIF leaders 
as responsible representatives of the national “Muslim 
community”, taking seriously their role of religious 
mediators towards hostile extremist groups, won them 
some political credit—at least temporarily.
Suburb riots, autumn 2005 
A second episode illustrating the coincidental promotion 
of “civil Islam” by government and revivalist actors 
was played out during the urban riots of 2005. The 
riots, which particularly aﬀected marginalized urban 
territories in France (referred to as the banlieues in public 
conversations), followed the deaths of two French youths 
fleeing the police in the Parisian suburb of Clichy-sous-
Bois. As these events occurred, the UOIF leadership issued 
a “fatwa concerning the troubles aﬀecting France.” With 
the objective of condemning the destruction of goods 
and violent actions, the fatwa—that is, an Islamic legal 
opinion—read as follows:
Every Muslim living in France, whether citizen or 
guest, has the right to demand the scrupulous respect 
of his being, dignity and belief, as well as to act for 
greater equality and social justice. But this action must 
never take place against the Islamic teaching and the 
law which regulates common life.9
8UOIF scholars hence deployed an Islamic grammar to 
condemn the rioters’ actions, drawing on their revivalist 
tradition which promotes Islam as a mode of social 
governance and code for moral citizenship (Caeiro 2006). 
A few days before the fatwa was issued, UOIF leaders had 
already sent a regional delegate to Clichy—a gesture that 
the secretary general of the organization defended along 
the following lines:
We cannot exclude religion from the social field. It can 
be a factor of appeasement. If all the laws and rules 
don’t achieve to control men [cadrer les hommes], 
religion can play its role more fully.10
This quotation illustrates the role of social control that the 
UOIF leadership willingly endorsed during the riots. In a 
similar way to the hostage crisis described above, UOIF 
leaders justified their political intervention in terms of 
an “ethic of responsibility”; they felt a duty to enlighten 
Muslim believers about the right course of action. In his 
introductory remarks to the Annual meeting of France’s 
Muslims, which took place a few months after the riots, 
UOIF president Lhaj Thami Breze further advocated the 
appeasing role that religion could play in the political life of 
the country:
[The waves of violence in the banlieues] have revealed 
a deep and multifaceted discontent which cannot 
justify violent action or the damage to property. In 
the light of this tragic event, a cooling oﬀ period is 
urgently needed. All actors concerned with peace and 
social cohesion have sought to contribute to a return 
to tranquillity. Religion, with its own approach and 
eﬀorts, has answered the call through the directives 
and interventions of the organizations’ leaders. 
Shouldering its responsibility fully, the UOIF has 
endeavoured, through its fatwa, to engage those who 
identified themselves as Muslims among the youth 
participating in these events.11
10   Fouad Alaoui quoted in Le Monde, 2 November 2005 “Quand les ‘frères’ musulmans tentent de ramener le calme”.
11   Lhaj Thami Breze quoted in La Lettre de l’UOIF no. 1, July/August/September 2006, p. 4.
12   Valérie Pécresse quoted in L’Obs, 8 November 2005, “Les événements du lundi 7 novembre”.
With little impact on the ground, since rioters were driven 
by socio-economic motivations rather than religious 
concerns, the fatwa was well received by right-wing 
politicians who hailed the UOIF’s positive intervention 
in public aﬀairs, suspending their usual suspicions on 
the organization. For instance, the spokesperson of the 
main right-wing political party in France stated in the 
weekly press conference of her party that it was “normal” 
that the UOIF “uses a fatwa to call youth for a calm 
down” in the banlieues.12 Their reaction illustrates the 
ambivalent interpretation of laïcite by French political 
elites, sometimes excluding religion as an unacceptable 
dimension of public life and sometimes invoking its 
supposed potential for pacification and social control 
(Galembert, 2016, p. 76). The entire political sequence 
came to exemplify how the social interventionism of 
religious actors could be encouraged by secular authorities 
and UOIF leaders simultaneously.
Expedient community brokers?
The hostage crisis and the urban riots took place in the 
context of the government-led institutionalization of 
Islam into the Conseil français du culte musulman (the 
French Council of the Muslim Faith), in which the UOIF 
was coopted by successive Ministers of Interior in the late 
1990s and 2000s (Laurence 2012). This Council reflects 
the promotion of religion as a form of social regulation 
and the summoning of UOIF to contribute to this process 
(Zeghal 2005). It also elucidates expectations held by some 
French politicians that Muslim organizations should serve 
as channels for conflict resolution and social control with 
regards to Muslim populations of North African origins. 
As outlined in this essay, both episodes of the hostage 
crisis and the riots hence oﬀered opportunities for UOIF 
leaders to present themselves as “social troubleshooters” 
engaged in mediation work between unruly members of the 
Muslim community (both outside the national territory, in 
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the case of the Iraq delegation, and inside, in the case of the 
suburb riots) and the broader non-Muslim society. In light 
of the process of institutionalization just mentioned, this 
self-positioning has to be understood within the long-term 
strategy of the respectability embraced by the organization 
in order to assuage suspicions about its Islamist filiation and 
establish its political legitimacy in the French public sphere. 
Enmeshed in what can resemble at times client-patron 
relationships between Muslim authorities and politicians 
(Geisser 2006), this strategy was not implemented without 
criticisms. Numerous actors active in the French Muslim 
landscape accused UOIF leaders of becoming “emissaries 
of the state” in the case of the delegation to Baghdad13 and 
“police oﬃcers of French Islam” in the case of the anti-riot 
fatwa.14 In the two instances, UOIF leaders were presented 
by their Muslim detractors as anticipating the state’s 
demands and serving the government’s interests.15 Most of 
these detractors, nonetheless, shared with UOIF activists 
a revivalist understanding of Islam and engaged with them 
in dynamics of co-operation and competition (Parvez 
2017). Ultimately, in ways similar to those explored by 
Khalil in this collection, these intra-community criticisms 
underscored the delicate issue of Islamic authority-building 
in minority contexts, whether from top-down mechanisms 
or bottom-up processes.
13   Interview with Fouad Alaoui, La Courneuve, 2016.
14   See the editorial piece “La ‘fatwa’ hallucinante de l’UOIF” published on the Muslim website, www.oumma.com, 7 November 2005.
15   Interview with D., Paris, 2016.
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What makes “Muslim representatives” representative?
Public policy attempts to build Muslim representation in France
Fatima Khemilat, Sciences Po Aix
The question of Muslim representation in France has 
been a recurrent issue in the French political debate 
since the late 1980s. Already present during the first 
“headscarf controversy”, both the media and the political 
class raised the question of who can and should speak 
on behalf of Muslims. It was then that the first attempt 
was made to organize the representation of Muslims in 
France. Until then, the Great Mosque of Paris had been 
the obvious institution public authorities turned to with 
questions regarding the Muslim community. However, the 
proliferation of Muslim associations led the State to widen 
the spectrum of potential representatives of Islam.
Pierre Joxe, then a member of the Socialist Party 
government, launched the first attempt to organize 
Islam in France (notwithstanding previous institutions 
in colonized territories) when he founded the Conseil 
de Réflexion sur l’Islam de France (CORIF). The relative 
return to power of the right wing during the “Cohabitation” 
(coalition government of 1993-1995) somewhat 
interrupted this initiative, as the Great Mosque of Paris 
took center stage again in the relations between Islam and 
the State. It took a few more years and another coalition 
government, this time in favor of the left wing, under 
Jacques Chirac’s presidency, for the process to be taken 
up. In the late 90s Jean-Pierre Chevènement started the 
“Ishtichara”, an extensive consultation of French Muslims. 
This resulted in the creation of the Conseil Français du 
Culte Musulman (CFCM) in 2003 under the leadership of 
Nicolas Sarkozy, then Minister of the Interior. 
However, the establishment of the CFCM, under intense 
criticism since its founding, did not put to rest the 
controversies related to the organization of Islam in 
France. Some of its critics question its eﬀectiveness or 
lack of funding, while others highlight the tensions that 
exist between the Federations of the CFCM, each of 
them connected, loosely, to a diﬀerent foreign country. 
In the face of the CFCM’s dysfunctions, in part due to its 
funding mechanism, another organization was resuscitated 
during François Hollande’s presidency. The Fondation des 
Oeuvres de l’Islam was created in 2005 when Dominique 
de Villepin was the Prime Minister and renamed for the 
occasion to Fondation de l’Islam de France (FIF). Hollande 
chose to appoint at its head the aforementioned Jean-
Pierre Chevènement, historical figure in the organization 
of Islam. This choice to name a non-Muslim as leader of 
the FIF raised protests and was the opportunity to (re)
interrogate the legitimacy of the State in picking the 
representatives of Islam in France. 
A survey conducted in 2016 by the Think Tank “Institut 
Montaigne” concluded that two-thirds of French Muslims 
were unaware of the very existence of the CFCM, supposed 
to represent them. The author of this survey, Hakim 
El Karoui, is a member of the Fondation de l’Islam de 
France and one of Emmanuel Macron’s close advisors in 
the elaboration of a new public policy on Islam in France 
which was announced in January 2018. Topics such as the 
fundings of places of worship, the training of imams and 
the influence of countries of origin are, unsurprisingly, 
at the heart of this new initiative. Like his predecessors, 
Emmanuel Macron seemingly wants to act quick, since 
the upcoming reform is scheduled for this year. He will 
be surrounded in his eﬀorts by Gérald Darmanin, current 
Minister of Public Accounts, who has argued for “a 
French Islam”, as well as Gilles Kepel, an Arabist expert 
several governments have turned to for advice, who many 
Muslims consider openly hostile to the consideration of 
issues which matter to them such as Islamophobia.
These top-down initiatives intended to build a 
representation for French Muslims are perceived by many 
Muslim associations as unwanted interferences in matters of 
worship and as attempts to control and infantilize Muslims 
inherited from colonial institutions. Among the Muslim 
leaders who share this feeling, Marwan Muhammad, the 
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charismatic former spokesman for the Collective Against 
Islamophobia in France (CCIF), decided in May 2018 to 
launch an online consultation of Muslims initiated by civil 
society. To carry it out, he called for the support of former 
president of the CFCM Anouar Kbibech but was denied. 
Thus, it was on his own and without institutional support 
that he published on May 9th an article in Le Monde, in 
which he exposed his approach as follows: 
“The successive Ministers of the Interior each chose 
their spokespeople for Islam by royal decree, dismissing 
entirely the principle of secularism, and Muslims have 
had to resign to it. [...] The authorities have appointed 
representatives from Algeria, Morocco and Turkey 
at the head of the institutions, and Muslims, who are 
annoyed, weary and disillusioned, have come to give up 
on expecting anything from them anymore.”
The lack of legitimacy of the CFCM finds its source in the 
“choice” of the voting system by the public authorities. 
Unlike in Belgium or Austria, members of the Council 
are not elected by direct suﬀrage but by an obscure voting 
system linked to the number of square meters per place 
of worship. This decision stems from the need to make 
the results of the election “predictable” to guarantee the 
monopoly of the Federations, themselves close to the 
emigration countries of the first generation of Muslim 
immigrants. The Great Mosque of Paris has links with 
Algeria, the Rassemblement des Musulmans de France 
(RMF) and the Unions des Mosquées de France (UMF) are 
close to Morocco, and the former Union des Organisations 
Islamiques de France (UOIF), now renamed Musulmans 
de France, is known for its connections with the Muslim 
Brotherhood (see Margot Dazey’s essay in this collection).
The choice of the president of the CFCM was made from the 
very beginning, according to Dounia Bouzar, one of the only 
women of the institution at the time; she spoke up against 
the colonial implications of his selection from the top:
“Sarkozy spoke to me about Boubakeur (the current 
chairman of the Great Mosque of Paris) as the leader of 
my troops. He was telling me: ‘Follow the leader of your 
troops.’ It was a sort of Concordat, remixed with a hint of 
the good old colonial management, kind of like: ‘we get the 
Arabs to speak to the Arabs.’” 
Dounia Bouzar interrogates, in her own words, the 
supposed target audience of the “representatives” of Islam. 
Margot Dazey’s essay in this collection illustrates the 
way religion is expected to function as a social mediator. 
The representatives of Islam are expected to speak to 
the Muslim community, with the purpose to maintain 
order and preach the values of the Republic. In this 
context, Islam is understood and presented by the actors 
themselves as a factor of social cohesion. The Muslim 
representatives would be presented this way to the Muslim 
community, especially to encourage order and “preach the 
good word”, Republican moreover. The Muslim religious 
fact is then understood and presented by the actors 
themselves, as a factor of social cohesion.
But does it also work the other way around? Do Islamic 
religious institutions formulate specific demands, and do 
they lobby in the interest of the Muslim community? On 
paper, this level of representation is part of the CFCM’s 
mission, which, according to its statutes, is “to defend the 
dignity and interests of the Muslim religion in France by all 
legal means.”
However, it would be a mistake to believe that the 
relationship between the government and the Muslim 
religious authorities is a bilateral one with no other parties 
involved. This would imply that their relations take place 
behind closed doors, which is only true in part, as most of 
the attempts to organize Islam in France are made in plain 
sight.
Islamic representation in France is frequently put on 
the political agenda, especially after terrorist incidents. 
Rather than bringing the Muslim community’s needs 
and grievances before the public authorities, it seems to 
serve the purpose of representing and promoting a certain 
vision of Islam deemed acceptable by authorities, as well 
as reassuring the general French population. Following 
a terrorist attack, many public declarations are made 
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regarding the organization of Islam, which unavoidably 
establishes a connection between Muslim representation 
and terrorism. 
The decree dated June 25th, 2018 is consistent with this 
understanding of the current context. In it, regional 
authorities are tasked with organizing by September 15th, 
2018, the “territorial conferences of Islam in France.” 
Gérard Collomb, Minister of the Interior, states that he 
“wish[es], in these times when our society is faced with 
radical Islamist movements that challenge the values of 
our Republic, and even call for the perpetration of terrorist 
attacks on our territory, to amplify the voices of the vast 
majority of Muslims in France.” Representative positions 
must be understood as authorizations to speak in the name 
of all Muslims. What is being requested here is for some 
voices to be heard louder than others. The oﬃcials of the 
state are the ones who get to decide whose voices should 
be heard. 
It is up to the regional authorities to “identify who should 
be invited to participate,” or, in other words, to select 
their partners for dialogue. This selection must consider 
the necessity to “represent the whole diversity of French 
Muslims” by including “diverse, younger voices and more 
women” and “successful people from the civil society, 
whether in the economic, cultural or artistic fields.” Indeed, 
the Board of Directors of the CFCM, which is composed 
of over 200 members, doesn’t include a single woman. In 
the past two years however, the Council founded three 
informal institutions for dialogue with women, young 
people, and converts. They are only advisory bodies with 
no decision-making power or legal existence, but they 
illustrate the consideration given to external injunctions to 
include Muslim women in the representative structures. 
What is framed as openness promoted by the French 
public authorities towards “Muslim civil society” is 
nevertheless immediately conditioned: to be allowed 
participation in the process, Muslim stakeholders have to 
pledge allegiance by acknowledging the “primacy of the 
laws and values of the Republic.” The idea of including 
women and young people in the oﬃcial representation 
of Islam in France, who were until then absent from 
the representation of Muslims in France, is increasingly 
admitted. However, representation of the multiplicity of 
Muslims in France, including of the most rigorist branches 
(e.g. salafism, tabligh, etc.), is not being envisioned. 
Thus, the institutions of French Islam were not designed 
to be representative of the actual Muslim population 
and reflect its diversity in terms of race, gender, age, 
occupation, origin or sect. Rather they are intended to 
promote a “good Islam” in a normative, prescriptive 
sense. The members of the CFCM themselves understand 
this, which is why its statutes mention that its purpose is 
“the representations of Muslim places of worship to the 
public authorities,” and not the representation of Muslim 
individuals. During an interview with Dalil Boubakeur, 
I asked him if he believed himself to be representative 
of Muslims in France, to which he replied: “I am 
representative of tomorrow’s Muslims.”
The question of representation has long divided the field 
of social science at a time when it is still diﬃcult to clarify 
what the role of a representative is. In The Concept of 
Representation, Hannah F. Pitkin highlights four types of 
political representation, drawing distinction between what 
she calls “substantive representation” and “symbolic” or 
“descriptive” representation. Substantive representation 
amounts to representing the interests of certain parts of 
the population without considering the representative’s 
own personal attitudes. This is what Pitkin calls “acting 
for”. Descriptive representation, on the other hand, is to 
give a voice to those who voted for the representative. 
Thus, the representative must be and act like them. This 
is also known as “mirror” representation or “standing 
for” in which the diﬀerent institutions of representation 
should represent society in its entire diversity (e.g. gender, 
ethnicity, sexual orientation, occupation, etc.). 
Once applied to Islam in French society, the questions 
that arise are: What type of representation do Muslim 
representatives carry out? Is their role to embody Muslims’ 
sociological diversity or various specific interests instead? 
Based on research findings, none of the two main types 
of representation are performed by Muslim institutions, 
beginning with the CFCM. This is likely the main reason 
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the CFCM lacks legitimacy and popularity within its 
Muslim constituency (see Institut Montaigne, 2016).
Descriptive representation:
The semi-structured interviews we conducted with 
the leaders of various Muslim associations in France 
enabled us to highlight a number of shared recurring 
characteristics. Namely, they were born abroad in North 
Africa, Turkey or Sub-Saharan Africa; they emigrated to 
France in order to pursue their university careers; they 
hold postgraduate degrees in scientific subjects; they now 
hold prestigious positions in their respective fields and 
they are all over 50 years old. Moreover, the leaders also 
share that they do not have any university-level theological 
training, with their religious education being based on 
what was included in their regular school curriculum. 
However, several of them pursued more advanced religious 
education later in a self-taught or informal manner.
It is more diﬃcult to establish a portrait of the ordinary 
Muslim in France. In contrast with essentialist stereotypes, 
Muslims present a great diversity, and it is challenging 
to account for this in France because ethnic statistics 
are forbidden by law. Thus, large-scale census figures 
are unavailable for the purpose of identifying the main 
characteristics of Muslims in France. Nevertheless, some 
studies can provide insight into the dominant trends. For 
instance, the survey conducted by Claude Dargent or 
“Trajectoires et origines” (TeO survey) reveals: a slight 
overrepresentation of men in the Muslim community, 
a young population (under 40), three-fourths of whom 
work in the tertiary sector or elsewhere, with low level 
qualifications or in areas of low value. The representation 
of Muslims in France thus suﬀers from the same biases as 
the representation of other segments of the population, 
namely, over-representation of men, with above-average 
cultural and economic capital, and with dominant status 
in the spectrum of social positions. However, the striking 
fact is that whilst most Muslims in France were born in 
French territory, all the leaders of the Muslim French 
federations were not, which may raise questions about 
cultural diﬀerences or even indicate a gap between the 
socialization of Muslim representatives and that of most 
French Muslims.
Substantive representation: 
We could say that the interests of the Muslim community 
are poorly represented. First of all, because of the lack 
of representation of Muslim religious diversity (e.g. 
tabligh, Salafism). In addition, our qualitative surveys 
allow us to identify the existence of a certain number of 
Muslim issues or causes, understood as issues that would 
concern Muslims more than the rest of the population. 
These causes include mainly Islamophobia and foreign 
policy issues, such as the situation in Palestine or Syria. 
Yet, representatives of the Muslim faith, in an attempt to 
please French public authorities, speak very little about 
these sensitive issues. Marwan Mohammed (CCIF), on 
the other hand, chose Islamophobia as his battle ground 
and was thus able to make a name for himself by tackling 
this vexed issue. However, not many people answered the 
online consultation he launched (approximatively 30, 000). 
Does this mean that this type of large-scale survey does 
not unite Muslims (for structural or logistical reasons, for 
example) or that French Muslims simply do not wish to be 
represented?
If the latter is true, it might be the sign of a “politics 
of refusal” (Hall), materialized here by an “empty 
chair” strategy. The absence of institutions that entitle 
representatives “to speak legitimately on their behalf” 
allows many people to express their own opinions about 
Islam without being specialists or Muslims themselves. 
In this context, Muslims themselves are the ones spoken 
for but few or none of them are in fact the ones speaking, 
which can lead to frustration and foster feelings of political 
alienation. 
If the future of Muslims’ representation in France will likely 
include more women and more young people, the question 
of who is representative of Muslims today, however, 
remains unresolved.
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The Hajj from a French perspective: 
The eﬀects of the pilgrimage on collective identities 
Leila Seurat, European University Institute
The Hajj, the pilgrimage that brings millions of Muslims 
to Mecca every year, has transformed significantly since 
the end of the 1980s. Mass transportation, the increase in 
world population, and the organization of tour groups have 
facilitated the journey to Mecca. In just half a century, the 
number of pilgrims has increased from 60,000 in 1946 to 
more than three million in 2017. To regulate this enormous 
flow, in 1989 Saudi Arabia imposed a strict regulation of 
the Hajj: in Muslim countries, a quota of 1 pilgrim per 
1,000 inhabitants was imposed, while in non-Muslim 
countries there is no fixed quota.
Approximately 100,000 Europeans citizens now make 
the pilgrimage annually, a huge increase reflecting both 
immigration and conversion.1 Fewer than 3,000 Muslims 
made the journey from France in 1986. The number has now 
more than doubled, from 10,000 in 2010 to 20,000 in 2012. 
The sociological profile of the pilgrims has also evolved, 
being increasingly young and French.2 While often travelling 
with their parents, they are less and less familiar with their 
family’s country of origin. They share an individualistic 
approach to their religious practices and beliefs.3 
My research participates in two academic debates. The 
first of these is related to globalization and citizenship. 
1    In Great Britain the number of pilgrims has increased consistently since the 1960s with approximately 23,000 pilgrims visiting these holy sites each 
year..“The Hajj and Europe” by Eileen Kane, Origins, vol.19, issue 12, September 2016, http://origins.osu.edu/print/4159
2   In 2014, and for the first time, more French citizens performed the Hajj compared to foreign residents. Among the 20,000 pilgrims travelling from 
France, 60% were French, when they has been only 30% at the beginning of the 1990s. Oﬃcial sources. 
3   Jean-Pierre Bastian, François Champion, Kathy Rousselet, (dir.), La globalisation du religieux, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2001  ; Thomas Luckmann, « 
Transformations of religion and morality in modern Europe », in La religion invisible, Social Compass, (2003-09) vol. 50, n. 3, p. 267-343.
4   For Anthony Giddens, the interpenetration of the local and the global leads to a weakening of social relations and decreases the importance of the 
territory as a source of identification, Anthony Giddens, Les conséquences de la modernité, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1999.
5   Saskia Sassen, « Cracked casings. Notes towards an analytics for studying transnational processes », in Ludger Pries (dir.), New Transnational Social 
Spaces. International Migration and Transnational Companies in the Early Twenty-First Century, Londres et New York, 2001, Routledge, p. 187-207 ; 
Danièle Hervieu-Léger, « Crise de l’universel et planétarisation culturelle : les paradoxes de la « mondialisation » religieuse », in Jean- Pierre Bastian, 
François Champion, Kathy Rousselet, (dir.), Op. cit.
6   Steven Vertovec uses the notion of “transnational identity”, Steven Vertovec, Transnationalism, London, New York, Routledge, 2009.
7   Florence Bergeau-Blackler, Le marché Halal ou l’invention d’une tradition, Paris, Le Seuil, 2017.
8   Laurence R. Iannacone and Roger Finke, A Supply-Side Reinterpretation of the Secularization of Europe, Journal of the Scientific Study of Religion, 
Vol.33, n.3, (Sept 1994), pp.230-252 ; Laurence Iannacone and Roger Finke, Supply-Side Explanations for Religious Change, The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, vol.527, Religion in the Nineties (May, 1993), pp.27-39.
Some consider that the intensification in migration 
has threatened the state, destabilized its territory and 
decreased national belongings4. Yet, others have shown 
that the blurring of territorial state borders has led to the 
strengthening of a national frame and local identification.5 
Following this second trend, I argue that the Hajj increases 
the pilgrims’ national belonging. By traveling with a group 
of national companions with no ethnic diversity, the pilgrim 
re-experiences a French sociability in Saudi Arabia. The 
concept of “transnational identity”6 reveals the diversity of 
spaces in which the changing identification emerges.
The second debate concerns the link between 
neoliberalism and religion. If there continues to be 
agreement that the former increases the latter, there is no 
consensus on its eﬀects on believers. Contrary to the thesis 
arguing that the religious market strengthens a “Salafi 
norm”7, this article shows that the Hajj market prevents 
the creation of a homogeneous group around the same 
ideological trend. Rather, this pilgrimage confirms that 
economic competition leads to religious diversity.8
This paper is based on written and statistical sources as 
well as participant observation both in France and in Saudi 
Arabia between 2016 and 2018. In France, 60 interviews 
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were conducted from August 2016 to August 2017, with a 
wide range of actors: pilgrims, directors of travel agencies 
(accredited and non-accredited), institutional actors 
(Ministry of the Interior, Tourism and Foreign Aﬀairs, 
diplomatic personnel). In Saudi Arabia, I conducted two 
diﬀerent fieldtrips: one based on participant observation 
during the Hajj season in August 2017 and another during 
Spring 2018 in Jeddah where I conducted interviews with 
Saudi actors implicated in the organization of the Hajj. 
The Hajj and collective identities
What eﬀects does the Hajj have on collective identities? 
By presenting itself as the expression of a strong religious 
identification, does the Hajj lead to a decrease in national 
belongings? What role does the market play in collective 
identities? Does re-Islamization through the economic 
field reinforce the prevalence of a fundamentalist norm? 
Both the organization of the Hajj and the Hajj market 
appear to impact collective identities by reinforcing 
national belongings and promoting diversified groups 
around diﬀerent ideological trends. The two hypotheses 
testify to the importance of institutions and organizations 
contributing to the formation of collective identities.9
By oﬀering a form of socialization outside the nation, 
participation in this pilgrimage contributes to the concept 
of “re-Islamization” and the shifting of “ethno-national 
citizenship”10 beyond the Wesphalian paradigm.11 The 
Hajj also oﬀers us the opportunity to examine the role of 
the market on collective identities: by organizing the tour, 
putting together the group and choosing the appropriate 
guide, the travel agencies are key actors re-configurating 
the pilgrims’ belongings. Far from being simple 
9   In accordance with the assumption of the relevant literature, the impact of institutions may follow logics of appropriateness (W.R Scott, Institutions 
and Organizations, Thousand Oaks, Sage, 2001), by way of socialization or the reference to cognitive scripts (DiMaggio and Powell, The New 
Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1991). The claim that institutions contribute to shape identities 
necessarily relates to the broader debate about the origins of collective identities that opposes primordialists, instrumentalists and constructivists (A. 
Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond, in World Politics (53), April 2001).
10   Jean-François Bayart, L’Illusion identitaire, Paris, Fayard, 1996.
11   Peter Beyer insists on the necessity to go beyond the Westphalian model to read the « new arrangments » between nationhood and citizenship, Peter 
Beyer, “Questioning the secular/religious divide in a post-Westphalian world”, International Sociology 28(6), pp.663-679, 2013.
12   Frederic Barth showed that a group is often formed by external frontiers and languages are majors cultural marks to read groups formation; see F. Barth, 
Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Diﬀerence, Bergen/Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1969.
commercial transactions, these agencies participate in 
the circulation of immaterial goods impacting the beliefs’ 
systems of the pilgrims. 
The Hajj strengthens religious belongings. On their return, 
pilgrims increase their religious practices by reading surahs 
of the Quran on public transports, adding recitations 
(dhikr), invocations (du’at) or supererogatory fasts. If 
common sense leads us to believe that the Hajj is a threat 
to national belonging because it reinforces religious ties, I 
argue that reinforcing religiosity doesn’t mean a decrease 
in national belongings. 
Saudi Arabia’s organization of the Hajj is built on 
nationalities. If you reside in France, for example, you 
are obliged to travel from France. This particular rule 
has important implications in terms of identifications: 
during your stay, you are always in the company of fellow 
nationals. Thus, contrary to the tendency to think that 
the Hajj transforms pilgrims’ identities by placing them 
with strangers or people from diﬀerent backgrounds, 
the purpose here is to show the opposite. While pilgrims 
undergo a change, but this change is not related to an 
ethnic or cultural sociability with the Umma, but more 
to the contacts with their French fellows. This collective 
experience strengthens their national identity vis-à-vis 
Saudi Arabia and pilgrims from other countries also for 
reasons of language. Indeed, for those who wish to meet 
the Saudi locals during the few chances they have (going 
to the Great Mosque, shopping in Medina), there tends 
to be language barriers for French pilgrims because 
many don’t speak Arabic. This lack of knowledge has an 
important impact on the way the pilgrim is being perceived 
by others and the way he perceives himself, stimulating or 
reactivating his sense of national belonging.12 Alongside 
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the literature dedicated to Pentecostalism in Africa or 
Latin America, which claims that religious tourism can 
build national identifications outside the nation,13 the Hajj 
eﬀectively consolidates a group of nationals. 
Contrary to the assumption that a group confronted 
by other nationalities automatically increases its 
cohesiveness,14 group consolidation doesn’t imply any 
decrease in its internal divisions. While the Hajj maintains 
the cohesion of a group of nationals, pre-existing internal 
divisions remain.
The first cleavage is generational. Even if the young and the 
old pilgrims travel together—and sometimes the young 
teach the old how to perform the rituals correctly (e.g. 
cutting hair at the right moment or picking up rocks no 
bigger than chickpeas for the Jamarat)—it is clear that there 
is a huge breaking point between them. This generational 
gap, which often appears before traveling when parents 
show their dissatisfaction seeing their children travel so 
soon, is reactivated during the pilgrimage when the young 
enter into conflicts with their parents. A lot of pilgrims say 
that the presence of their parents ruined their Hajj, with 
parents wanting constant attention whereas they needed 
to focus on their prayers. These conflicts, particularly 
problematic since the Hajj itself prohibits jidal,15 confirm 
the claim that Islam has increasingly disconnected from 
culture and in particular its culture of origins. This 
“standard Islam” has to be seen as a pure expression of 
globalization, leading to a new form of relations between 
religions, territories, societies and states.16
A second cleavage separates the young pilgrims. Sleeping 
the third night of the three Tachriq days17 in Mina is a 
13   Laurent Fourchard, André Mary et René Otayek, (dir.), Entreprises religieuses transnationales en Afrique de l’Ouest, Paris, Karthala, 2005. The traditional 
divide between local, national and global has sparked an important number of debates in particular in the United States since the begining of the 1990s. 
See M. Kearney, « The local and the Global: The Anthropology of Globalization and Transnationalism, Annual Review of Anthropology, vol. 24, 1995, p. 
547-565.
14   Donald Forbes and his contact hypothesis, see Forbes, Ethnic Conflict: Commerce, Culture and the Contact Hypothesis, New Haven, Ct, Yale, 
University Press, 1997.
15   Jidal is a discussion that leads to conflict.
16   Olivier Roy, La Sainte ignorance : le temps de la religion sans culture, Paris, Seuil, 2008.
17   The 11, 12 and 13th days of Dhu al-hijja.
18   In the Summer 2018 and for the first time, the Saudi authorities have decided to give the Hajj accreditation to new travel agencies. The number of 
these agencies diﬀers according to the sources but is around 25. 
point that is often discussed: if there is no obligation to 
sleep the third night, some would stick to the example of 
the prophet (Sunna) and stay while others will leave Mina, 
preferring to return to their lodgings in Azizia or to go and 
sleep under the Kabaa. If one were tempted to read these 
diﬀerences following the diﬀerent trends of Islam, no clear 
evidence confirms a relationship between ideology and 
practices. On the contrary, my observations show that it 
is impossible to establish a link between these choices and 
a clear ideological family. The distinct categories, often 
used by scholars but also by individuals themselves such as 
Muslim Brotherhood or Salafi, are not always eﬀective for 
reading the complex and conflicting religious belongings of 
a single Muslim. By putting someone in such a category the 
major risk is to ignore the fact that religious identifications 
always evolves. 
A competitive market governed by profit rather than 
ideology
In France, as in the rest of Europe, the Saudi authorities 
have organized participation in the pilgrimage according 
to a particular regulation: in 2006 a Hajj accreditation was 
distributed to 43 travel agencies, oﬃcially allowing them to 
sell and organize packages to participate in the pilgrimage. 
Each agency received a diﬀerent number of visas: some 
benefited from a huge number of visas (more than 1,000), 
others a small quota (only 100).18 In recent years, young 
entrepreneurs have opened up new agencies to deal with 
the growing demand. Having similar preferences and 
being closer in age with the pilgrims, they are successfully 
competing with the traditional accredited Hajj agencies led 
by the older generations. 
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Most of the time, the pilgrim does not have a direct 
relationship with an accredited agency, and instead passes 
through a non-accredited young agency to buy his journey. 
These existing intermediaries have made the Hajj package 
more expensive in France than in other European countries, 
with an estimate of around 5,500 euros. With these high 
costs of participation in mind, the attraction of French youth 
to the holy sites19 can be seen as the result of globalization 
and the emergence of a Muslim middle class born and 
educated in France. It confirms that the increase in the 
standard of living does not necessarily weaken religious 
aﬃliation, as the theory of modernization suggests.
The accreditation system imposed in 2005 has profoundly 
changed the Hajj market. Only these 43 actors are 
theoretically allowed to sell a Hajj package.20 Far from 
this oﬃcial rule, the reality of the market is diﬀerent: 
aside these accredited agencies directed by the older 
generations,21 new agencies run by young entrepreneurs 
more familiar with the young pilgrims’ preferences have 
emerged. Using an Islamic ethos and adapting their 
strategies to their clients,22 they are challenging the 
traditional agencies.23 
The Internet has become a major tool for this new 
generation, active in social networks and using marketing 
language. It appears to provide significant support for 
the religious market, confirming that re-Islamization is a 
product of globalization and that religious communities 
are becoming religious enterprises capable of transmitting 
the values of ultra-liberalism.24 Without being accredited, 
these agencies are able to sell and organize packages to 
participate in the Hajj. Most of the time they buy the 
19   Either the Hajj or the ‘Umrah, the small pilgrimage. While the ‘Umrah is not an act of religious obligation and can be performed in Mecca at any time 
of the year, the Hajj has to be carried out once a year, at the same place and the same time.
20   During Summer 2018, 25 new agencies received accreditation (number not confirmed by oﬃcials).
21   Among the 43 accredited agencies I have mentionned, only two were managed by young entrepreneurs: Oscar Voyage and Arianne.
22   Nathalie Luca and Rémy Madinier (dir), “L’entrepreneur religieux”, Les archives des sciences sociales des religions, no.175, Novembre 2016.
23   Sean McLoughlin has also noticed this double trend in the case of Great Britain. New agencies are no longer based on ethnic cleavages like the old 
ones. Although they represent a small but growing and competing segment in the Hajj market, this evolution seems to reflect “the hybridisation of a 
post-Islamist cultural turn towards consumerism”, Sean McLoughlin,”Organizing Hajj-going from contemporary Britain: A changing industry, Pilgrim 
Markets and the Politics of Recognition, in Porter V. and Said L (eds) Hajj: Golobal Interactions Through Pilgrimage, Leiden, Sidestone Press and 
Rijksmuseum Volkenkunde, pp.41-64, 2013.
24   Olivier Roy insists on this ability to transmit the values of liberalism through social networks.
visa from the accredited agency and create their own 
package. This illegal trade of visas, supposedly free, is 
concluded through a “deal” between the accredited and 
non-accredited agency, two types of actors dependent 
on the same system: the first has the visa and the second 
has the clients. Thus, the Saudi organization has created a 
dysfunctional configuration where the accredited agencies 
are obliged to establish multiples partnerships with non-
accredited agencies. Ignoring ideology, this collaborative 
business model allows for confessional diversity within the 
group and a wide range of diﬀerent dogmas. 
The circulation of the guides: how profit dominates 
ideology
Hajj management generates arrangements between 
accredited and non-accredited agencies that collaborate to 
gain more profit, disregarding religious preferences. If the 
non-accredited are more active on the Internet, oﬀering 
eﬀective products, they also oﬀer opportunities to travel 
with prestigious religious figures known to young people. 
These figures, who follow the group and give religious 
classes during the Hajj can also be very active on social 
networks, posting on Facebook live, for example, during 
their tour in Mecca and Medina. But again, looking in 
detail at the guide’s route reveals the neglect of ideology in 
this market. Indeed, the guide doesn’t necessarily follow 
a non-accredited agency managed by his companions but 
travels with the agency oﬀering the best deal. It appears 
that these well-known young preachers circulate easily 
between diﬀerent agencies, both traditional and new. For 
instance, Youssef Abou Anas and Brahim Abou Talha, two 
famous preachers from the well-known Salafi association 
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“la Voie droite” were both in partnership with non-
accredited agencies before turning back to working with 
accredited agencies. The logic of markets is predominant 
among religious figures who go for the best oﬀer following 
economical rules rather than depending on an “Islamic 
norm”. These men preserve their autonomy and can, 
when they wish, decide to change agencies, adding to 
competition.
Rather than familiarizing the pilgrims with another culture 
or with the larger Muslim community, as common sense 
would suggest, the Hajj reinforces the pilgrim’s sense of 
national belonging. As managed by the Saudis, the Hajj 
is built on nationalities and doesn’t facilitate meetings 
among foreigners, due to minimal opportunities and 
language barriers as previously noted. Analyzing the 
pilgrims’ identifications also means taking a look at the 
market. If the Saudis have oﬃcially given accreditation 
to only a few actors, non-accredited travel agencies also 
govern this market with a diﬀerent brand of Islam. This 
particular management generates arrangements between 
accredited and non-accredited agencies, which collaborate 
to gain greater profits. The French authorities have also let 
a number of unoﬃcial intermediaries gain further profit 
through a black market, considering the Hajj as a religious 
aﬀair. This specific configuration doesn’t permit any 
homogeneous group based on ideology. The more liberal 
aspect of the market also follows this idea of a confessional 
diversity within the groups. If we look at the guides, it 
appears that these well-known young preachers circulate 
easily between diﬀerent agencies, both traditional and new. 
I have shown that the Hajj keeps nationals all together, 
although they may have diﬀerent ideological orientations. 
This can be explained by the particular regulation of the 
market and the market itself. However, valid though this 
is for the Hajj, this still needs to be tested for the ‘Umrah 
which has a diﬀerent configuration and might therefore 
be diﬀerent in terms of group-making and collective 
identities. 
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Constraining Muslim Mobilizations in France:
Symbolic Repression and Disqualification as Demobilization Practices
Julien Talpin, National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS)
French secular and color-blind political culture has 
made it diﬃcult for Muslims to organize on the 
basis of religious identities without being labeled as 
“communitarian.”, i.e. to be seen as sectarian, self-
segregating and divisive for the French Republic. Despite 
a long tradition of Catholic organizing where the question 
of “laïcité” or secularism was rarely raised,1 Muslim 
organizing is frequently presented as a threat to the 
French secular model. In this paper I investigate the ways 
in which local government and the press constrain the 
mobilization of Muslim groups in France. I focus on the 
city of Roubaix near the Belgian border where Muslims 
are numerically over-represented and concentrated. I 
show that repression and control of collective action 
takes the form of what I term symbolic disqualification, 
repressing political action by labeling these actors 
negatively as “communitarian” or “proselytes”. Symbolic 
disqualification also has a more material embodiment, 
limiting the types of financial resources available for 
organizing to fight discrimination. These subtle and 
infra-political constraints to collective action have to 
be understood within a broader history of relationships 
between the French state and ethno-racial minorities, 
where the latter have often been co-opted by the local 
political field, limiting most forms of contention. These 
diﬀerent elements explain the relative weakness of 
1   See Duriez (B.), Fouilloux (E.), Pelletier (D.), eds., Les catholiques dans la République, 1905-2005, Paris, Éditions de l’Atelier ; Pagis (J.), « La politisation 
d’engagements religieux. Retour sur une matrice de l’engagement en mai 68 », Revue Française de science politique, 60 (1), p. 61-89. 
2   See Talpin, F. Frégosi, J. O’Miel (eds.), L’islam et la cité : engagements musulmans dans les quartiers populaires, Lille, Presses du Septentrion, 2017.
3   See from this perspective  Cinalli (M.), Giugni (M.), “Political opportunities, citizenship models and political claimmaking over Islam”, Ethnicities, 13 
(2), 2013, p. 147-16. 
4  Cf. Donnet (C.) « Une mosquée pour exister. Le militantisme de jeunes musulmans strasbourgeois », Archives de sciences sociales des religions, 2013, 
162 (2), p. 219-234 ; E. Pingaud “Entrepreneurs islamiques et mobilisations de musulmans dans les quartiers populaires » in J. Talpin et al. (dir.), L’islam 
et la cité, op. cit. ; N. Fuchs, « Nouvelle manière de vivre la foi musulmane et militantisme des descendants d’immigrés nord-africains dans la cité du Val-
Fourré », in J. Talpin et al. (dir.), L’islam et la cité, op. cit. 
5   D. Della Porta, H. Reiter (eds.), Policing Protest The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota 
Press, 1998.
6   See nevertheless C., Davenport, How Social Movements Die: Repression and Demobilization of the Republic of New Africa, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014; J. Talpin, « Une répression à bas bruit. Comment les élus étouﬀent les mobilisations dans les quartiers populaires », 
Métropolitiques, 2016. http://www.metropolitiques.eu/Une-repression-a-bas-bruit-Comment.html 
Muslim mobilizations against discriminations in the 
French context.2
Content analysis of the press at the national level may 
help investigate the forms that disqualification of Muslim 
mobilizations can take.3 But such methodological 
approaches only focus on the most visible groups, those 
who reach national attention, leaving under the radar 
the more ordinary forms of organizing that are the most 
widespread in the French context. A few young scholars 
have carried out research to study such mobilizations 
at the local level.4 Few point out, however, the symbolic 
and material constraints such groups face in their 
attempts to organize the Muslim population. While 
the social movement scholarship has emphasized the 
role of repression in the dynamics of contention,5 more 
systematic attention should be paid to the less dramatic 
and non-violent forms of repression that also shape the 
possibilities of organizing but often remain under the 
radar of the social sciences.6 This is one of the goals of 
my ethnographic study in Roubaix that focuses more 
broadly on the transformations of poor people organizing 
and mobilizations. This research is based on a seven-
year ethnographic study, direct observation of collective 
actions, interviews with key actors (activists, elected 
oﬃcials and public servants), and archival work. 
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A heterogeneous local Muslim organizational ecology
I cannot oﬀer here a detailed account of the social, 
demographic, political and religious context in which this 
research takes place. Similarly, it will be diﬃcult to present 
in detail the organizational ecology of Muslim associations 
in the city of Roubaix. It should be stressed, however, that 
Roubaix has an important Muslim population (hard to 
evaluate quantitatively, however), most of whom arrived 
in the 1960s and 1970s after the independence of former 
French colonies, especially from North Africa. This has 
led the city to be negatively labeled as “the Casbah” or “an 
Arabic city” or “the city of the Islamists”.7 The city is also 
infamous for having hosted one of the first French Jihadi 
groups in the 1990s, the Gang of Roubaix, and has often 
been associated with radical Islam. It nowadays counts six 
oﬃcial mosques—with a total capacity of more than 15,000 
seats—which is significant in a city of 95,000 residents. 
One of the mosques gathers Turkish residents. One is 
aﬃliated with the Algerian consulate. Another one—the 
largest—is often labeled as orthodox or ‘Salafi’. Another is, 
in contrast, close to the Jeunes Musulmans de France and 
the Musulmans de France, a national organization inspired 
by the Muslim brotherhood.8 The others are unaﬃliated. 
The context is marked by a relative fragmentation of 
Muslim institutions, despite the creation in 2010 of a 
“Collective of Roubaix Muslims” that has little existence 
apart from organizing the annual Aïd gathering in a 
large open space. The collective as well as most mosques’ 
presidents make little public appearances, rarely reacting 
to the frequent attacks on the city’s Muslim population. 
This might be due to the unique institutional recognition 
that has known the Muslim faith in Roubaix. In a 
rare occurrence in 2002, the municipal council voted 
unanimously, with the exception of the Front National, 
7   For books for helped constructing these stereotypes, see Aziz P., 1996, Le Paradoxe de Roubaix, Paris, Plon ; Guirous L., 2015, Allah est grand, mais la 
République aussi, Paris, J.-C. Lattès ; for a tentative deconstruction see Noyer J., 2013, « Roubaix à l’écran : images et imaginaires d’une ville », pp. 159-
190, in : Noyer J., Paillart I., Raoul B., (eds.), Médias et territoires. L’espace public entre communication et imaginaire territorial, Villeneuve d’Ascq, Presses 
universitaires du Septentrion.
8   See Margot Dazey’s memo on this central organization for French Muslims. 
9   M. David, Mémoire de science politique, Université Lille 2, 2004, p. 134.
10   For similar elements in another context, see Bowen (J. R.), Can Islam be French? Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2010. 
in support of a “schema directeur des lieux de culte”, i.e. 
a framework allowing for significant support from the 
municipal institution for the recognition and development 
of religious institutions. The 1905 law on laïcité does 
not allow local governments to finance directly the 
construction of religious congregations. They can however 
grant, for a symbolic price of 1 euro, a public space for the 
construction of a mosque or any religious building. To 
pass such an ordinance, the municipality had to be highly 
strategic. While the goal was clearly to allow Muslims 
to build decent mosques—allowing them to “move out 
of the basements …”—the ordinance mentions all faith 
traditions present in the city: Buddhists (who also needed 
a new pagoda), Christians, and Catholics, whose churches 
would then be considered as historical patrimony of the 
city and could therefore be restored with public funding. 
The mayor’s advisor, who plaid a key role in the passage 
of the ordinance, explained, “The ordinance was passed 
somehow in ‘contraband’. It moves away from the question 
of laïcité, which by its sacred and transcendental nature 
forbids any real discussion on concrete means, to the 
question of discrimination, emphasizing the issue of 
equal treatment but transforming the very concept of 
equality by introducing special treatments that could be 
seen as aﬃrmative action.”9 This oﬃcial recognition of 
Islam favored the construction, that is for the most part 
still on-going, of four new or larger mosques in the city. 
Absorbed by the exhausting need to find the funds for such 
projects, as well as the relationships created by this oﬃcial 
recognition, the associations running the mosques do not 
appear as important vectors of local-level participation or 
engagement for the Muslim population.10 
On the margins of these religious institutions lay a few 
associations with a more militant tradition. Three of 
them, interconnected and made up of the same small 
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group of activists, play an important role in fighting 
against Islamophobia locally. One is a local radio station, 
Pastel FM, created in the 1980s, that aims at valuing the 
diversity of the cultures of Roubaix’s population, and 
that occasionally organizes shows focusing on Islam, 
inviting imams or activists. The second is Rencontre et 
Dialogue, a space of public education programming, 
oﬀering conferences and meetings around Islam, laïcité, 
and discrimination. Created in the 1990s, it is well known 
for its regularly organized conferences with the renowned 
Swiss Islamologue Tariq Ramadan, once attracting a huge 
crowd. The founder of the NGO is a member of Presence 
Musulmane, the collective created by Tariq Ramadan, and 
one of his close friends (he recently played an important 
role in coordinating the crowd funding to support his 
legal defense). Finally, there is the youth organization, 
Association Nouveau Regard sur la Jeunesse (ANRJ), 
mostly supporting the professional and educational 
integration of Roubaix’s teenagers, as well as civic 
engagement. Indirectly related to Islam, it has, however, 
been the target of recent attacks by the press and the 
municipality due to the supposed religious aﬃliation of 
some of its members (its founder is also the president of 
Rencontre et Dialogue). 
Symbolic disqualification as a demobilizer of Muslim 
activists
While these actors have long endured symbolic attacks, 
I focus here on recent forms of disqualification they have 
faced. In a recent issue, the local newspaper targeted 
ANRJ, implicitly accusing it of Muslim proselytism and 
subtly fostering the ideology of Tariq Ramadan. In an 
article published on October 10, 2017 titled “The politico-
religious mélange des genres of a youth association”, 
the journalist blamed the ANRJ for organizing a buﬀet 
aimed at collecting funds in support of Tariq Ramadan 
in the framework of a conference he was giving in the 
11   In France, community organizations and associations are mostly funded by public institutions (the state and local governments), private foundations 
representing in general only a small share of their budget. This is related to the specific state/civil society relationship in the French context, where the 
state keeps a dominant position. In particular, this financial dependency significantly reduces the autonomy of community organizations. 
12   « La région cesse de soutenir Pastel FM, accusée de prosélytisme », Nord Eclair, 17.12.2017.
13   This per se is not contradictory with the law on laïcité, religious neutrality being only imposed to public servants and state oﬃcials. Thus, the main 
public TV station has organized for decades a show, every sunday morning, to broadcast catholic masses, islamic teachings or other faith traditions. 
region. He also accused the association of collecting food 
for the poor at the time of Ramadan, as well as inviting 
members to share lamb with incarcerated youth from the 
neighborhood. The journalist questioned the legitimacy 
of such actions and the funding of the association by 
public institutions. While he did not directly mention 
the words “laïcité” or “proselytism”, the language of the 
article implies such. ANRJ did not deny organizing such 
events, but stressed in a reply shared on social media that 
they were organized in compliance with the 1905 law, 
stressing that these events were not aimed at supporting 
Tariq Ramadan but, rather, to fund a trip organized by 
the youth members. The association also emphasized 
that similar events had been organized with other actors, 
religious and not religious, including with Catholics, to 
show its open-mindedness. The article has nevertheless 
had a direct impact. The association was supposed to 
meet representatives of the State the next day to discuss 
possible funding, but the meeting was cancelled because 
of the article. The municipality also decided to cut ANRJ’s 
funding and refused to grant use of a public space in a 
municipal building. This contributed to a broader conflict 
related to the ANRJ’s participation in the mobilization 
against an urban renewal project planned by the local 
government.11 This had a direct impact on the activities 
of the association, namely, resulting in the firing of one of 
its staﬀ members due to a lack of funding and, thus, the 
scaling down of its activities.
A few weeks later, the radio station Pastel FM’s funding 
from the regional government was cut too, following a 
charge from the Front National (FN) that it was carrying 
out “religious proselytism” on air.12 This attack was based 
on the fact that imams were regularly invited as guests on 
some radio shows.13 The FN elected oﬃcial noted, “It is 
the first time that the [right wing president of the Region, 
Xavier Bertrand] follows one of our proposals,” indicating 
the growing consensus on the matter among the French 
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political class. The symbolic attacks endured by these 
associations have therefore resulted in direct financial 
impact for them, clearly reducing their organizational 
capacity. An interview conducted with a public servant 
in charge of funding decisions for associations fighting 
discrimination in underprivileged neighborhoods (at 
the Ministère de la Ville and CGET) shows how these 
mechanisms are underpinned by administrative practices: 
“There is a risk for me … I am observed very closely by 
the State, by the delegates of the Prefect, who are not 
necessarily allies (...) They reproach me financing only 
Arabs and Blacks, and Islamo-leftists (...) The bottom line 
is that the delegates of the Prefect do not want to work 
on this issue [the fight against discrimination].”14 Muslim 
activists have not been passive recipients of these attacks, 
delivering responses via social media, mobilizing their 
networks for support, and fighting to keep being active 
on a local level. The number of events organized and the 
audience size has, however, significantly diminished since 
the reduction of the funding. 
Symbolic frames as crucial determinants of minority 
mobilizations
While scholars have rightfully emphasized the role of 
the label “communitarianism” in the disqualification and 
stigmatization of Muslim and ethnic minority organizing 
in France,15 there seems to be an increase in the use and 
significance of the label “proselytism”.16 It is particularly 
fitting as it can be linked, even if misleadingly17, to the 
14   Interview, Lille, July 22nd 2016. This indicates that the French state is not an homogeneous entity, and is marked by internal tensions between diﬀerent 
actors. The public servant quoted here is clearly perceived as an “ally” by muslim associations. 
15   See M. Mohammed, J. Talpin (dir.) Communautarisme ? Paris, PUF, 2018 (forthcoming) ; S. Dufoix, « Nommer l’autre. L’émergence du terme 
communautarisme dans le débat français », Socio, n°7, 2016, p. 163-186  ; F. Dhume, Communautarisme. Enquête sur une chimère du nationalisme 
français, Paris, Démopolis. 
16   While the category of “proselytism” is used at least since the 1990s to (dis)qualify women wearing a headscarf, the novelty of the phenomenon 
described here is the diﬀusion of this framing process to organizations, including those that do not qualify as muslim per se but only count a significant 
number of persons seen as muslims among its members. 
17   J. Baubérot, La laïcité falsifiée, Paris, La Découverte, 2012.
18   https://www.francetvinfo.fr/societe/religion/laicite/la-caf-de-dordogne-suspend-ses-aides-aux-maisons-de-quartier-ouvertes-plus-tard-pendant-le-
ramadan_2786635.html 
19   http://www.liberation.fr/france/2017/08/18/l-agence-du-service-civique-suspend-une-annonce-accusee-d-islamisme_1590702 
20   See http://www.associations-citoyennes.net/?p=9426 ; https://www.la-croix.com/Religion/Laicite/Marlene-Schiappa-veut-soumettre-associations-
charte-laicite-2017-09-25-1200879606 
21   As was the case for Lallab, mentionned earlier, of for the Collectif against Islamophobia in France (CCIF). 
legal framework of the 1905 law on laïcité and, therefore, 
has more than symbolic eﬀects. While I have focused here 
on Roubaix, it seems that a similar phenomenon can be 
observed all over the country. To mention only two recent 
cases, with the first in Dordogne, the Caisse d’Allocations 
Familiales decided to cut funding to two social centers—
about 300,000 euros annually—that were open late at night 
during Ramadan.18 It reproached them for not abiding by 
the principles of “neutrality and laïcité”. Similarly, but for 
a more militant association, the feminist group Lallab was 
denied its application to get “service civiques”, i.e. interns 
partly paid by the state, following an on-line controversy 
where they were accused of being “Islamists”.19 Lallab’s 
president lost her job following this controversy. More 
generally, it becomes more and more frequent to require 
associations to sign a “charte de la laïcité”, as voted on 
by the Ile-de-France region last year and promoted by 
the gender equality minister recently.20 Such initiatives 
contribute to the diﬀusion of an extended version of 
the French 1905 laïcité law, initially created to ensure 
state neutrality but increasingly applied to society and, 
therefore, transforming into a weapon to secularize French 
society. A more systematic survey would be required to 
assess not only the discursive frames used to disqualify 
Muslim organizing, but also its material impact and the 
consequences of such criticisms on the mobilizations 
of the Muslim population in France. While such attacks 
may drive attention to the bigger organizations of the 
field, helping them in recruitment and outreach,21 for 
the smaller and more precarious actors such forms of 
23
THE POLITICS OF ISLAM IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA
symbolic repression often leads to their weakening or 
disappearance.22  While these demobilization practices 
cannot be seen as a coordinated eﬀort by the French 
state, stemming in contrast from various uncoordinated 
actions among local politicians and institutions, it is clear 
that Muslim organizing is not welcomed in the French 
Republic. While many public actors claim the organization 
of French Islam through the top-down creation of oﬃcial 
representatives, such institutionalization should remain 
restricted to religious aﬀairs rather than to the well-
being of French Muslims. Faced with this double bind 
– that Muslims should have representatives but cannot 
exist collectively in the public sphere – French Muslims 
increasingly opt for more personal and individual answers 
to stigmatization rather than for collective action. 
22   On the heterogeneous eﬀects of state repression on social movements mobilizations, see C. Davenport, “ State Repression and Political Order’, Annual 
Review of Political Science,  Volume 10, p 1-23. 
24
Mosques and Political Engagement in Europe and North America
Aubrey Westfall, Wheaton College
As a site closed to non-Muslims and associated with 
foreign leadership, the mosque in Europe and North 
America is regarded with suspicion and the fear that 
terrorist networks and extremist ideologues are using 
them to embed themselves in Western countries. These 
perceptions persist despite the dominant reading of Islamic 
sources that suggests active citizenship within democratic 
society is permissible, even desirable (Peucker, 2018), 
and with many eﬀorts by Muslim leaders to reassure 
their communities. With a desire to better serve their 
community, many Muslim political and civic leaders are 
looking for ways to build institutions that are compatible 
with social integration in Western contexts (Klausen 
2005). As Dazey explains in this collection, these leaders 
seek ways to construct a “civil Islam” through a converging 
agenda shared by state and religious leaders. 
The mosque demonstrates remarkable potential as a 
site for this convergence.1 Though the links between the 
mosque and political or social integration are complicated 
and variable, many states recognize the central nature of 
the mosque and adopt diﬀerent strategies to either control 
mosques or harness their potential for the purposes of the 
state, increasing the sociopolitical integration of resident 
Muslims. The mosque plays a critical role in developing 
social cohesion by linking Muslims to others within 
their community, both inside and outside the religious 
institution. This essay discusses the role of the mosque 
in promoting political integration and engagement in 
Europe and North America, demonstrating commonalities 
in mosque eﬀects even while theorizing areas of critical 
trans-Atlantic diﬀerence. 
Mosques and political behavior in the United States
A well-developed body of research has explored the way 
religious institutions create political communities through 
1   The designation “mosque” can mean diﬀerent things in diﬀerent contexts. Technically mosques are used solely for religious worship. In many Western 
contexts, it is more common for Muslims to be aﬃliated with Islamic centers, which are usually open to the public and include a number of facilities, 
including a mosque. They are therefore often colloquially called mosques. The behavioral survey data illustrated below refers to a “mosque or Islamic 
center” and leaves the interpretation up to the survey respondent. 
helping congregants develop basic civic skills (Brown 
and Brown 2003, Jones-Correa and Leal 2001, Peterson 
1992, Schwadel 2002, Smidt 1999, Verba, Schlozman and 
Brady 1995) and expand their social networks (Putnam 
1993, Putnam 2000, Schwadel 2005). Religious institutions 
also provide a venue through which congregants can get 
information about political issues and discuss public aﬀairs 
(Brown and Brown 2003; Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2014). 
The general consensus is that the link between religion 
and politics is not about a belief system promoted by the 
religious institutions, but rather the way the institution 
facilitates social interaction. The eﬀect should theoretically 
transfer to any religious tradition that involves similar 
congregational dynamics. And indeed, a growing literature 
aﬃrms the same mechanism at work in mosques in 
Western democratic contexts. 
Evidence from the United States consistently reveals 
a positive relationship between mosque and political 
involvement. Read (2015) finds that those who are heavily 
involved in their mosques are more likely to be civically 
active in a number of secular community activities and 
organizations. Likewise, Jamal (2005) finds an association 
between mosque participation and civil and non-electoral 
political activities in New York, while Ayers and Hofstetter 
(2008) find a positive relationship between religious 
practice (mosque attendance, prayer, volunteerism) and 
political participation. The 2007-2008 Muslim American 
Public Opinion Survey (MAPOS) data reveals that 
respondents involved in mosque activities are more 
likely to identify as Americans and participate in politics 
than their counterparts who are not involved in mosque 
activities (Dana, Barreto, and Oskooii 2011). Using original 
data from a survey of Muslim Americans in 22 locations 
across the United States, Dana, Wilcox-Archuleta, and 
Barreto (2017) find that those involved in their mosques 
are over 50 percent more likely to become politically 
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active compared with those not involved in their mosques. 
Westfall (2018) demonstrates that there is a positive 
relationship between mosque attendance for social and 
religious activities but no relationship with attendance for 
prayer, suggesting that religious institutions must engage 
with social lives of their congregants in order to have a 
substantive political eﬀect. 
Figure 1 illustrates the eﬀects demonstrated in the 
literature with frequencies of data on political participation 
from the 2011 Pew Muslim American Survey and the 
MAPOS referenced above.2 Both surveys measure 
mosque attendance for reasons other than prayer, 
capturing behavior less tied to ritual and more open to 
participation across class and gender. Both measures of 
mosque attendance and political engagement refer to the 
previous year and are all measured dichotomously, with 
the respondent reporting that they either did or did not do 
the behavior indicated. The Pew data samples 1,033 adult 
2   Data from both surveys is included to demonstrate the eﬀect across a wide variety of political indicators. The surveys sampled Muslims in diﬀerent 
ways. The Pew survey includes data from phone interviews of 1,033 adult Muslims living in the United States using a probability sampling mechanism. 
The MAPOS data does not use probability sampling and was collected in-person as individuals of 745 individuals recruited with reference to a skip 
pattern as they left 16 mosques and Islamic centers in six cities (Barreto and Bozonelos 2009). 
3   This diﬀerence is likely attributable to sampling method, as the MAPOS data sampled individuals as they left the mosque or Islamic center. 
4   Statistical significance is determined through independent group t-tests, p<0.05. For full statistical analysis of these relationships using logistic 
regression models of the Pew data, see Westfall (2018). 
Muslims, 37 percent of whom attend mosque for reasons 
other than prayer, while MAPOS samples 745 Muslims, 65 
percent of whom attend regularly mosque outside of prayer 
services.3 Attending mosque is associated with statistically 
significant higher rates of political engagement across all of 
the variables, with an especially marked diﬀerence in the 
MAPOS data.4 
Mosques and political behavior in Europe
Research on degree of Muslim civic engagement in 
other Western contexts is less conclusive but seems 
to indicate similar trends. Using World Values Survey 
Data, Norris (2013) finds that there are considerable 
similarities across the Atlantic in the positive eﬀects of 
religious participation on strengthening civic engagement, 
measured through self-reported voluntary activism 
within religious organizations, membership in a broader 
range of secular community associations, and patterns 
Figure 1
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of political activism. Oskooii and Dana (2017) find that 
mosque attendance by ethnic minority Muslims in the 
UK is associated with increased self-reported rates of 
electoral and non-electoral political participation, like 
protesting or signing a petition, compared to ethnic 
minority Christian adherents. Giugni, Michel and 
Gianni (2014) use original survey data of Muslims 
in Sweden to support the argument that religious 
associational involvement is a strong predictor of 
political participation and protest. Phalet, Bayso and 
Verkuytem (2010) find that the salience of Muslim 
identity is associated with diﬀerent political goals and 
actions across diﬀerent ethnic Muslim groups in the 
Netherlands and caution against simplistic assumptions 
about all Muslims regarding the relationship between 
religion and politics. 
Despite this warning, Figure 2 demonstrates simple 
descriptive statistics of the eﬀect using the 3,522 
individuals in the Muslim sample of the European Social 
Survey (ESS) waves from 2002 to 2014, the same dataset 
5   Like Isani, I limit the analysis to Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom due to considerations of comparability and sample size.
6   Statistical significance is determined through independent group t-tests, p<0.05.
used by Isani in this collection.5 Because this survey is 
not designed explicitly to sample Muslims, the question 
asks how often the respondent attends religious services 
apart from special occasions, which is recoded into a 
dichotomous variable of regular attendance (at least 
monthly). Forty percent of the sample reports regular 
attendance, and there is no diﬀerentiation between 
attendance for prayer services and other social or 
religious activities. Based on work finding that attending 
diﬀerent types of services yields diﬀerent outcomes 
for participation (Westfall 2018), the generic indicator 
of religious service attendance should dilute the eﬀect 
of attendance on political engagement. In general, the 
results in Figure 2 demonstrate much lower reported 
rates of European Muslim political participation 
compared to the US data, with little diﬀerentiation based 
on attendance of religious services. The only significant 
diﬀerences are found in volunteerism, signing a petition 
(with a relationship in the opposite direction than 
hypothesized), participating in demonstrations, and 
participating in a boycott.6 It would be inappropriate 
Figure 2
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to draw many conclusions from direct comparisons of 
these trans-Atlantic data sources due to diﬀerences in 
measurement of both the religious attendance and the 
political engagement variables, and also because the ESS 
data is pooled over multiple years and across countries 
with very diﬀerent political systems. At most, the 
comparative data is suggestive, hinting at lower levels of 
engagement and potentially diﬀerent dynamics at work 
in European versus American contexts. 
Explaining trans-Atlantic diﬀerences
The remainder of this essay considers how these diﬀerent 
dynamics might manifest through the central mechanisms 
linking mosque attendance to political engagement. The 
first is in the way the mosque is a source of information 
and mobilization through religious leadership. Most 
typically, European state intervention in the mosque has 
focused on the religious leadership and reflects a desire 
to increase the presence of homegrown European imams 
over foreign imams who presumably hold traditionalist 
and culturally informed views.7 For example, the French 
government has created initiatives with Muslim councils 
to develop training programs for homegrown imams. The 
Netherlands has started a certificate program for Islamic 
chaplaincy and has also developed a required acculturation 
program for imams through which they learn the language 
and the Dutch law that is relevant to their position. Some 
countries, like Sweden, Belgium, and Spain have provided 
funding for mosque construction and imam salaries. In 
general, however, these eﬀorts are small-scale, because 
most governments want to avoid the public perception 
that they are encouraging Islam. Of course, some state 
intervention is more hostile. Denmark refuses entry to 
foreign imams, and Germany targeted Salafi mosques and 
organizations with raids and bans, in hopes of limiting the 
spread of the Salafist ideology (Erasmus 2016). 
7   The contrast between the foreign and homegrown imam is made obvious by Jonathan Birt (2006) in his essay “Good Imam, Bad Imam,” where the 
good imams and now governments have been eager to promote “civic religion.” “The good imam ought to acquire the skills to promote ‘civic religion,’ 
adopt an eﬀective integrative pastoral role for Muslim youth, and challenge the extremism promoted by the bad imam. The bad imam works outside 
the ‘opportunity spaces,’ refusing the praxis and rhetoric of ‘civic religion,’ and may either be obscurantist and isolationist, or rejectionist, anti-West and 
possibly a supporter of violence and terrorism” (Birt 2006, 692-693).
Whether inclusionary or exclusionary, even the small-scale 
public European state intervention in religious life stands in 
contrast to approaches in the US, where state involvement 
in religion is governed by norms developed with reference 
to the institutionally-embedded Christian faith. Recently 
these norms have been somewhat uncomfortably extended 
to non-Western religious traditions, though low-profile 
state incursion and surveillance of religious life is common 
in North American Muslim communities. Furthermore, 
as the North American Muslim community has grown, 
concerns over foreign-born imams are beginning to mirror 
those in the European context (Burnett 2013). Despite 
these trends, religious practice is legally protected in the 
United States and the American society is highly tolerant 
of personal religiosity. 
Mosque leadership and information transfer is only one 
mechanism by which religious associational membership 
influences political and social behavior. The general 
consensus of the research on religious associational 
membership and political engagement demonstrates that 
the strongest eﬀect is attributable to group dynamics and 
the development of social capital. Religious associational 
membership is theorized to creates social trust, which 
contributes to more generalized political trust and political 
participation. The eﬀect works for other types of voluntary 
associations as well, and both ethnic and cross-ethnic 
voluntary associational memberships have been associated 
with a strong positive eﬀect on political participation 
among immigrants in Europe (Jacobs and Tillie 2004). 
Ethnic networks are homogenous and primarily comprised 
of co-ethnics, while cross-ethnic networks refer to mixed 
associations, where membership is comprised of diﬀerent 
types of people. The most important distinction between 
the two reflects the diﬀerence between “bonding” social 
capital, which reinforces group identities, and “bridging” 
social capital, which overcomes social cleavages (Putnam 
2000). Translated to the mosque experience, those that 
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promote bonding social capital would bind Muslims 
of the same ethnic or cultural identities in networks, 
while mosques promoting bridging social capital would 
promote links across Muslims of diﬀerent cultures and 
ethnicities. The former might be useful for promoting 
political participation associated with aﬃnity group 
promotion or ethnic grievances, while the latter might 
develop richer social capital that links the group to a 
larger civic community, or it may help stimulate pan-
ethnic Muslim mobilization.8 There is some evidence 
for the stronger eﬀect of bridging social capital among 
Muslims in Switzerland (Giugni et al. 2014) and the United 
States (Westfall et al. 2017), but the distinct migration 
experiences and concentrated ethnic Muslim populations 
in many European states may influence and limit the 
degree to which developing bridging social capital within 
the mosque is possible. 
Muslim reactions to Islamophobia 
Mobilization within the mosque through leadership and 
social networks is only part of the story. The way the larger 
society reacts to Islam and the presence of mosques can 
constrain or enable the political participation of Muslims, 
and it will likewise influence the way mosque leadership 
and the congregations conceive of their place within 
society. Islamophobia is widespread and increasing in both 
Europe and North America and largely driven by the same 
forces on both sides of the Atlantic (Ogan et al. 2014). 
Though trends in Islamophobia are similar, the degree to 
which the social and political environment tolerates the 
expression of these ideas, or the degree to which the state 
is seen as being complicit in promoting Islamophobic 
perspectives varies across countries, as do state-led eﬀorts 
to encourage and include Muslim perspectives. The 
perception of social and oﬃcial hostility could lead Muslim 
communities to distrust the political community and turn 
inward, as implied by the work of Isani in this collection, 
or it could motivate oppositional political mobilization. 
The latter eﬀect was seen in black churches in the United 
8   In this collection, Seurat alludes to both bridging and bonding social capital mechanisms in her analysis of social networks eﬀects created by the 
Hajj, suggesting that the nationalist dynamics may be creating more bonding social capital between co-nationals, undercutting the ability of the Hajj to 
create bridging social capital serving a pan-Islamist identity.
States, where the exclusion of African Americans from 
civic and social life with Jim Crow institutionalized a 
racialized public sphere, which led to the development of 
a “black counterpublic”(Dawson 1994). The counterpublic 
includes religious institutions, communication networks, 
and a number of other groups and organizations that 
encouraged oppositional political tactics that challenged 
the white supremacist status quo, often through the 
“politics of refusal” discussed by Hall in this collection. In 
a context where Muslims are politically excluded despite 
Muslim feelings of political entitlement, a similar outcome 
facilitated by mosques is a distinct possibility. 
Where society rather than the state is at issue, a hostile 
social environment could provoke societal withdrawal by 
Muslims, but it could encourage further engagement with 
wider society in an attempt to alter mindsets, especially if 
the Muslim presence is legitimized by the state. Djupe and 
Calfano (2012) provide evidence that personal experiences 
with discrimination constitute a form of civic education, 
and that these experiences are associated with higher 
levels of tolerance in Muslim Americans. The options and 
incentives associated with discrimination are important 
and highly contextual. 
Concluding Thoughts
The very diﬀerent state approaches to Islamic leadership, 
the social compositions of mosques, and variation in the 
social climate warrant comparative study that will help 
answer critical questions: Do the mechanisms linking 
mosque participation to civic engagement work in similar 
ways across countries? How does state intervention shape 
the way the mosque functions for its congregants? What 
role does the mosque play in divergent experiences with 
Muslim integration? However, answering these questions 
requires a fuller understanding of the comparative 
legitimacy felt by Muslims in the public sphere and of 
the experiences of Muslim individuals in their mosque 
environments. Rather than engaging with state and elite-
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level concerns about how they fear Muslims will behave, it 
is more informative to engage with the actual behavior of 
Muslims and the connections that Muslims make between 
their behavior and their religious life. 
This research requires rich cross-national data focusing 
on Muslim’s experiences within their mosques and social 
networks and covering a broad range of formal and 
informal political behaviors and opinions. Studies on the 
political engagement or integration of Muslims in Western 
contexts have typically focused either on democratic 
values (gender roles and equality, sexual minority rights, 
the boundaries of free speech) or on rather infrequent 
behaviors like voting. But, as Robert Putnam and 
numerous others have argued, civic engagement through 
informal participation or membership in social networks 
is just as critical as political participation for “making 
democracy work” (Putnam 1993). Conceptualization and 
measurement of “active citizenship” including indicators of 
both formal and informal participation within the existing 
political system is therefore necessary to capture the full 
possibilities of the political integration and engagement 
of Muslims in western democratic societies (Hoskins and 
Mascherini 2009). It is equally important to pay special 
attention to protest behaviors and the “politics of refusal,” 
like those activities documented by Hall in this collection, 
which capture an important dimension of active and 
engaged participation. While there are a few national 
data sets with rich questions about political participation 
and large samples of Muslims, they do not allow for 
cross-national comparison, and the international datasets 
dramatically under-sample Muslims.9 A concentrated 
eﬀort must be made if there is interest in exploring the 
potential of religious associational life for enhancing the 
political engagement and integration of Muslims.
It is possible that, by the time we ask the right questions, 
the mosque will lose some of its importance in the lives 
9   For example, the World Values Survey collects data in many countries in six waves from 1981 to 2014. However, they do not sample the same 
countries every year, and the Muslim representation within the countries sampled is remarkably low. The United States, with a population of about 
300 million that is 1 percent Muslim, is sampled in four of the waves, and the total number of Muslims sampled is 19 out of 6,223 total respondents, 
or 0.003 percent. Likewise, Germany, a population that is about 6 percent Muslim, is sampled in three waves and yields a total of 87 Muslims out of 
6.136 respondents, or 0.01 percent. The European Social Survey used here does not include North American countries and collects seven rounds from 
2002 to 2014. They sample 1,000 Muslims only in waves 4, 5, and 6, and within the individual waves a country sample exceeds 100 Muslims only once 
(Belgium in 2012 with 110 Muslims). 
of Muslims. There is evidence of declining attendance 
in formal religious services among Muslims in Europe. 
Of the Muslims sampled in the European Social Survey 
from 2002 to 2014, 26 percent report weekly attendance 
at religious services, and 22 percent report attending 
only on holy days. Among second generation immigrants 
only 18 percent attend weekly services. The rates are 
higher in the United States. According to the 2011 Pew 
survey of Muslim Americans, 47 percent of respondents, 
report weekly mosque attendance for prayer. Declining 
attendance could signal integration into secular modes of 
living, since there are similar trends in the non-Muslim 
population (Brenner 2016). Alternatively, declining mosque 
attendance could represent the loss of an important venue 
through which Muslims can develop civic skills and social 
networks and reconcile their religious and civic democratic 
lives.
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The Politics of ‘Tradition’ and the Production of Diasporic Shia 
Religiosity
Avi Astor, co-authors Victor Albert Blanco and Rosa Martínez Cuadros, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Despite the progressive secularization of societies across 
Europe, the presence of religious symbols and practices 
in public space has become an increasingly prominent 
feature of cities throughout the continent. This is due, in 
large part, to the deepening of religious diversification 
as a consequence of rising levels of immigration and the 
growth of new religious movements for which public 
expressions of religiosity have special importance. For 
diasporic religious communities, public expressions of 
religiosity reinforce group cohesion and connection to 
the homeland. Yet they may also be a source of communal 
dissension, as members are not always in agreement with 
regard to the form that such expressions should take, and 
the degree to which religious traditions should be adapted 
in light of contextual factors.1 Consequently, negotiations 
and decisions regarding public expressions of religiosity 
become imbricated with larger questions regarding 
citizenship and transnational identity in much the same 
way that Balkan highlights in this volume with respect to 
diasporic burial practices. Public expressions of religiosity 
may also generate challenges for municipal regulatory 
agencies, especially when they are perceived as threatening 
to local norms regarding the place of religion in the public 
sphere and other sensitive issues. The manner in which 
such expressions are regulated provides a revealing lens for 
identifying ‘local regimes of public space’ core to religious 
governance.2 Regulatory policies concerning public forms 
of religiosity also have important ramifications for the 
general visibility of religious diversity as a part of urban life, 
much like Tepe illustrates in this volume with respect to 
places of worship.
This project examines public expressions of religiosity 
among Shia in Europe and North America, with a special 
1   Marta Alonso Cabré, Khalid Ghali, Alberto López Bargados, Jordi Moreras and Ariadna Solé Madonia, ‘Invisible Rituals: Islamic Religious Acts in 
Catalan Public Space’, in Observing Islam in Spain: Contemporary Politics and Social Dynamics, ed. A.I. Planet Contreras (Leiden: Brill, 2018).
2   Marian Burchardt and Mar Griera, ‘To See or Not to See: Explaining Intolerance Against the “Burqa” in European Public Space’, Ethnic and Racial 
Studies (forthcoming).
focus on Toronto, Paris, Barcelona, and Bonn, four cities 
strategically selected due to the innovative or distinctive 
character of public religiosity among their respective Shia 
communities. It focuses specifically on the cleavages within 
Shia communities surrounding the ritual commemoration 
of Ashura and other days of mourning, as well as the 
diverse models for regulating such commemorations that 
have emerged in each city. Our analysis centers on Shia of 
South Asian descent, as they place special importance on 
organizing religious processions in urban public spaces. 
We therefore use the terminology that is most commonly 
used among South Asian Shia for various religious 
statuses, practices, and organizational forms.
Ashura and public ritual commemoration
At various points during the year, Shia Muslims stage julus 
(processions) in open urban spaces. The largest and most 
visible processions are typically organized on the day of 
Ashura, which commemorates the death of Hussein ibn 
Ali, the grandson of Mohammad, during the Battle of 
Karbala in 680 A.D. During these processions, participants 
customarily dress in black and carry flags and banners with 
religious inscriptions, as well as other symbolic artifacts 
(e.g. a coﬃn representing Hussein’s death). In many of 
these processions, participants engage in practices of 
self-flagellation called ‘matam’ to the rhythm of collective 
chanting. There are several diﬀerent types of matam, 
including sineh zani (beating of the chest with one’s fist), 
zanjir zani (flagellation with sharp instruments), and qama 
zani (cutting of the head with a blade). The manner in 
which matam is practiced varies both within and across 
diﬀerent territorial contexts. 
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Many, though not all, influential Shia clerics—particularly 
those from Iran—have condemned zanjir and qama for 
violating the Islamic prohibition against self-inflicted 
injury. Ayatollah Khomeini was critical of the practice, and 
his successor Ayatollah Khamenei famously issued a fatwa 
prohibiting forms of matam that involve shedding blood 
in 1994. Ayatollah Sistani (Iraq) likewise voiced skepticism 
regarding zanjir, though his remarks on the subject 
have been interpreted diﬀerently by distinct segments of 
the Shia community. Criticisms of ‘blood matam’ have 
contributed to what Lara Deeb has termed “authenticated 
forms of Ashura and public piety” that eschew religious 
rituals perceived as ‘traditional’ or ‘backward’.3 For instance, 
it is now common for Shia communities to organize blood 
drives in remembrance of the blood spilled by Hussein, 
rather than engaging in zanjir. Despite the controversial 
nature of zanjir, the practice is still widespread and 
remains central to the religious identity of many Shia, 
especially those of South Asian descent. 
Religious tradition as a descriptive and evaluative 
concept
Debates about ritual practices like matam revolve largely 
around distinct visions and understandings of religious 
tradition. Religious tradition is typically understood as the 
symbols, meanings, and rituals that generate continuity 
among religious peoples and communities across 
generations. Along these lines, Riesebrodt defines religious 
tradition as “the historical continuity of systems of symbols.”4 
He describes particular traditions like Christianity, Islam, 
and Buddhism as “cultural ways of life that no doubt contain 
systems of religious practices, but also transcend them.” As 
such, religious tradition is a “concrete reality” that should 
be studied contextually, keeping in mind all its “overlaps, 
syncretisms, and local peculiarities.”5  
3   Lara Deeb, An Enchanted Modern: Gender and Public Piety in Shi’i Lebanon (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 154.
4   Martin Riesebrodt, The Promise of Salvation: A Theory of Religion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), xii.
5   Ibid., xii.
6   Genevieve Zubrzycki, ‘Religion, Religious Tradition, and Nationalism: Jewish Revival in Poland and “Religious Heritage” in Québec’, Journal for the 
Scientific Study of Religion 51, no. 3 (2012), 453.
7   Avi Astor, Marian Burchardt and Mar Griera, ‘The Politics of Religious Heritage: Framing Claims to Religion as Culture’, Journal for the Scientific 
Study of Religion 56, no. 1 (2017).
Zubrzycki highlights how religious tradition, in 
Riesebrodt’s sense of the term, may be mobilized for 
political projects, such as the production and contestation 
of national identity. In analyzing recent debates 
surrounding diversity and national identity in Quebec 
and Poland, she argues that religious tradition becomes “a 
material and symbolic resource for identity building and is 
sacralized as a marker of the nation.”6 Understood in this 
manner, religious tradition is a cultural repository that may 
be used instrumentally for the purposes of circumscribing 
or expanding the boundaries of the national community, 
protecting the privileged status of particular religious 
groups and institutions, or justifying the presence of 
religious symbols in purportedly secular public spaces.7 
Religious tradition and related concepts like ‘religious 
heritage’ may also be used evaluatively for articulating 
notions of religious authenticity and obsolescence. For 
instance, religious authorities may declare a given practice 
to be an ‘innovation’ or ‘fabrication’ that runs counter to 
the established ‘tradition’ of the community as a means 
of calling into question its authenticity. Similarly, within 
progressive circles, labeling a given religious practice 
‘traditional’ may serve as code for declaring it outmoded 
and contrary to contemporary values or sensibilities. 
Hence, in practice expressions like ‘it is part of our 
tradition’ or ‘that is a very traditional view of things’ are 
oftentimes not neutral but rather convey value-laden 
notions of authenticity or obsolescence that are central to 
debates over the ethics and desirability of various religious 
practices. 
This use of the concept of religious tradition arises not only 
amid debates within religious communities about authentic 
religious practice, but also amid debates among public 
authorities about which kinds of religious customs merit 
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special measures of accommodation. If a given custom 
is recognized as part of a longstanding and established 
religious tradition, authorities are more likely to view it 
as authentic and hence worthy of accommodation. By 
contrast, if a custom is viewed as deviant with respect to 
recognized tradition, its authenticity may be called into 
question, and authorities will be less likely to oﬀer special 
measures of accommodation.8 
In the analysis that follows, we examine diasporic Shia 
religious traditions with these various senses of the term 
tradition in mind. That is, we analyze factors that have 
influenced the persistence or transformation of religious 
tradition, understood in an empirical and descriptive 
sense. However, we also examine how notions of tradition 
have themselves been invoked to claim the authenticity or 
obsolescence of contested religious rituals, most notably 
the ritual of matam. 
The politics of ‘tradition’
Dogra has recently provided an illuminating analysis of 
how debates surrounding matam have unfolded among 
Shia elites in London.9 He frames the matter as a struggle 
between the ‘old guard’, who defend South Asian forms 
of ritual commemoration, and ‘reformists’, who favor 
the Iranian model espoused by Ayatollah Khamenei and 
those sympathetic to his perspective. While the old guard 
defends the practice of “severe and violent” forms of zanjir 
and qama, reformists advocate more restrained forms of 
matam or other forms of commemoration that do not 
involve self-flagellation.10 The categories of ‘old guard’ 
and ‘reformists’, however, are somewhat misleading, as 
they give the impression that Shia may be neatly divided 
into conservatives and progressives, those with rigid and 
those with flexible perspectives on tradition. The manner 
8   Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
9   Sufyan Abid Dogra, ‘Karbala in London: Battle of Expressions of Ashura Ritual Commemorations among Twelver Shia Muslims of South Asian 
Background’, Journal of Muslims in Europe 6, no. 2 (2017).
10   Ibid., 170.
11   Ibid., 159.
12   Vernon James Schubel, ‘Karbala as Sacred Space among North American Shi’a: “Every Day is Ashura, Everywhere is Karbala”’, in Making Muslim 
Space in North America and Europe, ed. B. Metcalf (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).
13   David Pinault, The Shiites: Ritual and Popular Piety in a Muslim Community (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992).
in which individuals and collectives on both sides of 
the debate position themselves with regard to tradition, 
however, is far from straightforward. For example, Dogra 
himself begins his article with a quote from a proponent 
of the so-called ‘old guard’ view in which the individual 
in question highlights his frustration with reformist 
discourses that portray qama as an ‘innovation’ that is just 
a hundred years old and therefore lacks authenticity.11 
An additional reason for exercising caution when using 
terms like ‘old guard’ and ‘reformist’ relates to the 
specificities of local context. Consider, for instance, the 
case of Toronto. During the mid-1990s, Schubel published 
an ethnography of a Shia community in Toronto composed 
largely of immigrants from East Africa of South Asian 
descent.12 He wrote that the julus (procession) organized 
during Muharram largely resembled a typical julus in 
Pakistan, though the practice of matam was conspicuously 
absent. Today, by contrast, matam is part of most julus 
organized in the city. In recent years, a matami group 
has even begun to practice zanjir in public space. The 
‘old guard’ in the local context of Toronto thus appears 
to consist of those opposed to matam, rather than its 
defenders. My point here is not that temporality should 
be used as the main criterion for drawing distinctions 
between the old guard and reformists. It is rather that 
many of the criteria that we typically use to draw such 
distinctions (temporality, age, generation, etc.) may 
generate counterintuitive results at the local level, and 
perhaps at the global level as well.
Complicating matters further is the fact that, as in India 
and Pakistan,13 matamis in the diaspora are organized 
as semi-autonomous groups called sangats. While some 
sangats are aﬃliated with specific imambargahs (houses 
of ritual worship), others are not. It is not uncommon for 
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sangat members, especially those who are unaﬃliated 
with any imambargah, to bear conflictive relations with 
local clerics. Many see themselves as resisting, rather than 
seeking to restore, established traditions and hierarchies 
of authority as part of a broader eﬀort to practice a more 
authentic form of Shia Islam. At the same time, however, 
tradition remains a key source of authenticity, resulting 
in clear tensions between the desire to remain loyalty to 
established religious understandings and practices, on the 
one hand, and the desire to reform misguided religious 
understandings and structures of authority, on the other.
AA, a young matami of South Asian descent who migrated 
to Toronto from Dubai, spoke to us of the tension that 
some matamis experience in resisting the dominion 
of clerics and other recognized authorities while at the 
same time embracing elements of tradition that reinforce 
hierarchical structures of authority. He said this tension 
was particularly apparent in relation to the structures 
of authority characteristic of sangats. While charisma, 
dedication, and initiative are certainly important for 
aspiring leaders (salars), ‘ancestral capital’ remains a 
critical source of their legitimacy. For this reason, many 
salars have the first name ‘Syed’, which indicates direct 
descendance from the prophet’s family. 
In the following quote, AA references two brothers who 
reside in Bonn and have gained notoriety as matami 
leaders, not only in Germany but also elsewhere in Europe 
and in India and Pakistan:
So if you look at Tossif and Tasneef, their first names are 
‘Syed’. You will notice that in some of the pictures they 
have on Facebook there’ll be a couple of people who 
when they’re taking pictures with them will actually 
kneel down in front of them and have their hand on 
their foot to sort of say you know… this is the ideal, 
you know they are descendants of the prophet, we 
love these people to no end… And most of the times 
what’s happened is that… these matami groups… 
often develop their own little leaders… These salars 
are folks like Tasneef, Tossif. And I, for a very short 
period of time – a very very short period of time – I was 
considered one when I began the matam in Toronto… 
but I’m not ‘Syed’ and neither am I Pakistani so it very 
quickly eroded oﬀ. So the salar of the matamis in 
Toronto is a Syed, the salars of the matamis in New 
York [are Syeds] – they’ve developed these leaders 
from within the community, within the matami group 
(personal interview).
Hence, while having the forename ‘Syed’ opened up 
leadership opportunities for Tossif and Tasneef, lacking 
this forename closed oﬀ opportunities for AA. The 
ongoing importance of ancestral capital to the structure 
of leadership among matamis speaks to the continued 
role of traditional sources of legitimacy within matami 
circles despite the fact that some matamis have begun to 
question the traditional sources of legitimacy of global 
religious authorities (marjas) and local clerics. Tossif, it 
should be noted, is the salar of an influential sangat, QBH, 
that is based in Bonn but has local branches in India. The 
somewhat controversial practice of organizing a julus 
and other events of ritual mourning commemorating the 
assassination of Ali ibn Abi Talib at the end of Ramadan, 
which is typically treated as a time of celebration, is 
something that QBH has played a role in popularizing, 
highlighting how diasporic leaders and collectives may 
influence religious practice among Shia in Muslim-
majority countries.
Image 1: Individual with his hand on Syed Tossif ’s foot as a 
sign of respect. Source: Facebook (personal page).
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Transnationalism and diasporic religiosity
South Asian matamis are a rather mobile collective, as they 
travel from community to community to participate in rituals 
of mourning. Many make pilgrimages to Iraq or Syria during 
Muharram. In Europe and North America, matamis who 
have the financial means commonly travel to other cities in 
their countries of residence and abroad for major events in 
order to provide support to other sangats. Possessing the 
requisite economic capital to make such trips is essential 
for those who wish to make a name for themselves and 
achieve a measure of distinction within the broader field 
of matamis worldwide. Given the importance of mobility 
and its role in generating and reinforcing transnational and 
trans-local networks among Shia, Scharbrodt emphasizes the 
centrality of ‘multilocality’ to social and religious dynamics 
characteristic of the Shia diaspora.14 
The centrality of mobility to diasporic religious practice 
among Shia is linked, in part, to their position as minorities 
within a (stigmatized) minority. Given that most diasporic 
sangats have relatively few members, they are often reliant 
upon outsiders to reach the critic threshold necessary to 
feel proud practicing matam publicly. The ideal is to go well 
beyond the critical threshold so as to display ‘strength in 
numbers’ and temporarily invert power relations between 
Shia and Sunnis.15 The religious character of Muharram as 
a period in which fresh perspectives are shared and new 
relationships forged reinforces dynamics of inter-community 
exchange. The circulation of matamis between cities and 
communities, in turn, sets in motion norms of reciprocity, 
which further contribute to the flow of matamis across local, 
regional, and national borders. Reflecting on this type of 
exchange, the president of the Shia community in Barcelona, 
Al Qaim, who is himself a matami, stated:
People come from India and Pakistan, people who 
live in Germany. They are young guys like me who 
were raised in Germany. They are friends of mine. We 
14   Oliver Scharbrodt, ‘A Minority within a Minority?: The Complexity and Multilocality of Transnational Twelver Shia Networks in Britain’, 
Contemporary Islam (forthcoming).
15   Garbi Schmidt, ‘Understanding and Approaching Muslim Visibilities: Lessons Learned from a Fieldwork-Based Study of Muslims in Copenhagen’, 
Ethnic and Racial Studies 34, no. 7 (2011).
16   Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).
coincided in Syria or Iraq. We asked each other, “Where 
have you come from?” “I come from Germany.” “I come 
from Barcelona.” “I’m from Paris.” “I’m from Italy.” You 
always invite. “Hey, on this date why don’t you come 
here?”… Just as I bring people to Germany, they have 
come here. A little while ago, in August, we went to 
Paris, ten of us from the mosque (personal interview).
Such exchanges, along with the pilgrimages that that Shia 
regularly make to holy sites in Iraq and Syria, and the 
significant coverage of julus (procession) in various digital 
media, contribute to the general sense of belonging to a 
broader Shia umma. They also sustain the ritual of matam, 
which otherwise might not have suﬃcient practitioners to 
flourish in many diasporic contexts.
The sense of interconnectedness that exists between 
matamis results not only from their physical mobility, but 
also from the wide circulation of photos, video recordings, 
and live feeds of julus and matam on sites like YouTube, 
Instagram, and Facebook. In most, if not all, of the 
events that we observed in our cities of focus, there were 
individuals transmitting live video feeds via social media. 
We also noted the presence of Pakistani TV channels 
broadcasting several of the events. On various occasions 
during the course of our research, we were surprised by 
how Shia whom we knew in Canada and Germany were 
telling us about events happening locally in Barcelona prior 
to our becoming aware of them. A matami from Toronto 
told us that seeing videos of matam in Pakistan played an 
important role in leading him and his friends to question 
the previous absence of matam in the city and empowered 
them to resuscitate the ritual. This is an instance in which 
the internet and digital technology have led to a return 
to home country traditions. This ‘reterritorialization’ 
of Islamic practice may be contrasted with the 
‘deterritorialization’ that Roy and others have linked to the 
proliferation of internet usage among Muslims seeking 
religious guidance in the diaspora.16
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The politics of including politics in religious 
commemorations
Beyond the practice of matam, Shia residing in the 
diaspora diﬀer in their views as to whether religious 
commemorations should serve as an occasion to use the 
memory of Hussain and other martyrs as inspiration for 
transmitting messages of universal justice and encouraging 
charitable acts, on the one hand, or whether they should be 
more apolitical and circumscribed in focus, on the other. 
In 2012, a group of London youth of South Asian descent 
began an initiative called “Who is Hussain?” that aimed 
to “to tell the world about an inspirational man” and to 
highlight how Hussain is a role model to whom everyone 
may relate.17 During the years following its creation, the 
initiative generated significant interest in the UK and 
beyond, and now has representatives in cities across 
the world. Those involved promote blood drives, food 
donations for the homeless, aid for war victims, and other 
charitable activities. There are, however, some Shia who are 
skeptical of the initiative, arguing that its promoters have 
sought to ‘sanitize’ longstanding and venerable traditions, 
and to replace them with activities that, while laudable, 
detract from the main purpose of Muharram, which is to 
mourn the death of Hussain and experience the suﬀering 
that he incurred. 
Controversy has also emerged over the incorporation 
of political messages in ritual processions. In her 
ethnography of an Ashura procession in central London, 
for instance, Spellman-Poots noted a strong presence of 
political messages regarding injustices in Palestine, Iraq, 
and Afghanistan in the form of speeches, placards, or 
symbolic attire. At the same time, she highlights how some 
participants felt that the procession had been “hijacked 
by political protestors.”18 Several of the matamis whom 
I interviewed likewise voiced their opposition to the 
inclusion of political messages that diluted the memory of 
Hussain, regardless of whether they agreed or disagreed 
with the content of the messages. 
17   For more information about the initiative, see: https://whoishussain.org/ (accessed 3 July 2018).
18   Kathryn Spellman-Poots, ‘Manifestations of Ashura among Young British Shi’is’, in Ethnographies of Islam: Ritual Performances and Everyday 
Practices, eds. B. Dupret, T. Pierret, P. G. Pinto and K. Spellman-Poots (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 45.
Regulating azadari (mourning rituals)
While staging mourning processions in open public spaces 
has been oﬃcially banned in some authoritarian Sunni-
majority societies, liberal democratic societies generally 
recognize the right of Shia Muslims to organize public 
processions and other forms of ritual practice in open 
urban spaces. Nevertheless, diﬀerent cities have regulated 
Ashura processions and rituals in distinct ways. In 
Barcelona, for example, Shia who participate in the Ashura 
procession are required by the city government to wear 
shirts when performing matam. This is a measure that 
was put into place in 2007 after one of the very first public 
Ashura processions was organized in the city. Municipal 
authorities evidently came to the conclusion that covering 
the upper part of the body was necessary to ensure the 
compatibility of matam with local norms governing bodily 
praxis and exhibition in public space. The route of the 
procession has also been modified at various points so as 
to minimize interference with local businesses. In 2018, 
the route was adjusted so as not to interfere with events 
that were part of Barcelona’s traditional local patron saint 
celebrations, highlighting how majority traditions in the 
city take priority over minority traditions when the two 
enter into conflict. 
Restrictions on dress such as those imposed in Barcelona 
are the exception, rather than the norm in European and 
North American cities. In Athens, zanjir (self-flagellation 
with sharp instruments) has been practiced in open urban 
spaces, generating a measure of public controversy in the 
city. Similarly, Shia in Toronto have recently begun to 
practice zanjir in open (though peripheral) urban spaces, 
having made arrangements with local authorities to have 
an ambulance and medical personnel on hand, and having 
agreed not to allow anyone under 18 to participate. Zanjir 
is also practiced in a limited number of open public spaces 
in New York City. In some cases, individuals and groups 
critical of the practice of matam or the communities who 
engage in the practice have written sensationalized articles 
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or posted decontextualized videos online as a means of 
stirring up controversy.19 Certain clerics have also made 
a name for themselves by criticizing the practice in their 
sermons. This has, in some cases, prompted responses from 
practitioners of matam eager to defend the practice. As a 
reaction to the proliferation of criticisms of matam in and 
around Toronto, for instance, matamis in the city created 
banners and t-shirts aimed at debunking misconceptions of 
matam as a barbaric or threatening practice (Image 2).
Image 2: A Toronto initiative to educate about ritual 
commemoration developed in reaction to public criticisms 
of matam. Source: Personal correspondence.
19   See, for instance, Vocativ’s recent Facebook posting about matam in the US: https://www.facebook.com/Vocativ/videos/350295825730285/ (accessed 
3 December 2018).
While it is rather common for Shia to organize processions 
commemorating Ashura in most European and North 
American cities where they have a relatively large numeric 
presence, in Paris they have been reticent to organize 
religious events in public space. 2017 marked the first year 
that Shia organized an Ashura event in the center of Paris. 
The event was framed as ‘cultural’ and took place in the 
Place de la République. Most of Paris’ Shia communities are 
located in peripheral areas of the city. The religious leaders 
with whom we spoke explained that their communities 
typically commemorate Ashura inside their respective 
mosques or in rented spaces. Some of them believed that 
attaining permission to organize a procession in the street 
would be diﬃcult due to the general framework of laïcité and 
the stigmatization of Islam in France. Their understanding of 
laïcité and presumptions regarding the likely reaction among 
local residents to a religious procession involving matam has 
led them to opt for evading controversy by limiting ritual 
commemoration to spaces that are indoors.
Conclusion
While certainly not exhaustive, this short reflection on 
the dynamics of controversy surrounding Shia religious 
processions and the practice of matam in public space draws 
attention to the complex interplay between internal divisions 
and external constraints in shaping public expressions 
of religiosity in Western diasporic contexts. At the heart 
of local debates over ritual commemoration in public 
space lie sharply contrasting views on the authenticity of 
specific religious traditions and the appropriateness of such 
traditions to the local contexts in which they are enacted. As 
highlighted over the course of this article, the language of 
‘tradition’ has itself become instrumental to the articulation 
of the distinct positions advanced in such debates. Future 
research should delve more deeply into local structures of 
religious power and authority, and the manner in which they 
both emanate from and challenge global structures of power 
and authority among Shia. This is critical for understanding 
the evolving development of Shia identity and practice in the 
diaspora and beyond.
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The Islamic Deathscapes of Germany
Osman Balkan, Department of Political Science, Swarthmore College
Anxieties about the place of Islam and Muslims in Europe 
underpin a wide range of contemporary debates over 
the meaning of secularism, democracy, citizenship, and 
national identity. Politicians and pundits across the political 
spectrum question whether Islam is compatible with 
European values and ways of life. Such discussions often 
focus on the visibility of Islamic signs and symbols in the 
public sphere. Although Muslim presence in Europe has 
been evident in urban landscapes for decades, the public 
visibility of Islam, as Nilüfer Göle argues, “disturbs the 
collective imaginary of European countries shaped by the 
secular values of freedom and a non-religious way of life.”1 
In attempting to understand why Islamic symbols have 
provoked backlash in various European countries, 
scholars have often focused on conflicts involving female 
headscarves or the construction of mosques. In this memo, 
I’d like to draw attention to a somewhat neglected site of 
public Islam that is, nonetheless, highly consequential 
for European Muslims: the cemetery. My discussion 
grows out my current book project, Dying Abroad, which 
examines how death structures political membership 
and identity among Muslim communities and ethno-
religious minorities in Europe. In the book, I argue that 
families, religious communities, and states all have a vested 
interest in the fate of dead bodies and endeavor to show 
how in contexts where the boundaries of the nation and 
its members are contested, burial decisions are political 
decisions that are linked to larger struggles over the 
meaning of home and homeland. My findings are based 
1   Nilüfer Göle. The Daily Lives of Muslims. London: Zed Books, 2017. Pg. 1. See also Avi Astor and Sultan Tepe (this volume). 
2   Elsewhere I have explored conflicts around local burial laws and Islamic rituals and the diﬀerent reasons why families decide to inter their dead in 
Germany or repatriate to their countries of origin for burial, the intermediary role played by Muslim undertakers between immigrant families and the state, 
and the ways in which Islamic funeral funds incentivize repatriation over local burial. See Osman Balkan. “Burial and Belonging.” Studies in Ethnicity and 
Nationalism. Vol 15. No. 1, 2015; Ibid. “Between Civil Society and the State: Bureaucratic Competence and Cultural Mediation among Muslim Undertakers 
in Berlin.” Journal of Intercultural Studies. Vol. 37, No. 2, 2016. Ibid, “Till Death do us DEPART: Repatriation, Burial, and the Necropolitical Work of Turkish 
Funeral Funds in Germany.” Muslims in the UK and Europe. Ed. Yasir Suleiman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.   
3   Recall that the Nazis invested much energy into purging what they perceived to be foreign elements and racial outsiders from “German” cemeteries. 
The process of Aryanization and “purification” entailed, first, the systemic exclusion of Jewish communities from the right to burial in municipal 
cemeteries, and later, the destruction of Jewish burial grounds throughout the country. See Monica Black. Death in Berlin: From Weimar to Divided 
Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.  
on extensive fieldwork carried out in Berlin and Istanbul, 
during which I conducted interviews and participant 
observation with Muslim undertakers and Islamic funeral 
homes, bereaved families, government oﬃcials, religious 
leaders, and representatives of funeral aid societies. 
With the long-term settlement of Muslim communities in 
Europe, there is a growing demand for local burial spaces 
where families can inter their dead in accordance with 
Islamic laws and traditions. In many European countries, 
including Germany, Muslims face a number of challenges 
with respect to the viability of Islamic burial, including 
the limited availability of Islamic cemetery sections, laws 
prohibiting coﬃnless burial, and mandatory (sometimes 
lengthy) waiting periods between death and interment.  
In the limited space that I have here, I’d like to oﬀer 
some tentative thoughts on one specific dimension of 
Germany’s Islamic deathscapes—namely, the patterns of 
memorialization and the representation of ethnic, religious, 
and national identities on the tombstones of Muslim 
graves in Berlin’s Islamic burial grounds.2 Such graves are 
still a relatively rare sight in Germany (only 250 of the 
approximately 32,000 public cemeteries in the country have 
sections reserved for Muslims), yet they are, nonetheless, 
suﬀused with deep cultural and symbolic meaning. 
Generally speaking, cemeteries are exemplary sites of 
public memorialization where struggles over memory and 
collective identity occur. 3 As places where the physical 
landscape is symbolically (re)inscribed and (re)signified, 
Germany’s Islamic cemeteries oﬀer insight into the 
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changing contours of political membership, belonging, and 
identity in an increasingly multicultural society. Moreover, 
they are sites where members of ethno-religious minorities 
assert and display their long-term communal presence and 
in the process, help normalize symbols of ethnic, religious, 
linguistic diversity in contemporary Germany.
Figure 1: Multilingual sign marking the Muslim burial 
section of Landschaftsfriedhof Gatow, Berlin, Germany
Writing and Seeing the Dead 
As an amalgamation of person, place, text, image, and 
name, the grave is a particularly dense semiotic object. 
“While they are endpoints for migrants,” writes Engseng 
Ho, “[Graves] are beginnings for their descendants, 
marking the truth of their presence in a land.”4 My reading 
of Islamic tombstones focuses on three dimensions: the 
texts and images they contain, as well as the built features 
of the stone itself. Of the approximately two hundred 
tombstones surveyed, I found that the majority of textual 
inscriptions are monolingual and that Islamic referents are 
fairly prevalent. Furthermore, the stones display a range 
of symbols such as flags and crescent moons that place 
the deceased within broader ethnic, religious, or national 
4   Engseng Ho. The Graves of Tarim: Genealogy and Mobility across the Indian Ocean. Berkeley: UC Press, 2006. Pg. 3.
5   The Turkish phrase “Ruhuna Fatiha,” translates to “Fatiha for his/her soul.” It refers to the Sura al-Fatiha, the opening chapter of the Qur’an, which is a 
central part of Islamic worship and an obligatory part of the daily prayers. 
6   The practice dates back to Ancient Rome and is famously captured along the Appian Way. Roman Law required that the dead be buried outside 
human settlements and entering the city entailed passing through a community of the dead. Tombs called out to passers-by, asking them to stop, 
reflect, and remember with injunctions such as: “You are human, stop and contemplate my tomb, young man, in order to know what you will be. I did 
no wrong. I performed many duties. Live well, for soon this will come to you.” 
collectivities. In some cases, the design of the stone itself 
mimics Islamic architectural styles. Through the choice 
of language, epitaph, symbolic imagery, and gravestone 
design, the living commemorate the dead and assert their 
membership in a variety of overlapping communities. 
The graves of Berlin contain a multitude of diﬀerent 
messages written in a myriad of languages including 
Arabic, Bosnian, Farsi, German, English, and Turkish. They 
are often addressed to the deceased herself but in many 
cases, speak directly to the living, inciting them to action. 
The most common appeal is for prayer. Variations on the 
phrase “Ruhuna Fatiha,”5 including “al Fatiha,” “al Fateha,” 
“el Fatiha,” or simply “R. Fatiha” or “Fatiha” were present on 
approximately one third of the tombstones, on the graves 
of the old and young alike (see figure 2). 
Injunctions on tombstones for passers-by to pray for the 
soul of the deceased are not unique to Islam nor to the 
contemporary period.6 Such communicative acts create 
potentials for signification by delimiting a community of 
mourners and believers. The act of writing “Fatiha” on a 
tombstone marks the individual deceased as a Muslim 
but also situates her within a broader collective Islamic 
community by instigating communicative action between 
the deceased and other members of the community of 
faith. It signals the existence of a Muslim identity while 
simultaneously entreating other Muslims to profess their 
own Islamic identity through ritualistic acts of prayer. 
By acknowledging the deceased as a Muslim and by 
praying for the souls of all Muslims, the observant visitor 
reflexively produces the wider Islamic community through 
pious symbolic action. 
Beyond references to religious beliefs and identities, the 
graves of Muslims in Berlin also contain secular histories 
in the form of epitaphs. The vast majority of the written 
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text on these grave markers is not in German. Of the tombs 
surveyed, 77 percent have monolingual inscriptions in 
Turkish, Arabic, or Bosnian. The remaining 23 percent 
incorporate text in two or more languages, including 
German. Although multilingual messages are present 
in some of the earliest graves surveyed here (from the 
1990s), they are more numerous from the 2000s forward, 
reflecting a trend towards linguistic syncretism (see figure 
3). Biographical information is conveyed through short 
inscriptions that contain a family’s genealogy, kinship 
terminology, places of birth and origin, and occasionally 
information about the deceased’s occupation, hobbies, or 
interests. Often these texts are paired with images and icons.
Figure 2 (“R. Fatiha”) and Figure 3 (“Maroc / Berlin”)
Invoking the country of origin by referencing the place 
of birth not only oﬀers biographical information, but 
simultaneously concretizes and makes explicit a migratory 
history (see figure 3). Although this tradition exists among 
“native born” Germans, it is usually to convey the fact that 
the deceased was born in another part of the country. In 
the Muslim sections of Berlin’s cemeteries, the practice 
is largely restricted to people who were born abroad. The 
decision to reference the country of birth makes clear that 
certain families seek to honor their ancestral roots and 
migratory routes. It also acknowledges the fact that the 
deceased is not buried in their natal soil, a practice that is 
still very common among first generation migrants. 
Approximately 75 percent of the graves surveyed bore 
images, a practice that is less common in Muslim majority 
countries. These visual markers can be classified into three 
categories: national or patriotic symbols, religious motifs, 
and personal portraits. While compiling this archive, I 
was struck by the existence of flags on the tombstones 
of civilians, a practice that is often reserved for soldier 
dead. The flag is a recognizable visual marker that has the 
potential to reach a wider audience than an epitaph or 
inscription, particularly if the text is written in a language 
that is foreign to the observer. It is a powerful symbol 
of national belonging and conveys a range of emotional 
attachments to a political community. 
Among the diﬀerent nationalities represented within 
Berlin’s Islamic burial sections, the Turkish flag appears 
far more frequently than others. While only 10 percent 
of the tombstones surveyed included flags, 90 percent 
of these were Turkish flags (see figures 4 and 5). One 
could read this as a sign of greater (real or aspirational) 
nationalist sentiment among Berlin’s Turkish population 
or as a strategy used by Turkish Muslims to distinguish 
themselves from other national groups. Skeptics might 
argue that the existence of a Turkish flag in a German 
cemetery evinces a lack of integration or assimilation to 
the dominant culture. Yet, there is a certain ambivalence 
at play, given that the deceased is buried in Germany and 
hasn’t been repatriated to Turkey for burial. While the flag 
might be Turkish, the body remains in Germany and serves 
as an anchor and reference point for future generations. 
Like the practice of marking a foreign birthplace, the flag 
simultaneously acknowledges a migratory history and the 
reality of the community’s presence in a new land.
Figures 4 and 5: Graves featuring Turkish Flags and Islamic 
referents. Note that the grave on the right is for a two-month 
old baby.
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Finally, one of the most visually striking features of Berlin’s 
Islamic cemeteries are tombstones resembling mosques. 
The domed mosque with its pointy minarets might very 
well be the most widely recognized symbol of Islam. The 
mosque grave brings the mosque—a place of collective 
worship that might be located near or adjacent to a burial 
ground—into the heart of the cemetery itself, albeit in 
miniaturized form. Beyond the conspicuous visual eﬀect 
generated by the existence of mini mosques scattered 
among the mortuary landscape, the mosque grave 
occasions a socio-spatial reorientation for worshippers and 
mourners. The lines between sites of worship, pilgrimage, 
and prayer become blurred as the gravesite is re-imagined 
as something more than a place for the deposition of 
human remains. The dead Muslim body, which endows 
the soil with Islamic qualities, is directly linked to the most 
recognizable symbol of Islamic faith. The proximity of the 
mosque to the dead also mimics the medieval Christian 
practice of burying the dead directly under the grounds of 
the church. This practice, usually reserved for the rich or 
the holy, is given new lease in the diaspora cemetery. If you 
can’t bury under the mosque, why not build a mosque over 
your grave? (see figures 6-7). 
Figures 6 and 7: Mosque Graves
The landscape of the cemetery is transformed as it is 
imbued with new religious iconography. What is novel 
about the mosque grave as a cultural and architectural 
practice is how the built form of the mosque is deracinated 
from its original, everyday context and location and 
7   Christine Gruber. Islamic Architecture on the Move. Bristol: Intellect Press, 2016. 
8   See Jocelyne Cesari. “Mosque Conflicts in European Cities: Introduction” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. Volume 31, No. 6 (2005): 1015 – 
1024. 
appears in a new and unexpected locale. It is an example 
of what art historian Christine Gruber has termed “Islamic 
architecture on the move.”7   
I want to suggest that the use of Islamic architectural 
elements like the mosque grave in the cemeteries of Berlin 
is, in part, a response to the political challenges faced 
by the city’s Muslim communities. The incorporation 
of religious architecture and design in the public space 
of the cemetery represents an innovative step towards 
the normalization of Islamic symbols in the German 
landscape. The visibility of such symbols has provoked 
controversy across Europe, and eﬀorts to build actual 
mosques and places of worship have been undermined 
by municipal oﬃcials in a number of diﬀerent countries 
(usually on technical grounds or with reference to zoning 
laws).8 The placement of miniature mosques in the space 
of the cemetery reflects eﬀorts by Germany’s Muslim 
communities to express their religious identities and beliefs 
in the public sphere. 
Rather than assuming that the expression of national, 
ethnic, or religious belonging is simply evidence of 
cultural retention, I think it is also helpful to understand 
these gestures as evidence for the changing horizons of 
German identity. Read in this light, expressions of Islam 
are not articulations of an outside, extraneous, or foreign 
culture, but, rather, they are part of Germany’s evolving 
and dynamic society. While mosques and minarets may 
currently seem out of place in the cemetery or the city, 
their proliferation might help neutralize their eﬀect and 
make them as invisible and unremarkable as the crosses 
and church towers that are an integral part of Berlin’s 
urban landscape. 
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“Do We Need a Minaret?”:
Challenging Urban Contexts and Changing Islamic Theologies
Sultan Tepe, University of Illinois at Chicago
Religion’s dual potential to transcend or reinforce some 
well entrenched social, racial and spatial boundaries has 
been recognized in many studies. Yet, studies of Islam in 
many cities focus on Islam and Muslims’ impact on their 
respective cities or communities and questions how Islam 
reinforces preexisting shared identities and whether and 
how these identities can be better integrated. Such studies 
disregard the plurality of Muslims’ experiences and leave 
unanswered the question of whether and how the city 
impacts the experiences of Muslims. But the distinct ways 
in which urban governance is exercised is not extraneous 
to Muslims’ experiences. Instead, as noted by Avi Astor 
and Osman Balkan in this volume, urban governance 
plays a major role not only in defining the location and 
appearance of Muslim spaces but also in facilitating 
internal theological changes. 
In order to illustrate how the treatment of religious 
assemblies makes inroads into Muslim experiences 
and theologies, this essay focuses on so-called mosque 
disputes, placing them in their urban administrative 
structure and tracing the theological questions they pose. 
An overall review of mosque disputes, public hearings, and 
subsequent discussions indicates that the cases discussed 
here are not aberrations but instead help us to understand 
a general trend. The findings show that any treatment 
of Muslim communities in a vacuum requires careful 
questioning and implicitly and explicitly advances the idea 
that the beliefs and practices of Islam are self-enforcing—
they shape yet are not shaped by their environments. Such 
decontextualized studies risk generating self-confirming 
analytical narratives and missing critical aspects of these 
controversies. 
Building a place of religious gathering may seem to be 
routine process, but such attempts have always been 
1   E:|\BILLS\S2869.ENR 
challenging for unorthodox and minority religious groups 
in the United States.   A federal law was adopted in 2000 
(The Religious Land use and Institutionalized Persons 
Act) to prevent religious groups from excessive burden on 
the religious groups.1 Religious communities, particularly 
Muslims, that strive to have their own places of worship 
have the option of buying a vacated temple or church, 
purchasing a building to be reused through a “special use” 
permit, or buying their own lots for new constructions. 
Zoning boards decide whether and how certain building 
types (commercial, residential or religious, etc.) can be 
built in designated areas. Each option poses diﬀerent 
challenges. For instance, vacant temples are often located 
in areas with declining populations and gaining a special 
use permit can be challenging due to the limitations of 
existing structures and parking. Lots available for purchase 
are often located in unincorporated areas (which constitute 
unique administrative spheres in the U.S.) that maintain 
a level of autonomy and are governed directly by their 
respective counties. 
This essay reviews several mosque projects in Chicago 
by focusing on one mosque project called MECCA, in 
the Chicago suburb of DuPage County, Illinois in an 
unincorporated area next to the village of Willowbrook.  
This case oﬀers an excellent example of the overall process 
and its impact on diverse Muslim communities. It mirrors 
a pattern that has been seen in countries such as Spain of 
pushing new religious temples built by immigrants outside 
of residential areas and sheds light on the intra-community 
debates (see Avi Astor, 2017).
The MECCA Project
MECCA’s request to build a mosque was declined by the 
DuPage County when a board member noted the area 
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was “saturated by religious institutions.”  2Also noted 
was that unincorporated areas are meant to maintain 
a rural structure in urban environments and that such 
construction projects were threatening the expectations of 
residents. 3
These objections did not stand up to initial scrutiny. 
Despite the references to “oversaturation,” Willowbrook’s 
population has been on the decline since 2010, yet the 
area has maintained a median income of $70,000 and an 
average home value of $227,000, placing itself well above 
the state average. The village’s foreign-born population 
(25%) put it well above the Illinois State average (%13).4  
The temples close to MECCA included a Macedonian 
Orthodox Church, a rare Anjumen e Saifee center, 
a Dawoodi Bohra center (a largely unknown small 
unorthodox Islamic group with members from South Asia 
and Ethiopia), and a Buddhist Wat Buddhadamma center.5 
Objections to MECCA echoed those against other mosque 
proposals—the uncertainties regarding the precise 
number of people who will use the facilities; expected 
traﬃc congestion, especially during Friday prayers and 
religious holidays; depreciation of home values in the 
immediate vicinity; the increasing likelihood of flooding in 
the area; and compromises to the well and septic systems. 
6An application for another center, the Islamic Center 
of the Western Suburbs (ICWS), that sought to use an 
existing house near West Chicago as a prayer center and 
chose not to build a new place faced exactly the same 
list of objections. 7Although the concerns about Islamic 
identities played a role, the public statements against the 
reuse argued that the real issue was “the right to protect 
2   Barry Ketter, Zoning Appeals Board member  “In good faith” Chicago Tribune, February 27, 2011. 
3   DuPage County, Zoning Board of Appeals, T-3-10, August, 26 2010 
4   http://www.city-data.com/city/Willowbrook-Illinois.html
5   Dawoodi Bohras are Shia Muslims, an oﬀ shoot of Ismailis. The community believes that the 21st imam went into seclusion in Yemen in the 12th 
century and appointed a deputy, called a dai-e-mutlaq, to lead the community. Many Dawoodi Bohras first moved to Gujarat, northwestern India and 
now have branches in 40 countries.
6   DuPage County, Zoning Board of Appeals, T-3-10, August, 26 2010
7   Du Page County Zoning Board Of Appeals Minutes. July12 -August 26, 2010
8   ibid
9   Interview with Mark Daniel, Zoning attorney, April 12 2016. 
private property” and potential property tax increases to 
support infrastructure problems caused by non-profits 
which take over private homes for broader use. 8
What makes the MECCA case unusual is the visual 
aspect of the project. MECCA’s architectural structure 
included a 69-foot-tall dome and 79-foot-tall minaret. The 
plan exceeded the county’s height restriction of 36 feet, 
a restriction that was often waived for religious places. 
9What is important however is not only the community’s 
reactions to a minaret as visually unacceptable but also 
diverse reactions to the proposal from the community.  
The mosque applicants considered a dome and minaret to 
be the sine qua non of an Islamic prayer place, and argued 
that the permit needed to accommodate it. Building a 
mosque without a minaret would be akin to building 
a church without a steeple. For the proponents of the 
mosque it was not the height constraint but the increasing 
visibility of Islamic ideas and presence that created the 
reactions. The minaret became the symbolic locus and 
triggered debate on Islamic symbols especially among 
suburbanites who argued that such places needed to 
maintain rural life with a familiar religious landscape. 
For the proponents of the minaret, the real issue was not 
treating MECCA as a regular temple and approaching it 
as a disruptive appearance in a rural landscape. Two of 
the three existing religious structures in the area exceed 
the county’s height restriction of 36 feet proving that 
exceptions were granted to others. More important, due 
to the increased buﬀer zone between the building and 
surrounding buildings, the minarets would be noticeable 
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only to visitors. Thus the issue of visibility was more the 
issue of having a disruptive presence. 
The reception may also have been shaped by a recent 
increase in the number of permits requested by Muslim 
communities (DuPage Country received five applications 
from Muslim communities between 2009 and 2014) 
marking an unprecedented number in its history. While 
zoning and permit decisions often involve prolonged 
processes with polarizing debates and negative decisions, 
they still oﬀer a useful venue to voice concerns. DuPage 
County revived one of its earlier amendments to 
restrict the construction of new places of assembly in 
unincorporated areas and to move all new places of 
assembly to industrial or commercial zones, a trend that 
has been marking many U.S. cities. 10 Defenders of the 
proposal to move places of worship outside of residential 
zones present it as a market-driven solution to the 
perturbing financial influences of new places of assembly. 
But while market-driven language may justify zoning 
changes, a systematic review of existing research does not 
indicate what financial prospects and projections prevail. 
Proponents of the zoning practice present it as a strictly 
property-based decision as the highest level of increase 
(above 500%) of newcomers in many cities is constituted 
by Catholics (due to migration from South America) and 
not Muslims. Neglected in such discussions is that such 
10   For an example of such a trend see Hackworth J, Stein K. The Collision of Faith and Economic Development in Toronto’s Inner Suburban Industrial 
Districts. Urban Aﬀairs Review. 2012;48(1):37-63.
11   DarusSalam purchased a 6.5-acre parcel of land at the intersection of I-355 and North Avenue. 
12   Berger, Peter, and Gordon Redding, eds. The Hidden Form of Capital: Spiritual Influences in Societal Progress. London: Anthem Press, 2010.
13   DarusSalam,  masjidds.org/ retrieved December 10, 2018.
groups can receive services from existing churches while 
an Islamic landscape and places of worship are completely 
missing in many areas.
The DarruSalam Mosque as a comparison 
The MECCA experience can be useful compared to 
another recent mosque project in the area.  DarrusSalam 
followed the county’s idealized pathway of having a temple 
beyond the eyes and ears of communities in commercial 
areas. The project was successfully completed in 2013 and 
the new mosque was located on an interstate highway 
and in a commercial and industrial strip surrounded 
by a fast food chain, gas stations, a warehouse, a set of 
factories, and hotels.11  While this mosque exemplified “the 
move-assemblies-to commercial/industrial zone model”, 
the mosque proved itself to be distinct in its reaction to 
urban marginalization, exemplifying the cost of uprooting 
mosques from communities and the risk of depleting 
spiritual civic capital, a capital that is often defined as a set 
of ideas and actions stemming from religion and available 
for use in inclusive economic and political practices” 
(Berger & Redding 2010).12 
Unlike other mosques, DarrusSalam commits itself 
to hosting only American-born and raised Imams by 
stating that, “now the time has come to raise up a new 
wave of learned Muslims who have been born, bred, and 
educated at home to address Islamic legal and social 
issues and challenges unique to the American context.”13  
Paradoxically, while DarrusSalam is physically separated 
from many communities, its teachings address the unique 
needs of groups in the U.S. and tackle very controversial 
questions, such as if Islam can be lived best under an 
Islamic state, or if a Muslim group can pay attention only 
to their own ethnic issues (e.g., the Palestinian cause) if 
such interests lead them to neglect others (e.g., Rohingya 
Muslim).  Addressing the questions of radicalization or a 
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specific ethnic outlook is especially important considering 
that such issues are left unaddressed in many mosques 
due to their eﬀort to create completely a-political neutral 
places, thereby limiting their spiritual capital and depriving 
the mosques’ contribution to civil society as noted by 
Aubrey Westfall in this volume.14 
Representing Islam - Reactions to or appropriating 
essentialization?:
MECCA’s experience captures a broader historical patterns 
of how zoning and special use permits are appropriated to 
control and manage urban spaces and minorities within 
those spaces. The Nation of Islam reported the impact 
of zoning on their projects as early as 1968.15 Yet what is 
neglected in many accounts of so-called mosque disputes 
is the impact of such discussions on the communities 
themselves. More often than not, zoning related issues 
pose many theological questions to the community.  As the 
county discussed height limits, the same question arose in 
discussions in the community. Given the variety of mosque 
designs, what was traditional in Islamic architecture? Was 
a minaret an indispensable part of a mosque or was it a 
necessity when the first mosque was built? What was the 
meaning of a minaret, without having a public call for 
prayer? Since minarets were originally meant to create an 
elevated structure to make the call for prayer accessible 
and audible to many, could such a structure be easily 
eliminated when many had cell-phones that reminded 
them of prayer time? 
Discussions in the community regarding architectural 
adjustments were intense yet very muted—many debates 
took place quietly as members tried to balance the 
demands to create a place that the community would find 
acceptable and would meet the demands of the county. 
One of the first Syrians to move to the US explained the 
discussion as a “reverse essentialization” of Islam--what 
was considered as a “traditional” symbolic representation 
14   For more on the relation between civic culture and the restriction on Islamic practices see Aubrey Westfall’s Mosques and Political Engagement in 
Europe and North America, Wheaton College.
15   Sultan Tepe, Building Faiths, forthcoming. 
16   http://meccacenter.org/about/history-of-mecca/ ( retrieved on December 11, 2018) 
of Muslims was actually appropriated by Muslims based 
on their perception by others, without engaging critically 
with authentic Islamic ideas. A minaret served a function 
(expand the sound as a reminder of the time of prayer) 
and was not a main pillar of Islam; it was no longer 
needed due to the prevalence of watches and cellphones. 
Only uncritical decisions to assert Muslim identity, not 
missing minarets, would hollow Islamic practices. A 
careful engagement with so-called Islamic tradition would 
be much needed as Islam was practiced in new places. 
Some felt that given that minarets are always associated 
with Islam and religious places of assembly, not having 
one would be complying with the expectation of the 
majority that wanted to promote a watered-down Islam 
without a commonly accepted theology and symbols.  
Regardless of the debates, the center was eventually built 
without a minaret and its carefully developed website 
included the designs for the original project without any 
explanations for the omission of the minaret.16 Meanwhile, 
the first newsletters and sermons focused on the deeper 
implications of Islamophobia, which might not mean much 
to those who did not know the history of the place. 
From External to Internal Transformation of Mosques: 
balancing the power of boards, bylaws and Imams?
Building a mosque might appear challenging, said a 
mosque president who engaged in a several-year long 
battle to get the required construction permits in another 
suburb, but the real challenge is to find an Imam who 
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would not only lead but also understand the community. 
Imams conventionally maintain a level of autonomy in 
controlling a mosque’s services and teaching. Perhaps the 
most important questions facing many mosques include 
recruiting and defining the responsibilities of Imams, as 
noted by Nancy Khalil in this volume’s analysis.17 While 
many mosque communities try to maintain traditional 
Islamic practices, they also seek to reach out to the younger 
generation who are not familiar with the traditions their 
parents have experienced firsthand. Many mosques with 
two diﬀerent constituencies—Arabic, Urdu or Farsi etc. 
-speaking elderly immigrant generations and English-
speaking younger generations—try to bridge the diﬀerence. 
Among American born Black Muslims the generational 
gap issue remains with diﬀerent manifestations. 
Linguistic and generational gap questions are intertwined 
with theological questions.  While some communities 
uphold conventional methods and do not make fluency in 
English a requirement for an Imam, many communities 
strive to find bilingual Imams who can bridge the 
generations. In the case of MECCA, the mosque found 
a solution by creating a two-tier system that has been 
adopted by many mosques.18 While the Imam at MECCA 
came from the prestigious Al-Azhar University in Egypt, 
the youth leadership was entrusted to a local sheikh. 
However, indicating emerging hierarchies in the newly 
formed mosque communities, both Imam and youth 
leader were required to submit regular reports to the 
board.19 As many mosque decisions are scrutinized and 
contested by members, one of MECCA’s first newsletters 
urged members to vote in both national (presidential) and 
board member elections.  Such practices are new as many 
mosques were conventionally run by ad hoc decisions and 
Imams. The changing context required the adoption of 
bylaws and changed the internal hierarchy of the mosque 
in favor of boards, said a community member.20 For 
17  Nancy Khalil’s chapter.
18    “Mecca Center Youth Coordinator” October 23, 2016
19  Ibid
20   Author’s interview with a member of the Mosque Foundation, April 12, 2017
21   Author’s interview with a member of Irshad Learning Center, April 12, 2017. 
22   Author’s interview with a member of Irshad Learning Center, March 8, 2016.
23   Ibid
many mosque attendants, the shift from an Imam-led 
mosque to a board-led mosque with bylaws changed the 
entire structure of the mosques, including the content of 
sermons. When Imams’ independence is curtailed, boards 
and committees emerge as platforms to discuss and resolve 
diﬀerent ideas and interests, forging new practices.
In Zoning We Unite: urban entropy, rules and 
institutionally induced identities?
While many studies reduce mosque disputes to a 
contestation between well-knit communities (Muslim 
groups and anti-Muslim groups), such processes often 
include multiple stakeholders. Instead of pitting well-
defined groups against each other, such disputes often help 
to consolidate ties across and within Muslim communities. 
“We had a rather vague sense of unity before we tried to 
have a learning center,” said a member of an Islamic center. 
21The center experienced a multi-year, highly contested 
process of attaining a special use permit. Paradoxically “it 
is the zoning decisions and public hearings that turned us 
into to a community--we coordinated our participation in 
hearings, raised funds, took time oﬀ from work to go to 
the court, baby-sat for children etc.”22 More importantly, 
statements such as  “we did not know the process, we 
received help from an Islamic center that we had no ties 
with before ” are echoed  by many mosque members 
noting the lack of understanding of the local regulations 
and the emerging collaboration across various groups 
that would have theological diﬀerences otherwise.23 Such 
statements are not outliers. Instead, interviews with 
diﬀerent Muslim communities show that it is not the 
communities that build mosques, but rather the decision 
to build a mosque that brings together and consolidates 
Muslims’ identities, thereby creating the community. The 
reactions of neighbors and committees (e.g., development, 
zoning and county boards) diﬀer significantly. When 
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public hearings are scheduled, a small, well-organized 
community can change the tone of the debates, while 
how the zoning and development committees are formed 
and the individual experiences of members might create 
completely diﬀerent results.  While some communities 
that experience contested zoning issues limit their 
discussions to in-group conversations, others make it one 
of the main pillars of their call for unity and fundraising 
eﬀorts. Additionally, these disputes are internalized and 
even in some cases instrumentalized, reinforcing a distinct 
identity, emphasizing the existential crisis in a hostile 
context where Islam is demonized. 
Zoning restrictions serve as a US-specific demobilization 
strategy and treat all Muslim identities as similar, but inside 
the mosque communities one can witness changing power 
dynamics as well as increasing room for creative expressions 
that view the moment as one of change and construction of 
a new identity.24 What makes such expressions important 
is that they are framed as a result of the externalization 
of Muslim identity in many countries and also from the 
perspective of Muslims’ position among other minorities. 
The accommodation of such questions shows that, once 
established, mosques become the realms of newly emerging 
exegetical practices with substantial implications: 
The entire world is waiting to see, 
Just what this Ummah might be, 
But can we tell them who we could be, 
When we ourselves cannot see… 
Who we are.25
Are we foolishly left holding shattered dreams 
And battered lands with which to go galumphing back? 
Are we rabid wolves part of the pack? 
Is the only word we know -attack?! 26
24   Please note how disqualification and demobilization strategies of the states diﬀer depending on their political administrative context see 
Julien Talpin’s Constraining Muslim Mobilizations in France: Symbolic Repression and Disqualification as Demobilization Strategies in this volume. 
25   https://meccacenter.org/2016/02/28/who-are-we/
26    https://meccacenter.org/2016/02/28/who-are-we/
27   For a more detailed review of individual expression of Islam see Bogumia Hall’s Art and activism of the ‘war on terror’ generation: British Muslim 
youth and the politics of refusal in Britain.
28   Author’s interviews with Zahra April 2018.
29   The Mecca Center Newsletter, November 2016
While collective identities are used to express zoning and 
special use claims, the expressions exemplified in the above 
poem capture the ongoing individuation of Islam that 
addresses a range of question from code-switching to being 
Muslim while struggling with some Islamic injunctions. 
Such faith-rooted critical questions as well as challenges 
to stereotypical approaches to Islam appeal to the younger 
members of the community who deal with rejection by 
mainstream Muslim and non-Muslim groups as well as the 
older generation and want to connect with other groups 
who are critical of the historical and past marginalization. 
27 “We are a minority within a minority,” said an Ismaili. 
“For instance, some Muslims do not think I am a Muslim, 
but a client did not want to work with me after he found 
out I am a Muslim, yet I strive to get myself recognized 
as Muslim at my school by the Muslim groups. I am 
marginalized in every community.”28 
Changing Theologies in and Beyond Mosques. 
Although mosque debates are often forgotten after their 
permits are granted or denied, many mosque communities 
seek to create a viable financial structure and loyal 
congregations once they are built. As a result, how they 
approach current questions surrounding them and how 
they conduct Friday sermons help to modify and construct 
new Islamic theologies.  It is not surprising that MECCA’s 
first issue, for instance, focused on Islamophobia, but this 
group does so by focusing on the very early years of Islam 
by isolating such issues from their current context. The 
discussions indicate how early Muslims were described 
as liars and madmen, and how they reacted to such 
accusations with patience and prayers. Such discussions 
also describe Muhammad’s activities in Mecca and Medina 
as “activism” to emphasize the importance of debate and 
discussion. 29While such calls are rooted in the familiar 
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Islamic historical accounts, they take new terms such 
as Islamophobia and activism and ground them in early 
Islamic practice, turning engaging with Islamophobia into 
a religious practice. One address given by MECCA’s Imam 
concludes, “Coexistence instead of dependency and fusion 
should be the way of Muslims anywhere. We should avoid 
blind imitation of others, Muslims or non-Muslims.” 30 
Inside the mosques there is a range of diﬀerent questions 
that were not previously tackled by communities, 
especially in Muslim majority countries. A lecture on 
diversity, for instance, does not focus on the plurality of 
identities in the US but the plurality of identities within the 
Islamic community and the implications of privileging one 
ethnic-Islamic group or cause (Syrian refugees, etc.) over 
others. 31 Likewise, the question of how the community can 
respond to excessive individualization generates diﬀerent 
answers. Fitrat, human nature, requires individuals to 
protect themselves not only from Hollywood but also from 
Bollywood, says an Imam; dawah, spreading Islam, is most 
useful because it reflects what the Qur’an has said about 
human nature and its inclination to discern bad, do good 
and how Islam’s approach to human nature diﬀers from 
others, raising a set of ontological questions in relation 
to other theological traditions that is not posed in many 
Muslim majority countries.32 
The Transformation of Urban Space and Muslim’s 
Identities
The building of a mosque in the west challenges Muslim 
communities “who never raised funds to have a mosque,” 
said a mosque executive board member of a Chicagoland 
Mosque.33 The lack of an established tradition to finance a 
mosque requires residents to adjust to a new tradition (a 
new practice of building a community’s own mosque), to 
raise the necessary amounts while finding a place to build a 
mosque. As new places are built, there are objections, often 
reduced to the precarious ideas of Islam and its followers; 
30   Sheikh Hassan Aly , Submission, Unity, & Identity: Lessons learned from changing the Qiblah,The Mecca Center, April 2016.
31   Minhajuddin Ahmed, The Diversity in Deen- Mufti, Jummah Khutbah, March 16, 2018.
32   Minhajuddin Ahmed, “The Hardships of Practicing Islam,” Jummah Khutbah, December 11, 2015
33   Author’s interview with an Orland Park Mosque Member, April 2016.
it is an unsettling process. Some members leave right 
away and go to established communities. Contested urban 
spaces, the increasing tendency of local governments 
to use zoning to manage their tax revenues and growth, 
and increased property values compel many new Muslim 
communities to look for buildings or lots, especially in 
unincorporated areas or suburbs where urban governance 
is less present and can be more accommodating, yet 
such regions often have a populace that reacts to mosque 
communities more vocally. The reluctance of local 
governments to accommodate new identities, especially 
when they are seen as symbolically and economically 
destabilizing, and the increasing tendency to move 
mosques to industrial zones risk creating spatial isolation 
and limiting their spiritual capital.  Many mosque 
communities embark on their mosque construction 
process without much information about zoning and other 
requirements as well as with limited financial capacities 
and fundraising abilities; thus they are transformed 
throughout the process more drastically—not only in their 
Islamic identity, but also in the ways they approach local 
and national governance. 
As the size of local communities gets smaller, it gets easier 
to organize opposition against mosque construction 
projects. Thus, building mosques actually becomes 
more diﬃcult in small communities where sometimes 
one or two oppositional votes can prevent construction. 
At the same time urban centers with large populations 
often do not oﬀer enough space for the construction of 
new temples, and Muslims are moved to suburbs. The 
struggle over the very location of the mosque becomes 
an important area of contestation that not only alters 
Islamic identities but changes the formation of U.S. cities 
and suburbs.  Suburbs and unincorporated areas risk 
becoming increasingly fragmented due to reactions to new 
places of religious assembly and relegating new temples 
to commercial/industrial zones, thereby increasing the 
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social distance among communities. Financially struggling 
mosque communities refer to the costs of their rejection 
to raise funds; Islamophobia becomes the raison d’etre for 
many collective actions that risk putting important 
debates about accountability and critical engagement 
with conventional practices on the backburner as divisive 
issues while many express declining trust in institutions.34 
Nevertheless, new theological questions are posed due 
to voluntary and imposed adjustments in response to the 
demands of urban environments. Meanwhile multiple 
emerging novel answers reinforce the pluralization of views 
and theologies within the Muslim community.  Behind 
the so-called mosque controversies or minaret disputes is 
the intersection of urban transformation and theological 
questions that allows communities to create internationally 
focused and locally rooted Islamic theologies, suggesting 
that a vernacularized Islam marked by American urban 
space is in the making. 
 
34   For a more detailed discussion between feeling discriminated and trust see Mujtaba Isani  and Jolanda van der Noll’s The Eﬀects of Discrimination on 
European Muslim Trust in Political Institutions
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Approaching the Security-Integration Nexus
Andrew Aguilar, Center for International Studies, Sciences Po Paris
Security issues are only one aspect of the Muslim 
experience in Europe, but an aspect which receives a 
disproportionate amount of media attention. The idea that 
the integration of Muslims is related to security has been 
vocally articulated after each recent terrorist incident and 
urban rioting (Bleich, 2009; Bleich et al., 2010).  Political 
responses to the 2001 riots in Britain and the 2005 banlieue 
riots in France linked social unrest in segregated Muslim 
communities to perceived shortfalls in national approaches 
to integration. For example, in 2006, UK Labour Prime 
Minister Tony Blair remarked that the 2005 bombing 
of the London Underground – perpetrated by “well-
integrated” Muslim British citizens – threw the dangers of 
multicultural Britain “into sharp relief” and formally ended 
his support for multiculturalism. Conservative UK PM 
David Cameron has insisted that multiculturalism prevents 
citizens from truly integrating and called for an emphasis 
on teaching British values (Mattei and Broeks, 2016). 
Similarly, French Prime minister Manuel Valls linked the 
November 2015 Paris attacks to the “social, territorial, and 
ethnic apartheid” of French minorities while maintaining 
the unity of the Republic as the only answer (Le Point, 
2015). In response to the November 2015 Paris attacks, 
he stated “We will improve integration – not least by 
inspecting and shutting down any educational institutions 
that are teaching intolerance” (Cameron, 2015). 
As evidenced in political rhetoric, the integration process 
is a form of statecraft should be understood as a reflection 
of the contemporary socio-governmental context among 
seemingly unrelated initiatives. More than promoting 
economic opportunity or better education, the definition 
of integration holds important implications for the very 
definition of national identity and social stability. The 
almost natural coupling of integration outcomes with 
national security outcomes marks the rise of an important 
conceptual framework long overlooked in academic 
research. Far from a natural occurrence, concerns over 
increasing crime, urban rioting, and most recently 
terrorism directly link integration challenges to not simply 
immigration policy but also to how states perceive their 
own security. The important result of this coupling is the 
normalization of integration outcomes as an indicator 
of national security. This relationship indicates that poor 
integration outcomes represented a significant security 
risk. The establishment of this relationship also reflects the 
increasing weight of security-based analyses and institutions 
in driving decisions and introduced international security 
risks into the domestic arena. Such research focuses on the 
emergence of the rise of transnational Islam as a key driver 
of poor integration outcomes and political strife (Kepel, 
2012, 1997; Obin, 2004).
Existing research has not yet identified the eﬀects of 
developing social integration policy to strengthen security. 
Recent policy developments in Britain and France reflect 
an increased focus on Muslim citizens through policing 
initiatives and counterterrorism strategies. The security 
field, comprising intelligence services, the policing 
infrastructure, and counterterrorism experts in academia, 
occupies an important role in the implementation of policy 
attempting to improve structural deficits in important 
socioeconomic indicators. “Securing” these citizens against 
the threats of religious fundamentalism occupies a top 
concern for the Interior Ministries of these countries. For 
certain Muslim citizens, this increased scrutiny could be 
contributing to higher feelings of discrimination, lower 
levels of trust in national institutions, and withdrawal from 
public debate (Hall, 2018; Isani, 2018). How and to what 
extent did “security” become a factor in the development 
and implementation of integration measures in France and 
the United Kingdom regarding its Muslim citizens? What 
are the state processes that contribute to this process, and 
what have been the resulting outcomes of such initiatives? 
Reassessing Integration Models
Prior integration literature has juxtaposed Britain and 
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France to typecast two distinct integration models. The 
literature has described France as an “assimilationist” 
society and Britain as a “multicultural” society in their 
approaches to integration (Hill, 2013). In these terms, 
the Republican integration model (modèle français 
d’intégration) prioritizes individual integration over 
group ethno-religious identities, while the British model 
accommodates diﬀerence and allows individuals to retain 
community identities (Long, 1988; Schnapper, 1991; 
Haut Conseil à l’integration, 1991; Modood, 2005). These 
countries occupy the extreme end of a spectrum in which 
other European countries are placed to compare Muslim 
integration approaches (Goodman, 2014).  Scholars have 
reified political assertions rooted in specific national 
histories in an attempt to explain how policy initiatives 
fit within or contradict their respective ideologies rather 
than understanding the sociopolitical context driving these 
decisions (Favell, 1998; Kastoryano, 2002). 
Rather than buttressing theoretical debates on national 
models, integration as a concept holds important 
implications in assessing how states view administrative 
promotions of social cohesion. After identifying a list of 
14 diﬀerent topics encompassed in integration research in 
the early 2000s, Adrian Favell astutely asked “how and why 
this disparate range of state policies, laws, local initiatives, 
and societal dispositions – which could in theory be 
implemented by all kinds of agencies and at all kinds of 
levels – comes to be thought of and described as a single-
nation-state’s overall strategy or policy of integration” 
(Favell, 2015). In this question, Favell identifies the 
important assumption that “integration” is a construction 
used to facilitate analyses among disparate state initiatives.  
Such claims should not discount the importance of local 
contexts in Muslim-focused integration initiatives. Many 
of the papers in this collection underscore the national 
contexts in which state actors, local policies, and Muslim 
associations operate. Shia communities attempting to 
practice religious self-flagellation rituals face city ordinance 
regulation and actively refer to other foreign communities 
to help push their permits through (Astor, 2018) . Many 
Muslim associations in the United States prioritize the 
501(c)3 tax-exempt status to increase their philanthropic 
reach, and others interpret Islamic theology to account 
for the limitations in finding a stable place of worship 
(Merriman, 2018; Tepe, 2018). In Germany, tombstones 
assert migrant identities such as a national flag or a 
mosque in an attempt to redefine public debate on the role 
of these religious symbols in public  (Balkan, 2018). These 
approaches, however, should not be forced into a static 
integration model and then assessed on its compatibility 
with the model. The complexities of contemporary 
integration challenges warrant a wide range of responses 
within a single national context. National integration 
themes such as multiculturalism or assimilation oﬀer 
guidance to local level policy implementation, but local 
level administrative challenges often require negotiation on 
seemly hardline ideological discourse. 
Security, Immigration, and Integration
The security studies literature has developed an influential 
framework for understanding how states view domestic 
policy as a manner of strengthening their security.  Though 
originally focused on the sources of state-based conflict, 
the literature evolved in the 1990s to understand how 
domestic policy could impact the security of sovereign 
states. The biggest implication in this argument was the 
incorporation of policy outside of the defense sector in 
assessing a state’s overall security.  The Copenhagen School 
identified a series of threat categories and their role in 
defining a state’s security agenda (Buzan, 1983; Waever 
et al., 1993; Buzan et al., 1998). Such views asserted that 
states fully controlled the issues comprising the security 
agenda. The term “securitization” referred to the rhetorical 
ability of state elites to make any issue a security issue. 
Their interpretations hinge on a coherent view of the 
state, an approach similar to the one found in integration 
models literatures and convey security in a static zero-sum 
perspective. 
Increasing migration in Europe during this period 
also prompted reflections on immigration policy and 
its increasing role in expressing state sovereignty. Its 
implications on issues such as border control, asylum 
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policy, and citizenship provided scholars with a compelling 
argument on the increasing influence of security concerns 
posed specifically by Muslim migrants. The Salman 
Rushdie incidents of 1989 and the first aﬀaires du foulard 
eﬀectively mobilized public discourse on a number of 
citizenship and immigration policies in light of social 
integration concerns and the potential for physical violence 
(Bowen, 2007). In sum, concerns over which migrants 
and how spurred debate regarding more restrictive 
immigration policies in Western Europe throughout this 
period to prevent anticipated instances of urban tension.
More recent security literature has begun re-assessing 
the static security perspective through assessments of 
immigration policy practice such as border control at 
both the national and supranational level (Bigo, 2002; 
Huysmans, 2006; Rudolph, 2006; Chebel d’Appollonia, 
2012). While these scholars have oﬀered a preliminary 
approach on moving away from a static security 
perspective, they have kept their analyses rooted 
in immigration policy and the practices of security 
institutions.  With increasing concerns arising from 
domestically-produced terrorism, addressing the root 
causes of disintegration has become an important 
assumption in strengthening overall security.
Proposing A New Approach to Security-Integration
In contrast to a static security-integration model, I 
propose framing security as a competing administrative 
paradigm within key integration policy areas.  I argue that 
security concerns and their accompanying institutions 
are increasingly present in both grand policy designs and 
in the implementation of such policy. Through shifting 
the analytical frame to incorporate both integration 
initiatives and security institutions, the interactions among 
them can be observed to understand the new day-to-day 
interactions among various state institutions, Muslim 
community members, and media outlets. Other papers in 
this collection have raised important examples in which 
the two areas overlap. The French Muslim association 
Union des organisations islamiques de France has in certain 
cases collaborated on the promotion of a “civil Islam” with 
state authorities in response to security incidents (Dazey, 
2018). French authorities in Roubaix have increasingly 
relied on Muslim “proselytizing” rationales to deny public 
funding to certain Muslim associations (Talpin, 2018). 
Such examples allude to a new governing baseline in the 
execution of social policy but should not be oversimplified 
into asserting that security is the end-all issue. 
Asking the question of how policy is translated reveals the 
importance of policy-implementing individuals and even 
more importantly the context through which they base 
their decisions.  Policy analysis literature has outlined three 
key levels of analysis: the philosophies or ideologies that 
describe a general society, the “policy solutions” proposed 
by policymakers, and general programs that underpin 
these solutions (Schmidt, 2008). Scholars have proposed 
several models to contextualize the ideas and actions 
of public actors considering changing events (Muller, 
2005; Béland, 2009). Literature focusing on local-level 
implications of integration policy stresses individuals 
left outside of the national models spectrum – political 
councilors, mayors, non-profit leaders – who hold 
responsibility for the actual implementation and outcomes. 
These individuals often form part of an institution that 
is the direct tool of integration policies such the school 
(Mattei, 2012; Zanten, 2004), the hospital (Sargent and 
Erikson, 2014),  and the city government (de Galembert, 
2006; Garbaye, 2005). How do these oﬃcials obtain their 
security knowledge? What is the relationship between 
social policy institutions and security institutions? How 
does the need for “increased security” intersect with the 
democratic need to ensure equal opportunity?
Policy assessment literature has long noted the disconnect 
between a policy’s stated intentions and its resulting 
outcomes. The unintended eﬀects of policies have varying 
eﬀects at diﬀerent levels of state governance and daily 
life that are often in contradiction with one another. 
Moved by spurs in public opinion, politically charged 
analyses, and ineﬃcient administration, governments 
design and implement policy in ways counter to their 
perceived intentions. This unevenness is a crucial variable 
to assess in the extent to which security concerns can 
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ultimately influence policy implementation (Evans et al., 
1985; Skocpol, 2008).  Security in this sense must not 
be viewed only as a grand strategy but also observed in 
how it contributes to implementation unevenness. I am 
specifically interested in whether security institutions 
and rationales influence the ultimate success of social 
integration policies across a wide range of government 
ministries. I suggest that security concerns can result 
in a series of conflicting policy recommendations in the 
development and execution of integration policy focused 
on Muslim citizens.
One compelling example of this trend is occurring in the 
education system. The French and British governments have 
embarked on extensive de-radicalization programs in the 
school  to combat the threat of homegrown terror (Heath-
Kelly, 2013; Hill, 2013; Ministère de l’éducation nationale, 
de l’énseignement supérieur et de la recherche, 2015). The 
development and evolution of the CONTEST strategy in 
Britain has focused on the school as a place to both identify 
symptoms of radicalization and a way to best mitigate them. 
This strategy constitutes part of a larger security outsourcing 
approach to many aspects of British society.
In France,  the education system has been the institutional 
arena in which debates regarding religious symbols, most 
specifically the hijab, have played out.  The famous 2004 
ban was passed in part to limit the influence of radicalized 
grand-frères on young girls (Mattei and Aguilar, 2016).  
The school was also central in the French response to 
the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks where laïcité was further 
stressed as a core Republican value. Indeed, new positions 
within the Education Ministry dedicated to security and 
radicalization prevention reveal the prominence of security 
within traditional integration institutions. The shift to an 
implementation-oriented approach will illuminate how 
such policy was eﬀectively implemented and examine the 
day-to-day concerns of Muslim citizens and government 
oﬃcials.
An analysis of the security-integration nexus therefore 
oﬀers numerous avenues to understand a prominent 
decision-making context in France and the United 
Kingdom. The novelty of identifying “security” as the end 
result of “integration” places social institutions such as the 
school, local government, and workplace, at the core of 
the 21st century security debates regarding homegrown 
terrorism and social stability. But it also raises the 
questions as to the extent to which they are participating 
in integration policy implementation. Such questions 
oﬀer an important reflection in an era of increasing state 
surveillance and rising social suspicion of Muslims in 
Western democracies.
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Towards an Autonomization of Jihadism?
The ideological, sociological and political permeability between contemporary 
quietist Salafism and Jihadism in France
Mohamed-Ali Adraoui, Georgetown University
Grounded in several years of fieldwork on French Salafism 
and Jihadism, this essay advances the thesis of the 
emancipation of Jihadism. By this, I mean that the violent 
career1 represented by Jihadism must first be conceived of 
as a form of socialization. Entering into a Jihadist trajectory 
from the possible starting point of quietist Salafism (the 
main form of Salafism in France) must be understood 
on the basis of objective criteria, namely through a 
certain number of connections and social ties with the 
main actors and contexts of French Salafism. More 
specifically, it is important to raise the question of quietist 
Salafist socialization as a potential prior step in Jihadist 
engagement. Is it possible to verify this relationship? 
Another question must also be considered: if this link 
is not observed between quietist Salafism and Jihadism, 
how is it possible to explain that the violence expressed 
by certain Muslims takes on a symbolic, even practical 
language of the Salafist matrix (despite its diversity)?
I call the autonomization of Jihadism the convergence 
of three more specific dynamics. The first is the clear 
disconnection, in sociological terms, between French 
Jihadists and quietist Salafist communities. Put diﬀerently, 
here the question concerns the lack of permeability 
between Salafist quietism and Jihadist violence, with the 
two forms of socialization being totally disconnected. The 
second is the polarization between quietist Salafism and 
Jihadism. By this, I mean a phenomenon of increasingly 
clear separation, even clear-cut competition, between the 
two branches which, nonetheless, claim to come from 
the same doctrine. Put diﬀerently, these two sides of 
contemporary Sunni fundamentalism are more diﬀerent 
than they are similar. The third concerns the emergence 
1   I am borrowing the concept of career from the symbolic interactionism within sociology and particularly Ervin Goﬀman for whom the career is both 
the reflection of an actor’s oﬃcial situation and a moral itinerary by which she assimilates a given personality. See Ervin Goﬀman, Asiles, 1968, Paris, 
Ed. de Minuit, Le Sens commun, [1963] 1975, p.179.
of a form of political violence which echoes, ideologically 
speaking, the Salafist imaginary, but lacks fundamentalism 
in terms of religious practice. 
Jihadism is thus becoming an independent branch of 
Islam, with no real attachment to religious and social 
puritanism. It organizes itself increasingly as a religious 
branch that is above all violent, but without the claim to 
orthodoxy which is the very raison d’être of Salafism. In 
other terms, Jihadism, by putting the emphasis on the 
pressing need for violent struggle in the name of Islam 
and oppressed Muslims worldwide, imposes itself above 
all as an ideology of combat, while religious practice (in 
terms of worship) is put in the background. This extreme 
form of dissenting and revolutionary politicization thus 
replaces the preaching characterizing Salafist ethics. This 
element nonetheless forces us to evoke an important 
feature in current debates on Jihadism, in that the absence 
of the claim to orthodoxy or sociological permeability 
between quietist Salafism and Jihadism does not make 
it possible to omit the cultural domination of revivalist 
discourses constructed on the paradigm, echoed by 
Salafism for nearly a century, of the need to return to 
original Islam. There is thus an essential question that must 
be raised, namely the juxtaposition of a double reality: the 
promotion of the Salafist imaginary in the context of a lack 
of connection between Salafist communities and Jihadist 
trajectories in contemporary France. 
Methodology:
I have shed light on these three dynamics through long-
term fieldwork. From 2004 to 2011, I aimed to study the 
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various forms taken by socialization within French quietist 
Salafist communities.2 Although, during this work, I met a 
number of Jihadists (or sympathizers with Jihadist theses), 
the latter didn’t represent the core of my work. Since 
2013 and the emergence of a form of political violence 
legitimized by a Jihadist vision of Islam (even though 
attacks had been prepared and committed before) in the 
wake of the Syrian crisis, I conducted field work in several 
countries, including France, among populations that I met 
during my PhD in order to shed light on their trajectories 
since 2011, and immersed myself among Jihadist actors 
and sympathizers (in prisons, in neighborhoods where 
people have left for Syria, etc.). I have tried to dissect 
their trajectories and, through this, analyze their prior 
socializations in order to observe (or not) the existence of a 
Salafist influence or determinism.3 
The first field primarily concerns the sociology of quietist 
Salafism in France. In geographical terms, I conducted 
around one hundred interviews with French Salafists in 
Mantes-la-Jolie, Les Mureaux, Stains, Argenteuil, Saint-
Denis, Nanterre, Villeneuve-la-Garenne, Montreuil, 
Levallois-Perret, Athis-Mons, Corbeil-Essonnes, 
Sartrouville, La Courneuve, Clichy-sous-Bois, Montfermeil, 
Asnières, Gennevilliers, Colombes, La Garenne-Colombes, 
Maisons-Alfort, Courbevoie, Vitry-sur-Seine, Draveil, 
Juvisy-sur-Orge, Epinay-sur-Seine, and inner Paris. In 
addition to this, I conducted research in mosques in cities 
across France, starting with my home region, Normandy. 
Finally, I did a research stay in the North of France in 2008 
in Lille. In all, I did interviews as well as a number of hours 
of neutral or participant observation in over 50 places of 
Muslim worship. The content of these exchanges primarily 
concerned the reasons of their religious engagement, 
their vision of political events, the place of Islam in France 
and in the world, their conception of religious otherness, 
their relationship to their country of origin, and family 
relationships. 
2   Mohamed-Ali Adraoui, Salafism in France: Local and Transnational Movements, Oxford University Press, 2019.
3   This second field owes a lot to several interviews I conducted in prison for several years, as well as to sociological research done by myself and my 
colleagues specialized in the study of Salafism and Jihadism as part of the International Panel on ways out of violence implemented by the Fondation 
maison des sciences de l’homme with the support of the Carnegie Corporation of New-York: http://www.ipev-fmsh.org
4   Bernard Godard, La question musulmane en France. Un état des lieux sans concessions, Fayard, 2015. 
The field work that I started in 2013 is rooted in 
two dimensions. First, I returned to the cities and 
neighborhoods where I did work for my PhD in order 
to analyze possible changes in the religious, social, 
and political landscape, under the eﬀect notably of the 
conflicts in the Middle East, in the context of which a 
change of scale relating to Jihadism has occurred over 
the past several years with the emergence and bolstering 
of movements that are among the main actors of these 
conflicts (Syria, etc.). Secondly, I conducted research 
within Jihadist circles, primarily in some French prisons 
(Fresnes as well as other prisons in the Paris suburbs) 
where I met with a dozen people incarcerated for acts of 
Jihadist terrorism. Additionally, in certain neighborhoods 
of some cities in the Paris suburbs (Trappes, Sevran, etc.), 
I also met a few dozen people over the past few years 
whom I consider sympathizers of Jihadist theses even if 
they committed no acts of violence nor declared any direct 
allegiance (synonymous for now with a promotion of the 
Jihadist imaginary, and nothing more).
A clear disconnection between Salafist socialization 
and Jihadist engagement
On a macro-territorial level, the map of Jihadist 
engagement is the same as that of Salafist mosques, but 
also of communities which are not Salafist, as shown 
by the map of consular mosques (linked to the states of 
origin of several immigrant communities such as Morocco 
and Turkey).4 Such an observation cannot demonstrate 
that Salafism and Jihadism are causally linked. This 
cartography rather illustrates the presence of various 
forms of identification with Islam on territories where the 
population is largely Muslim. It is thus necessary to reason 
at a much more micro-sociological level. 
Thus, the analysis I conducted after returning to the field 
I had investigated from 2004 to 2011 clearly shows the 
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absence of a Jihadist metastasis among all of the people 
I had previously met. None of the quietist Salafists that I 
met and followed for all these years (and up until today) 
turned towards Jihadism. Moreover, as I will show, there 
is no legitimation of Jihadist theses, as violence is clearly 
and absolutely rejected for religious reasons (the killing of 
civilians, ineﬀectiveness, immorality, and the abandonment 
of preaching in the name of political revolution). Although 
the Assad regime is never defended (unlike Saudi Arabia 
for instance which is considered to defend the true Sunni 
Islam), Jihadists are fought through preaching and stances 
within these non-violent Salafist communities as shown 
by the diﬀerent contents of preaching that I observed 
at regular intervals in a number of mosques known for 
housing puritan groups.
Although members established within Salafist 
communities do not evolve towards Jihadism, my 
empirical research conducted in the past years among 
a dozen imprisoned Jihadists also makes it possible to 
see the lack of sociological correlation between these 
two fundamentalist branches. Even though the latter 
clearly say that in the Muslim religion they see the only 
true faith, as well as the justification of extreme violence 
against any actor (the French state, the Syrian regime, 
Shias, etc.) deemed to have attacked the “Truth” and 
Muslims worldwide, thereby reactivating a discourse 
that can be found within quietist Salafist communities, 
the various forms of socialization that characterize their 
trajectories only sporadically rely on religious institutions. 
The identification with original Islam is real in terms of 
a desired model for society, but there is no trace of any 
continuous passing through Salafist mosques over a 
given period. Their prior socialization concerns interest 
for illegal activity (various forms of traﬃcking) and often 
gang life. Visiting mosques is trivial, and does not show a 
specific rooting or inclusion into the puritan community 
that would incite the followers to read specific Salafist 
works or become familiar with web sites that have 
popularized theses of clerics located in the Gulf (Saudi 
Arabia, etc.). The stories told by the people I met in prison 
5   Farhad Khosrokhavar, Le nouveau jihad en Occident, Robert Laﬀont, 2018.
moreover show the absence of religious education within 
the family as well as an emphasis on Islamic reference in 
terms of identity which happens rather late in life. The age 
of the sample, between 21 and 29, shows that it is during 
adolescence, as well as in the first years of adulthood, 
that a religious quest occurs, without real participation 
in a given community. Rather, most seem to be fluttering 
around in sociological terms. No specific Islamic structure 
characterizes these profiles, whose aspiration to reconnect 
with Islam is real but is not accompanied by a specific 
socialization within an established community built on 
identified principles and norms as is the case with quietist 
Salafism. 
A growing polarization between these two radical 
forms of Islam
Beyond the lack of sociological permeability between 
quietist Salafism and Jihadism, the trend also shows an 
increased polarization between the two branches in 
terms of doctrinal and social issues. Even though since 
the beginning of the 2000s, both Jihadist and the quietist 
Salafist approaches exclude the other in their respective 
messages, the last few years have shown an increasingly 
large distinction, and even a veritable symbolic war, for 
hegemony over the definition of “authentic” Islam.5 Today, 
this takes the form of an increasingly clear and intended 
demarcation in the presentation of the two branches. The 
disqualification of one branch by the other conveys not 
only a growing emancipation of fundamentalist discourses 
compared to others, but also and especially a greater 
diﬃculty, today and undoubtedly in the future, to pass 
from quietist Salafism towards a radical and violent form 
of Islam such as Jihadism.
A Jihadism without orthodoxy: the primacy of the 
paradigm of insecurity 
The thesis of a Salafization of social ties is as interesting as 
it is problematic. Indeed, the analysis of quietist Salafism 
communities and that of Jihadist profiles (whether in 
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prison or non-violent sympathizers) reveals a dynamic 
that can seem contradictory, but which is understandable 
in reality if we don’t focus on the paradigm of linearity. 
Quietist Salafism contains an undeniable part of symbolic 
and even social violence while rejecting the use of 
violence in terms of doctrine and preaching in favor of a 
strategy of a psychological separation (but not necessarily 
economic given what we know about the emphasis on 
entrepreneurial and commercial careers within these 
puritan communities). This leads to the question of the 
impact of the sociological separation, which, as we saw 
earlier, doesn’t lead to Jihadist-style violent engagement, 
but also that of a type of social break that can facilitate 
violent strategies despite the ideological opposition to 
them contained in the principles of quietist Salafism.
Thus, based on these various empirical findings, an 
additional disconnection must be mentioned in the 
analysis of Jihadist profiles (which naturally deserve a 
number of additional and more diverse studies). The 
religious quest takes the form, primarily and above all, of 
a struggle to bring down what can be seen as a paradigm 
of insecurity. Muslims are considered to be a religious 
and political nation that is in danger and can only be 
helped by a violent and transnational movement (with of 
course some local ramifications). Religious purification 
through education and classic preaching are not included 
(at least not as a priority) in the Jihadist prerogative and 
imaginary. This is another instance of the emancipation 
of this religious branch, which is increasingly oriented 
towards combat for the safety and dignity of the Umma 
notwithstanding the need for orthodoxy which is still at the 
heart of the Salafist ethic. In this sense, there is no social 
homology between quietist Salafism and Jihadism. The 
concepts mobilized may certainly be close, even identical, 
but what matters is the understanding and the meaning of 
a discourse in a given context.
Moreover, the proximity and even the identity of doctrinal 
themes addressed both in quietist Salafism and in 
Jihadism cannot hide the diversity of practices; in sum, 
the sociology of religious principles put into practice. In 
this respect, considering the ideological infrastructure 
as primary seems a faulty way of understanding violent 
engagement and specifically the violent careers that 
define contemporary Jihadism (in France or elsewhere). 
Violence seems to be an independent and disconnected 
element of orthodoxy which replaces the latter. Salvation 
through a strategy of purification over the long term seems 
to be a major contradiction with the Jihadist principles 
of permanent revolution and continuous combat in the 
name of defending oppressed co-religionists. The Jihadist 
paradigm is indeed one of the Umma in danger, namely a 
consideration of security and in fine politics (in the modern 
sense of the word). Within quietist Salafist communities, 
politics is not theorized other than as a call to good 
mores in a limited framework, that of stability and the 
preservation of social order. It is therefore not surprising 
that even if the doctrinal matrix seems to be the same, 
Jihadism is an ideology of urgency where quietist Salafism 
is de facto content with the existing social structures. 
Violence is thus in this case a profoundly political category 
as it relates to the arsenal of solutions enabling Jihadists 
to restore the security and dignity of Muslims worldwide, 
whereas the aim is largely diﬀerent within quietist Salafism 
(ensuring the Islamness of their faith, belief and practice).
A final question remains: why are Jihadists, despite their 
lack of alacrity for orthodoxy and orthopraxy (shown in 
my interviews, both among those I met in prison as well 
as those sympathizing with these theses without being 
engaged in violent acts), choosing a fundamentalist, 
radical, vehement and revolutionary religious narrative? 
Specifically, how can one explain the appeal of an 
ideological oﬀer historically rooted in Salafism, without 
any common lifestyle and social trajectory with forms 
of contemporary Salafist practice (absence of linearity 
between religious socialization and violent engagement 
as seen above)? In cultural terms, it thus seems that 
there exists a form of domination, and even within 
certain social groups (primarily young generations of 
Muslims) a kind of hegemony, of Islamic radicalism. 
The most revivalist branches, but also those which are 
the most at odds with the social order in the name of 
Islam, are experiencing a form of real but diﬀuse success, 
which although diﬃcult to question from the macro-
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sociological point of view, is impossible to interpret in a 
linear way from a micro-sociological perspective. Thus, 
a kind of primacy of Salafist narratives exists, although it 
is diﬃcult to see a rigorous ideological connection, but 
rather a sort of re-appropriation by certain social groups 
of the potential for opposition contained in this religious 
matrix (which, moreover, cannot summarize it since it 
also contains a strong conservative potential). It seems, 
therefore, more than ever, that ideological oﬀers must 
be subject to in-depth sociological inquiry. The issue of 
a social construction of Salafism seems like it should be 
put back into center stage. The conditions and factors of 
identification with one form of identity rather than another 
must therefore replace more normative questions about 
the essence of a religious imaginary whose imitators often 
do more for its interpretation and definition than the 
fundamental sources.
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Sunni Jihadism and Religious Authority: 
Its Transformative Character and Eﬀects
Tore Hamming, European University Institute and Sciences Po
“kill a disbelieving American or European – especially 
the spiteful and filthy French – or an Australian, 
or a Canadian, or any other disbeliever from the 
disbelievers waging war, including the citizens of the 
countries that entered into a coalition against the 
Islamic State.”1 
When Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, the late spokesperson 
and a senior leader of the Islamic State, uttered this call 
to action in September 2014, it had an impact. In the 
following months, and escalating throughout 2015-16, 
multiple terrorist attacks on Western soil were executed 
and claimed by the Islamic State as a response to the 
launch of the military coalition against the group and 
arguably as a reaction to an intra-Jihadi power game.2 Why 
would anyone listen to the words of al-Adnani and act on 
his words? 
The influence of the Islamic State and its most prominent 
leaders such as al-Adnani has been dependent on a 
continuously transforming nature of religious authority 
within Islam.3 Unlike in Christianity or Shiism, Sunni 
Islam has never benefited from or been limited by a central 
religious authority like that of the Pope or the imam (or 
more precisely the marja e-taqlid). Since the early days of 
Islam, after the Prophet passed away, religious authority 
has been decentralized.  But this does not imply that no 
1  r Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, ‘Indeed, Your Lord is Ever Watchful’, Al Hayat Media, 22 September 2014: https://archive.org/details/
IndeedYourLordIsEverWatchful [accessed 5 June 2018]
2   Tore Hamming, ‘Jihadi Competition and Political Preferences’, Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol 11, No 6 (2017): 63-88
3   For a thorough examination of Islamic authority, see Wael E. Hallaq, Authority, Continuity and Change in Islamic Law (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004)
4   Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds, God’s Caliph: Religious Authority in the First Centuries of Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
5   Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Modern Islamic Thought in a Radical Age: Religious Authority and Internal Criticism (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012); Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).
6   Faisal Devji, Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity (London: Hurst & Company, 2005);  Muslim Politics (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996); Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994).
7   Zaman, Modern Islamic Thought in a Radical Age: Religious Authority and Internal Criticism, 181–82.
8   Ibid., 1.
traditional sources of religious authority existed. In her 
paper in this volume Nancy Khalil demonstrates how 
scholars have disagreed on the sources of Islamic authority, 
whether it is derived from the Islamic textual corpus or 
reserved for the ulama or the elite that implements Islamic 
law. Political authority most often remained in the hands 
of the Caliph, but religious authority was delegated to 
the ulama, people specialized in the religion as narrated 
by the Prophet and his actions.4 Ever since, the ulama’s 
authority and level of institutionalization has fluctuated. 
This has allowed certain groups to challenge mainstream 
Islamic interpretations and, more recently, the sources 
that qualify religious authority. Religious authority has 
traditionally been closely associated with the discipline 
of ijtihad (the eﬀort of interpreting), concretely through 
so-called commentaries on the Qur’an and hadith.5 As 
several scholars have noted,6 traditional sources of Islamic 
authority have changed dramatically over time with Zaman, 
arguing this is partly due to changed conditions of ijtihad 
(where there is no longer scope for ‘absolute ijtihad’, but 
only ‘limited ijtihad’ meaning expanding the boundaries 
of a school of law in accordance with the principles of 
that school), modern means of communication, mass 
higher education, and the spread of liberal thought.7 
These factors, he argues, have facilitated a challenge to 
the ulama’s privileged access to authoritative religious 
knowledge,8 making religious authority less dependent on 
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knowledge and more related to practice and piety.9 This 
change, however, should not be considered a structural 
break with previous practices, but rather an “intensification 
of a tendency towards decentralised authority”10 that 
has fostered the emergence of a new group of ‘Islamist 
intellectuals’ in the words of Olivier Roy.11
The Salafi and Jihadist claim to authority
Salafists and Jihadists have been at the forefront among 
those taking advantage of changing structures of religious 
authority. But while Salafists in the 1980s emphasized 
the importance of education, Jihadists such as Abu 
Muhammad al-Maqdisi did not just claim that education 
was unnecessary but even discouraged it. This disconnect 
between Jihadism and Salafism is further elaborated in 
Mohamed Ali Adraoui’s contribution to this issue in which 
he discusses three dynamics dividing quietist Salafism 
from the more militant expression of Jihadism. Focusing 
exclusively on Jihadism in her brilliant book The Jihadis’ 
Path to Self-Destruction, Nelly Lahoud, however, explains 
how Jihadi ideologues have from the outset worked to 
undermine any established authority or hierarchy through 
promoting an individualization of ijtihad.12 In fact “jihadist 
leaders have downplayed the status of religious and 
political leadership, including their own, and empowered 
jihadists to assume ownership over the interpretation of 
Islamic teachings of social justice and to take up jihad 
on their own initiative.”13 Religious loyalty, they argued, 
should not be to a certain sheikh or institution, but only to 
God. Telling of this attitude, Uthman bin Abd al-Rahman 
al-Tamimi, a former oﬃcial of the Shariah Committee in 
the Islamic State of Iraq, quoted a hadith by al-Bukhari 
9   Eli Alshech, ‘The Doctrinal Crisis within the Salafi-Jihadi Ranks and the Emergence of Neo-Takfirism: A Historical and Doctrinal Analysis’, Islamic Law 
and Society, Vol 21, Issue 4 (2014): 419-452
10   Peter Mandaville, ‘Globalization and the Politics of Religious Knowledge: Pluralizing Authority in the Muslim World’, Theory, Culture & Society 24, no. 
2 (2007): 2.
11   Roy, The Failure of Political Islam.
12   Nelly Lahoud, The Jihadis’ Path to Self-Destruction (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010)
13   Nelly Lahoud, ’Beware of Imitators: al-Qaida through the lens of its Confidential Secretary’, CTC Harmony Program, 4 June 2012 https://ctc.usma.
edu/app/uploads/2012/06/CTC-Beware-of-Imitators-June2012.pdf
14   Uthman Bin Abd al-Rahman al-Tamimi, ”Informing the People about the Birth of the Islamic State of Iraq”, Al Furqan media, 6. Traditional versions 
of the narrative diﬀers slightly from that used by al-Tamimi, e.g. see http://www.sacred-texts.com/isl/bukhari/bh1/bh1_664.htm 
15   Nelly Lahoud, ’Beware of Imitators: al-Qaida through the lens of its Confidential Secretary’.
in which the Prophet said, “Listen and obey, even if 
the Abyssinian slave whose hair is as kinky as a raisin 
is appointed to rule you, as long as he is governing you 
according to the book of God.”14 
Modern Jihadists have thus sought to capitalise on the 
waning influence of traditional religious authorities. 
While not the first to succeed in obtaining a platform 
partly founded on religious authority, al-Qaida under the 
leadership of Usama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri 
nonetheless took this endeavour to an unprecedented 
level within the Jihadi movement. What remains certain 
is that none of the two al-Qaida leaders had the religious 
credentials to speak authoritatively in religious matters 
(even their senior shari’ figures such as Abu Hafs al-
Mauritani and Abu Yahya al-Libi would be regarded 
novices by most traditional ‘ulama). They, nonetheless, 
still managed not only to challenge established Sunni 
authorities in the form of prominent Saudi and Egyptians 
‘ulama but also to redefine what was considered legitimate 
Jihad. While Bin Laden came to personify the fighter-
scholar persona despite being neither, it was the broader 
message al-Qaida espoused that was key to its authoritative 
standing in the eyes of potential supporters.15 Abu Musab 
al-Suri theorized this in his famous statement ‘a system of 
operations and not an organization for operations’ (nizam 
al-amal wa laysa tanzim lil-amal). Al-Qaida’s status was not 
to be dependent on its leaders or the organisation itself, 
but on the ideas and ideals it represented. 
Although this individualisation has been an integral part 
of Jihadists’ – and particularly al-Qaida’s – success, it has 
also been a constant source of internal contestation and 
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volatility.16 Late Jihadi ideologue Anwar al-Awlaki said, “It 
is important that we encourage Muslims to respect their 
scholars. It is to no one’s benefit to put down the men of 
knowledge who represent the religion of Allah. But when 
some of our scholars - no matter how knowledgeable 
they are - divert from the straight path, we the Muslims, 
need to advise them”.17 The challenge from an internal 
Jihadi perspective is that diﬀerent Jihadi groups lay 
claim to be representatives of this correct methodology 
(manhaj), or straight path, thus instigating intra-Jihadi 
contestation and competition. Trotsky once said that 
“Every group representing a new trend excommunicates 
its predecessors. To those who come with new ideas the 
previous period seems to have been but a crude deviation 
from the correct road, an historical misunderstanding….”18 
This seems to apply to the Jihadi movement as well. The 
Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) in Algeria opposed the 
presence of other Jihadi (or Islamist) groups, and on one 
occasion it even threatened Bin Laden, claiming other 
groups were inferior. 
A similar argument has been promoted by the Islamic 
State after its rise from the ashes and its organizational 
break with al-Qaida in early 2014. As al-Adnani announced 
the caliphate on 29 June 2014, he simultaneously decreed 
that all other groups were null.19 In the group’s Dabiq 
magazine from February 2015 it was explained how the 
grayzone between good and bad had ceased to exist with 
the caliphate’s establishment,20 the argument being that if 
other Jihadi groups do not join the Islamic State then they 
deviate from the correct path. In their claim to authority 
the Islamic State embarked on a mission to appropriate the 
legacy of Bin Laden while vilifying living senior al-Qaida 
16   Nelly Lahoud, The Jihadis’ Path to Self-Destruction, 245.
17   Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, ‘Inspire magazine Vol 2’, Al Malahem Media, 11 October (2010): 33
18   Quote is from Leon Trotsky, Nashi Politicheskiya Zadachi [Our Political Task], 1904: 4, but cited in Isaac Deutscher’s ‘The Prophet Armed: Trotsky, 
1879-1921’, (London: Verso, 2003) : 74.
19   Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, ’ This Is the Promise of Allah’, Al Furqan Media, 29 June 2014: https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2014/06/shaykh-
abc5ab-mue1b8a5ammad-al-e28098adnc481nc4ab-al-shc481mc4ab-22this-is-the-promise-of-god22-en.pdf [accessed 7 June 2018]
20   The Islamic State, ’Dabiq magazine Vol 7’, Al Hayat Media, February 2015: https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/the-islamic-state-
e2809cdc481biq-magazine-722.pdf [accessed 7 June 2018]
21   Interestingly, when the Islamic State’s fortune was turning and the group experienced setbacks, it began to emphasise the necessity (and religious 
obligation) to obey its leaders no matter what. Furthermore, one was not simply allowed to leave the group, even if one found it to be diverting the 
correct methodology.
figures like al-Zawahiri. Besides al-Adnani and Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi, the main proponent of such fierce attacks 
against former superiors and brothers-in-arms were the 
30 years-old Turki al-Binali while other senior shar’i (legal) 
figures for the Islamic State included Abu Bakr al-Qahtani, 
Abu Malik al-Tamimi, and, most, prominently Abu Ali 
al-Anbari. While they did have training in theology, these 
figures were young and inexperienced (except al-Anbari) 
compared to senior al-Qaida figures and ideologues 
sympathetic to al-Qaida. In the case of al-Binali, it was 
even an example of a student going against his most 
prominent teacher (the teacher being the influential Jihadi 
ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi who remains 
supportive of al-Qaida).
The Islamic State in its propaganda and shar’i arguments 
stressed that loyalty was not to a group (e.g. al-Qaida) but to 
God alone, and since the Islamic State, rather than al-Qaida 
or any other Jihadi group, followed the true prophetic 
methodology (manhaj al-nubuwwa), allegiance should be 
exclusively to the caliphate.21 Just like al-Qaida 20 years 
earlier, the Islamic State was successful in its challenge 
for authority, but this time the victim was al-Qaida itself. 
Al-Zawahiri’s group found its position within the Jihadi 
movement severely challenged between 2014-16 as most 
Jihadi newcomers in addition to some veterans joined the 
ranks of the Islamic State and in some instances actively 
fought al-Qaida groups. What the Islamic State did was 
to take advantage of the authority structures within Sunni 
Islam, the opportunity structures oﬀered by the outbreak 
of the Syrian civil war, and the leadership vacuum after the 
death of Bin Laden, thus further illustrating how detached 
religious authority has become from traditional sources.
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Al-Adnani and other challengers for authority
This process of individualization and detachment is what 
enabled al-Adnani in September 2014 not just to call for 
attacks in the West but also for his message to actually 
resonate among Islamic State soldiers and sympathizers. 
According to his biographer, Turki al-Binali, al-Adnani was 
in fact well-read in several Islamic disciplines including 
tafsir (interpretation), hadith (prophetic tradition) and 
fiqh (jurisprudence).22 He allegedly also authored several 
written works, among those one dealing with fiqh al-Jihad 
(jurisprudence of Jihad), and he taught fellow Jihadists in 
Islamic sciences. But at the time of his call to action against 
the West, al-Adnani was just 36 or 37 years-old. He had no 
formal education of note and his experience included little 
more than Jihad. But these seeming deficiencies according 
to classical sources of authority within Islam were in fact 
his foremost advantages. Al-Adnani was an early joiner of 
the Jihadi project in Iraq when he in 2002 left his native 
Syria to join ranks with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. His image 
was that of a fighter and a religiously savvy leader,23 which 
– together – combines to be a powerful resource within 
Jihadi circles.
Al-Adnani and the Islamic State more generally were, 
in the eyes of the constantly expanding pool of Jihadi 
sympathisers, considered authoritative to interpret Islam 
and what methodology should be followed. The examples 
of al-Qaida and later the Islamic State illustrate how 
decentralized authority has both benefitted the Jihadi 
movement and evolved into a source of internal conflict. 
But an equally important point is what it implies for the 
expression of Sunni Jihad and, related, how it is connected 
to the western world. 
22   Turki al-Binali, “A Biography of IS Spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani” 1 November 2014: https://medium.com/@muftimilk/biography-of-
sheikh-abu-muhammed-al-adnani-al-shami-4bdb6ac35653 [accessed 28 November 2018]
23   In 2011 al-Adnani was appointed spokesperson of the Islamic State of Iraq and at some point he became a member of its shura (consultative) council. 
24   Graeme Wood, ‘The American Climbing the Ranks of ISIS’, the Atlantic, March 2017: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/03/the-
american-leader-in-the-islamic-state/510872/ 
25   Thomas Joscelyn, ’How a US citizen became a key player in the Islamic State’s rivalry with al Qaeda’, the Long War Journal, 7 April 2017: https://www.
longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/04/how-a-us-citizen-became-a-key-player-in-the-islamic-states-rivalry-with-al-qaeda.php 
An interesting case example is that of Thomas Barnouin 
(Abu Umar al-Madani), a French Jihadi ideologue who rose 
to the top of the Islamic State after he migrated to Syria in 
2014. Barnouin grew up outside of Toulouse in southern 
France and converted to Islam in either 1999 or 2000. He 
was a serious student of Islam and this eventually took him 
to Medina in Saudi Arabia to enhance his Arabic and study 
Islamic sciences. Despite his enthusiasm for learning, he 
never finished his studies as he became attracted to the 
Jihadi cause and finally left for Iraq in 2006. Barnouin did 
not get further than Syria, however, where he was arrested 
and later sent back to France where he served a three-year 
sentence from 2008 to 2011. When he was released, the 
convinced Jihadi started to hold lectures on issues central to 
the Jihadi ideology, but in early 2014 after the Islamic State 
expanded to Syria – even before declaring the caliphate – 
he migrated to join the group. As a member of IS he was 
a well-respected figure, especially among his countrymen, 
and he appears to be one of the only foreigners to obtain 
a senior ideological position within the group. Another 
example is the Americans Yahya Abu Hassan (real name 
John Georgelas)24 and Abu Sulayman al-Shami (Ahmad 
Abousamra).25 Although Barnouin was eventually 
arrested by the Islamic State due to internal theological 
disagreements, he is nonetheless reported to have been 
a central figure in the group’s terrorist campaign in the 
West. Of note, he allegedly took part in organizing the 
November 2015 attack in Paris, thus showing the potential 
security ramifications of people like Barnouin obtaining 
positions of authority despite not living up to the classical 
sources of religious authority. Barnouin, Georgelas and 
Abousamra have all been dedicated to Jihad and the specific 
politico-religious project of the Islamic State, and while 
they all appear to have engaged in learning several Islamic 
disciplines, none of them are to be considered scholars and 
certainly not graduates of respectable learning institutions.
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 In fact, time and again the Jihadi movement has witnessed 
a younger generation emerge ever more ‘pious’ and radical 
in their expression, always pushing the boundaries of takfir 
(excommunication) and whom it should be considered 
legitimate to kill. This happened in Afghanistan, Algeria, 
and Iraq. The Islamic State-executed attacks in the 
West diﬀer qualitatively from al-Qaida’s early attitude 
to legitimate terrorist attacks in that the Islamic State 
promote a much more indiscriminate and liberal attitude 
to such attacks. Unlike al-Qaida, the Islamic State deem no 
targets in the West illegitimate, and the group has shown 
an immense propensity to claim responsibility for any 
attack carried out in its name. Perhaps these experiences 
will provide indications for what to expect in the future in 
terms of new Jihadi actors emerging with ever more radical 
ideas. At least the field of religious authority, a resource of 
essential importance to Jihadists, is now wide open if only 
one knows how to exploit it.
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The Eﬀects of Discrimination on European Muslim Trust in 
Governmental Institutions
Mujtaba Ali Isani, University of Muenster
European Muslims and Discrimination
European Muslims face marginalization, discrimination, 
and exclusion based on being seen as an out-group with a 
diﬀerent culture, identity, religion, ethnicity and worldview 
(Landman, 2006: 19; also Crowley, 2001; Sidanius et al., 
2004). They therefore encounter restrictions in accessing 
economic and political opportunities. As a result, 
European Muslims might become skeptical of the political 
context they are living in and of political institutions which 
are seemingly unable to prevent or protect them from 
discrimination (Caldwell, 2009; Maxwell, 2010a, 2010b). 
This essay hypothesizes that Muslims who face 
discrimination are significantly more likely to distrust their 
domestic institutions. Indeed, survey data of European 
Muslims, who participated in the European Social Survey 
(ESS) between 2002 and 2014, reveals that around one-
third of the 3,601 respondents indicated that they feel part 
of a discriminated group in their country. As a comparison, 
among the non-Muslim respondents of these surveys, less 
than six percent indicated they felt discriminated against 
(see Table 1).  
Table 1: European Muslims Compared to Non-Muslims 
Who Feel Part of a Discriminated Group
Feel Part of Discriminated Group
Yes No
Muslim 33.22% (1,153) 66.78% (2,318)
Non-Muslim 5.90% (11,877) 94.10% (189,462)
Source: ESS 2002-2014. Authors’ own calculations. Absolute 
numbers in ().
As shown in Table 2, a majority European Muslims 
who feel discriminated against perceived themselves 
to be discriminated against because of their religion 
(62 percent), and this surpasses all other reasons for 
discrimination.  Discrimination based on religion can take 
various forms including the harassment of women who 
wear the headscarf (Sauer, 2009), no formal recognition 
of Islam by the state (Joppke, 2013), and just a general 
characterization of Muslims being foreign to the land 
(Alba et. al., 2003). Westfall (2018) points out that Muslims 
who attend mosque regularly may be seen as suspiciously, 
as mosque attendance is inaccurately attributed to 
participation in terrorist activity. On the contrary, as 
shown by Westfall (2018) and others, mosque engagement 
is more likely to have positive eﬀects such as participation 
in secular community activities.  This ties in well with the 
starting point of this essay, as it seems as though practicing 
Muslims are more likely to feel discriminated against on 
religious grounds, as some in the host society may see 
their appearance and certain activities as suspicious. An 
often highlighted problem faced by practicing Muslims 
in the West is a lack of praying space and problems in 
getting permission to build mosques. The problems faced 
by US Muslims with mosque construction highlighted 
by Tepe (2018) may even be more severe in Western 
European countries like Spain, Germany and France (see, 
for example, Cesari, 2005; Astor, 2011). Muslims, especially 
mosque-going Muslims, are therefore more likely to feel 
discriminated against if they cannot adequately practice 
their religion in their country. 
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Table 2: Self-Identified Sources of Discrimination Among 
Discriminated Muslims
Reason for discrimination1 Percentage
Color or Race 30.96%
Nationality 43.71%
Religion 61.84%
Language 16.05%
Ethnic Group 23.94%
Age 1.47%
Gender 2.52%
Sexuality 0.78%
Disability 0.61%
Other Grounds 6.68%
Source: ESS 2002-2018. Authors’ own calculations.
Perceived Discrimination and Governmental Trust 
It can be argued that people who feel discriminated against 
become skeptical of the political context they live in and 
the political institutions of their country. Governmental 
trust may be defined as an individual’s confidence that the 
executive would attend to their interest even if governmental 
authority were exposed to little supervision (Easton, 1975). 
Trust is considered to be essential for the stability and 
legitimacy of institutions (Gibson, 1997; Klingemann, 1999; 
Seligson, 2002). Moreover, it is seen as indispensable for 
institutional endurance and eﬀective functioning (Brehm & 
Rahn, 1997; Norris, 2002; Putnam, 1993).
As shown above, European Muslims feel especially 
discriminated against, and the question is whether this 
1  The self-identified grounds for discrimination are not mutually exclusive.
2   Based on criteria of survey representation, EU/Schengen membership and minimum number of Muslim respondents, we choose the following 
16 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
makes European Muslims more unfavorable and more 
skeptical of the political context they are living in and the 
political institutions of their country, which are seemingly 
unable to prevent or protect them from discrimination. 
I expect that European Muslims who feel part of a 
discriminated group are less likely to be trusting toward 
their governmental institutions (H1). 
Other factors that may aﬀect trust institutions as theorized 
in the previous literature are utilitarian factors such as 
satisfaction with one’s economic situation (Maxwell, 
2010a), satisfaction with democracy, government, and 
one’s health situation (Röder & Mühlau, 2012). Since 
the population of European Muslims is predominantly 
composed of immigrants, whether they are first or second 
generation immigrants, may also be an important factor 
to determine their trust in political institutions (Alba & 
Nee, 2003; Dancygier & Saunders, 2006; de la Garza et al., 
1996; Maxwell, 2013; Röder & Mühlau, 2011, 2012; Waters, 
1999). Finally, demographic factors such as age, education, 
sex, religiosity, and political interest could also aﬀect 
political trust (for an overview, see Isani and Schlipphak, 
2017). 
Data
To test the hypothesis that it is perceived discrimination 
which is aﬀecting trust among Muslims, while controlling 
for other important factors mentioned in the literature, 
I analyze the pooled dataset of the ESS from 2002-2014.2 
This dataset contains 207,432 respondents without 
considering any missing values on the dependent or the 
independent variables. Among these respondents, 3,601 
self-identified as Muslim. Around 95% of the European 
Muslims in this dataset are immigrants, of which 
approximately 71% are first-generation immigrants.
I operationalize political trust through trust in four 
domestic institutions, namely, the national parliament, 
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police, politicians, and the legal system, all measured 
on a 0-10 scale. I use each of these “trust in” variables as 
dependent variables, but also combine these variables into 
one general trust variable which adds all of these scores. 
Descriptive statistics as well as the operationalization of 
the other variables is shown in Table 3.
Table 3:  Summary of Descriptive Statistics and Coding.
Variables Mean (European Muslims) Coding
Dependent Variables
Trust in National Parliament 5.40(3304)  0-10 scale of increasing trust.
Trust in the Legal System 6.05(3421)  0-10 scale of increasing trust.
Trust in the Police 6.42(3523)  0-10 scale of increasing trust.
Trust in Politicians 4.33(3376)  0-10 scale of increasing trust.
Combined Trust 22.13(3172)  0-40 scale of increasing trust.
Independent Variables
Economic Satisfaction 5.15(3476) 0-10 increasing scale of satisfaction.
Democratic Satisfaction 6.39(3403) 0-10 increasing scale of satisfaction.
Health Satisfaction 6.97(3549) 0-10 increasing scale of satisfaction.
Government Satisfaction 5.17(3341) 0-10 increasing scale of satisfaction.
Religiosity 7.11(3589) 0-10 increasing scale of self-perceived religiosity.
Discriminated Group 0.33 (3471)
Coded 1 if an individual feels part of a discriminated 
group in the country of residence and 0 if otherwise.
First Generation 0.68(3601)
Individual and parents not born in country of 
residence.
Second Generation 0.25(3601)
Individual born in country of residence and at least 
one parent is an immigrant.
Political Interest 2.25(3585) 1-4 increasing scale of political interest.
Education 11.64(3601) Number of years of formal education top-coded at 26.
Female 0.46(3601) Coded 1 if individual is a female.
Age 41.91 (3601) Calculated age of respondent.
Source: ESS Rounds 1-7 (2002-2014). Absolute numbers in parentheses. 
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Results
I estimate four models to test the hypothesis. For the 
combined trust dependent variable I estimate an ordinary 
least squares (OLS), and for each of the other variables 
I estimate ordinal generalized linear models (OGLM) 
as the ordinal logit models violate the proportional 
odds assumption. Table 4 presents only the results of 
the combined institutional trust model due to space 
considerations.3
Table 4: Explaining Trust in the Political Institutions among 
European Muslims
(SE)
Independent Variables
Economic Satisfaction 0.29*** (0.07)
Democratic Satisfaction 0.93*** (0.06)
Health Satisfaction 0.37*** (0.06)
Government Satisfaction 0.97*** (0.07)
Religiosity 0.12* (0.05)
Discriminated Group -1.69*** (0.27)
First Generation 0.59  (0.48)
Second Generation -0.04 (0.53)
Political Interest 0.67*** (0.13)
Education 0.02 (0.45)
Female 0.92 (0.24)
Age 0.02* (0.01)
N 2,742
R2 44.36%
Source: ESS Rounds 1-7. Own calculations. Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression estimated with country-fixed 
eﬀects and clustered standard errors, including controls 
3   The OGLM models show similar results.
for ESS waves 1-7, not plotted here. Standard errors in 
parentheses. * = significant at the 0.05 level ** = significant 
at the 0.01 level *** = significant at the 0.001 level.
Discussion, Further Analysis and Conclusion:
The results as seen in Table 4 show that if European 
Muslims perceive themselves as part of a discriminated 
group, they have significantly less trust in domestic 
institutions. Substantively the coeﬃcient for the 
“discriminated group” shows it has one the strongest 
eﬀects on the trust in institutions. This is a discouraging 
trend as discrimination can lead to problems in political 
integration as well political participation of Muslim 
citizens as shown by the works of Adda et. al. (2016) and 
Erisen (2017) in the French and American contexts.
Further analysis of the ESS as reported in Table 5 depicts 
that European Muslims are overall quite trustworthy of 
domestic institutions. However, it is the perception of 
being discriminated against that makes European Muslims 
more skeptical of the government.   Future signs do 
not seem promising, as additional analysis showed that 
second-generation European Muslim immigrants are more 
likely to perceive themselves to be part of the discriminated 
group than first-generation Muslim immigrants, and they 
are less likely to trust domestic institutions. Currently, 
most Muslims in Europe as well as in my sample are 
composed of first generation immigrants, so prospectively 
trust and feelings of discrimination are likely to worsen.
A recurring theme in this POMEPS series is that there 
might be significant generational diﬀerences in how 
Muslims respond to conditions in Europe and the USA. 
Hall (2018) depicts how a group of second-generation 
British Muslims engage in the politics of resistance and 
refusal. Seurat (2018) and Hamming (2018) point out that 
second-generation Muslim immigrants may reject certain 
cultural practices of their parents to follow more orthodox 
forms of Islam. The analysis done for this memo reinforces 
the generational diﬀerences present among Muslim 
immigrants in the West. Not only are second-generation 
Muslim immigrants more likely to feel discriminated 
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against, but they are also significantly less trusting of 
government institutions.
Table 5: Mean Combined Trust in Domestic Institutions by 
Religious Denomination
Religious Denomination Trust in EUP (0 to 40 scale)
Protestant 24.30 (n= 36,080)
Eastern Orthodox 17.65 (n= 9,404)
Roman Catholic 19.19 (n= 59,162)
Other Christian 20.30 (n= 2,253)
Muslim 22.13 (n= 3,172)
Jewish 20.87 (n= 198)
Eastern Religions 21.36 (n= 775)
Other Non-Christian 
Religion 19.81 (n= 530)
Belonging to No Religion 20.23 (n= 76,687)
Source: ESS Rounds 1-7 (2002-2014).
In conclusion, this essay’s primary finding, that the 
perception of being discriminated against has a negative 
eﬀect on trust in political institutions suggests that 
more needs to be done by the respective European 
governments and the European Union to reduce feelings 
of discrimination among its Muslim population. These 
could be but are not limited to, for example, an increase 
in mosques and praying spaces for Muslim residents 
or programs that develop understandings (or remove 
misconceptions) of Muslim practices such as the wearing of 
headscarves. Eliminating feelings of discrimination may be 
crucial in maintaining cordial European Muslim relations 
with domestic institutions and the society at large.
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He’s Not an Imam, lol He’s a Postal Worker: 
Locating the Imam in the USA
Nancy Khalil, Yale University
Where does Islamic authority come from? Is it from 
the law, and the texts from which it is derived, as Hallaq 
argues (2009)? Or from the scholars, or ‘ulmaa, who 
are institutionally and governmentally authorized and 
interpret the texts, as Malika Zeghal’s work depicts (2007), 
or the mediums they use to disseminate it, as Charles 
Hirschkind teaches (2006)? Does authority come from 
those who implement the law, like judges’ interpretive 
methods in times of legal doubt, as depicted in the work 
of Intisar Rabb (2015)? Is it from the state and its role 
in supporting and establishing religion, as Johnathan 
Laurence’s work in Europe suggests (2012)? Does Islamic 
authority emerge from knowledge, as Patrick Gaﬀney’s 
work with Egyptian preachers argues (1994)? Or is 
Islamic authority derived from the faith’s adherents and 
the multiple ways in which they authorize it, interpret 
it, and practice it, as supported by the work of many 
anthropologists including Gilsenan (1982), Geertz (1968), 
and Mahmood (2005)?  
If there is one attribute one can extract from the various 
theories on authority present in social theory, it is that 
authority is not static. The larger project this essay draws 
from is not a search for Islamic authority, but instead for 
understanding how that authority emerges informed by 
local cultural, legal, historical, and bureaucratic norms. 
Eﬀectively, it is better titled Muslim authority, not Islamic.  
The idea of a Muslim authority contends with dominant 
theories in the anthropology of Islam. It seeks to re-center 
the role of the anthropologist from invoking texts without 
engaging them, giving the text more life than is bestowed 
to those uttering its words. It does not deny the idea of an 
“Islamic authority,” but seeks to contextualize it through 
the lens and experiences of those who call on it, without 
making “Islam’s” authoritative role hegemonic.  
This short paper aims to depict a portion of the larger 
project’s argument, which is that through the identification 
and professionalization of the imam, religious authority 
for Muslims in the US emerges as much from Muslim 
recognition as it does from religious cultural norms 
in the US, and from the regulatory frameworks that 
inform the directions religion takes in this time of rapid 
institutionalization.
The Imam and the Priest
Shortly after the 2016 presidential election in November, 
Amazon began airing a unique advertisement. The ad was 
widely viewed as a political message, despite the company’s 
insistence that they had no such intent, stating that work 
began on it months before the election. It featured a priest 
and an imam, or so the media identified them. Sitting 
down at tea, the two faith leaders wince from knee pain 
when rising to stand, independently proceed to their 
Amazon Prime app to purchase their tea-drinking friend 
a knee brace and deliver each other identical gifts. After 
embracing, the imam and the priest are shown in their 
houses of worship painlessly prostrating and kneeling, 
respectively. According to advertising professors at Boston 
University, this is the first time an imam has been featured 
in a major network broadcast ad, although other faith 
leaders have been portrayed (Weise 2017).
The ad inspired discussion on its relationship with reality. 
On a Whatsapp group of Muslim leaders from around the 
US working in a variety of non-profit, media, academic, 
and public service industries, including several chaplains 
and imams, one person shares the ad and another chimes 
in that his family member knows the imam.  “He’s not 
an imam lol,” he messaged. “He’s a postal worker.”  An 
approximately 38-minute video online with almost one 
million views, posted by Al-Jazeera English, features the 
imam and the priest answering viewers’ questions (“Live 
With: A Priest and an Imam from Amazon’s Viral Ad” 
2016).  They assure the audience multiple times that they 
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are now good friends despite only having met on the set. 
They argue that the reason Amazon cast them was because 
their personal connection appeared genuine on film, and 
that the authenticity was a reflection of interfaith work that 
was already a regular part of their lives—a contrast to the 
forced-looking rapport among actors vying for their roles. 
The imam identifies himself in the video as the principal 
of an Islamic school, but never seeks to shed the title 
imam either. So, what is he? Is he a postal worker? Is he a 
principal, or is he an imam?
The actor’s appearance in the ad reflects general public 
expectations for how such a religious authority looks and 
dresses. The imam, a man of South Asian descent, appears 
to be middle-aged, in the 50- to 70-year age group, with a 
thick, long beard and olive-colored skin. He smiles warmly 
throughout the ad. He is dressed in a long beige thawb, a 
floor-length dress robe commonly worn in much of the 
Arab world. On his head rests a topi or kufi, best translated 
as skull cap. To those familiar with Muslim clerical attire, 
the garment provides clues to his professional identity. The 
long thawb, while common attire in many parts of the Arab 
world, is less so in South Asia. On the subcontinent, the 
more common traditional attire among men is a shalwar 
kameez, a knee or shin-length dress shirt and matching 
pants combination. The thawb is worn commonly there 
only among religious leaders such as mawlanas (honorific 
title with an etymology rooted in stewardship), muftis 
(jurists), ‘ulamaa (scholars), or qadis (judges). 
It is unclear whether Amazon ad directors were attuned 
to such clothing nuances, or whether the man cast 
elected to don the thawb to depict a religious vocation. 
Either way, there are implications to the portrayal. It is 
evident from the topi, age, beard, and attire that, at least 
for the commercial’s purpose, he is being fashioned, or 
is fashioning himself, as an imam, and that there is some 
common imagined figure of an imam to fashion him 
into. Depicting him alongside a priest also puts him in a 
category of professional peers as an analogue for his own 
1   A female can be an imam, and there are women who hold that role in some all-women mosques.  In its most classic understanding and ubiquitous 
use, ‘imam’ is the individual who leads the prayer, not a particular job, role, or title.  Accepting that, any time a women leads others in prayer, she is, in 
that function, the imam.  
occupation, regardless of how strong of an analogue it is 
or the implications of appropriating such a professional 
parallel on authority and leadership within Muslim 
traditions and Islamic development. Meaning, are an 
imam and a priest necessarily professional peers?  Or, does 
American society need them to be so we reform them to 
meet what is comprehensible?   Furthermore, it is highly 
unlikely that the priest would also work as a postal worker; 
a principal, perhaps. Which raises the question, can an 
imam also be a principal? Can he also be a principal and a 
postal worker? Who decides, and why do we care so much 
about what an imam can do or who can hold that title? 
And, what are the Muslim repercussions of the title of the 
imam becoming synonymous with that of minister, priest, 
or rabbi?
To those familiar with Muslim leaders, it would not be 
surprising to learn that the imam does work in fact as a 
postal worker, securing benefits and a stable salary from that 
position.  In addition, he may also be serving as a principal 
of an Islamic weekend school.  He may still also be a man 
versed in the reading and recitation of the Qur’an, and a 
regular leader for the five ritual prayers in his local mosque, 
as well as an occasional speaker at the pulpit. If the mosque 
does not have a hired imam, that title is often granted to 
men1 with ability to perform some of the imam’s duties. This 
ad, produced by one of the largest global corporations today, 
and aired to broad audiences on both sides of the Atlantic, 
depicts the imam, his presumed image, and his assumed 
professional peers.  The ad is one of many mechanisms 
contributing to the professionalization of the imam by 
oﬀering an implicit fashioning of his image, his professional 
peers, and his ritual. 
The individual cast in the role also helps us see that the 
term imam is under no one’s authority or control. Unlike 
the priest, who, even if working as a principal, would 
be ordained by his church and assigned by that church 
to any related work, the imam lacks such a process or 
central institution to legitimize his authority. He can also 
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be a postal worker, and in fact, may need to be in order 
to secure healthcare and retirement benefits, which, 
until quite recently, were almost impossible to find while 
working at a mosque [Bagby 2012].
Professional dissonance among Imams
Imams employed or volunteering in mosques across 
the US expressed a mix of emotions. Many love their 
jobs, while others are unable to fulfill the expectations 
of their congregation, or ones they place on themselves. 
A congregation has many needs, and when one person 
either perceives that it is their duty alone to fulfill them, 
or has those expectations placed on them, it can lead to 
consistent cognitive dissonance.  Geoﬀ Harkness and 
Peggy Levitt call this response “professional dissonance” 
and argue that it can frequently arise in transnational 
occupations, as those who work in them negotiate their 
imagined roles from “back home” with the expectations 
of their new locale (forthcoming). The idea of professional 
dissonance becomes even more pronounced in the case of 
imams in America, where the profession is not regulated 
or clearly defined.  Many come from societies where the 
title of imam refers to men in sovereign leadership, or 
founding jurists of major theological schools of thought, or, 
more simply, the individual leading a congregational ritual 
prayer at any given prayer time.  Borrowing duties from 
foreign homelands, along with Christian-centric religious 
leadership norms in the US, the imam in America is 
forming into a vocation, one that is emerging from a hybrid 
of these forces. 
More recently, that hybrid also encounters state 
bureaucracies, as Muslims seek to institutionalize and 
produce imams locally. Finally, this dissonance can occur 
as imams get caught up in everyday pastoral needs of their 
congregations. These commitments can make them unable 
to invest time in the spiritual development portion of their 
work, one that rests on their own spiritual experiences 
first and foremost.  These pastoral needs emerge from a 
local understanding and expectation of the role of religious 
leadership within their congregation and society at large, 
both socially and legally. Clergy operate under a set of 
norms particular to them and their duties, including both 
privileges and responsibilities.  In order for those to be 
applied, one needs to be recognized as “clergy.”  The end 
result for the imam in the US is a term that is technically a 
multiple indicator, referring either to individuals employed 
by mosques serving as the central religious leader, or an 
individual leading any congregational prayer, or as an 
honorific title used to address an individual identified as 
someone with some level of knowledge and/or influence 
emerging as one that refers to the spiritual leader of a 
mosque.  
Professionalization has historically been tied to regulation.  
Absent direct government control (which is precluded 
by our first amendment principles), locating a regulatory 
gatekeeper in the US, as has been done in other countries, 
is perceived as a solution to existing problems. However, 
our politics here preclude the emergence of typical 
regulatory patterns. The ideological diversity of the Muslim 
community, the various sites of immigrants’ places of 
origin, and the various visions for religious presence in 
the US have made even fledgling attempts to establish 
recognized sites of Muslim authority unsuccessful. This is 
now slowly changing. A recognized authority may emerge 
in the future, and in so doing, will alter the roles of Muslim 
religious leaders. I argue that such a regulatory site to 
emerge successfully will require institutionalization that 
routinizes the historic authority of Muslim charismatic 
figures, but also makes more explicit other competing 
occupations to the imam, such as that of the mufti (jurist) 
and the ‘alim (scholar). In this sense, the profession of the 
imam will not, and cannot, regulate its own boundaries, 
but rather those boundaries will sharpen in form as 
emerging Islamic seminaries oﬀer space that anchors 
conflicting occupations. I use the term “conflicting” 
here hesitantly because it is not the occupations that 
are in conflict but their boundaries.  An individual can 
be trained as a scholar and have produced a substantial 
peer-recognized body of scholarship and yet elect to be 
employed as an imam.  Such a case indicates that there 
is no conflict between occupations; however, conflicts 
emerge in the ways one can move between them, or gain 
access to them at all.  
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At this moment in the US, there are no recognized 
gatekeepers or authoritizing mechanisms for any of these 
occupations. The process of granting authority to imams 
and other leaders is thus done on a comparatively ad hoc 
and individualized basis. Some strongly condone this 
decentralized structure, pointing to it as one that fosters 
true freedom of religion.   Others remain wary that lack 
of any regulation creates excessive space for community 
vulnerability and lack of an ability to unify congregations.  
More recently, Islamic seminaries have been emerging 
relatively rapidly across the country, with a strong push for 
pursuing accreditation.  The process of institutionalizing 
Islamic seminaries on par with broader US higher 
education standards, however, shifts the authorizing 
mechanisms from relying on an (often singular) 
charismatic scholar who legitimizes an institution to ones 
that are built on an administrative structure that includes a 
range of leaders and scholars, and a life and identity for the 
institution beyond a single individual. 
As they institutionalize, Islamic seminaries, bound by 
state governed degree-granting requirements, can and will 
oﬀer requirement boundaries and expectations for their 
scholars, educators, theologians and jurists. Defining these 
occupations through institutions oﬀers professional paths 
for those aspiring to such careers, allowing individuals 
interested in scholarship to distinguish their work and 
pursuits from the increasingly pastoral expectations of 
mosque boards hiring imams. This results in the potential 
professionalization of the imam surfacing not through 
structure introduced by organized imams, but through 
the relegation of certain skills and expertise to the domain 
of the Islamic seminaries.  As this category of local ‘alims 
and muftis becomes well defined, and the routinized 
institutions accepted as legitimate by Muslims through the 
broader US higher education authorizing mechanisms, 
mosques may further come to trust their provision of 
training, credentialing, and authorizing individuals 
deemed qualified to lead congregations. 
The emerging change highlights the diﬀerence between 
top-down and bottom-up authoritization. Top-down 
decision-making originates within regulatory frameworks, 
and, as seen when governments like those in many 
Muslim-majority and some European nations have explicit 
roles in managing religion, is dictative, not authoritative.  
Bottom-up authorization begins with charisma, and 
that is precisely where the Muslim community began. 
However, this charisma is not uniform, nor unchallenged. 
In order for the charismatic figure to emerge, stigmatized 
identities—as many imams contend with—become a 
necessary contrast. Furthermore, owing to the loud 
politicization of Islam, this process is not happening 
internally to the community, but in conversation with, and 
exposure to, a broader public with a vested interest in its 
outcome.  
There are many stakeholders who have an interest in 
the American imam. First and foremost, the primary 
stakeholders are Muslims around the country seeking 
spiritual guidance and religious leadership. Second are 
the various non-Muslim faith groups interested to know 
their neighbors and develop meaningful relationships with 
diverse groups within their broader community.  Third 
are various state apparatuses, including federal and local 
law enforcement, elected politicians, and public servants 
who are interested broadly in community leaders, their 
organizing capacity and their activities as they intersect 
with other municipal events and life. Government 
interest can sometimes be cause for concern, reinforcing 
stigmatized associations with security concerns, including 
the deputization of imams to seek out potential perceived 
threats. The imams themselves need not be forgotten, 
along with other Muslims who work in nearby fields, such 
as chaplains, scholars, mediators, and counselors, each of 
whose occupation is impacted by their local imam and his 
vocation. Thus the question of who determines who is an 
imam, who decides how one can get there, has meaning 
for all of these stakeholders and their various intents and 
interests in locating a US source of Muslim authority.
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Trust and Giving for the Sake of God: 
The Rise of the Bureaucratic Non-Profit in American Muslim Charity
Katherine Merriman, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Muslims in what is now the United States have engaged 
in explicitly religious giving for over four centuries. 
From enslaved West African women oﬀering saraka or 
devotional rice cakes on Georgia Sea Islands to a turn-
of-the-century Bosnian benevolent society in Chicago, 
charitable giving has been a cornerstone to build religious 
community and forward social and political causes 
inspired by Islamic values. 
The ritualized collection and distribution of charity by 
American Muslims in the form of zakat and sadaqah 
(obligatory and voluntary charity) create moral 
dispositions towards justice and care –what Chris Taylor 
calls an Islamic virtue ethics of “obligatory voluntarism” 
(2016). Over the twentieth century, tangible manifestations 
of these collective acts built American mosques and 
schools; funded relief eﬀorts for Muslim majority regions 
aﬀected by war or natural disaster; and sustained resource 
redistribution programs by economically marginalized 
Muslims. However, despite its ubiquity and impact as a 
religious practice, the terrain of charitable activity only 
came into public and scholarly visibility briefly after 
post-9/11 raids of several charity organizations accused of 
assisting terrorism (Siddiqui 2010).
Perhaps one reason why American Muslim practices of 
charity – as giving and service – exists below the radar 
is that historically it has not been organized under a 
centralized beit al-mal (treasury that distributed charity 
for public works) or dominated by a singular form, such 
as waqf (charitable endowment) as it was in Muslim 
majority regions. However, in the last three decades I 
argue that the 501(c)(3), faith-based nonprofit relief and 
development organization has become a dominant form 
to institutionalize Muslims’ collective obligations of 
care. While personal, private giving continues to support 
an ailing neighbor and mosques are built one sadaqah 
envelope at a time, Muslim nonprofits have positioned 
themselves as the central institution – as both a set of 
practices and space - to fulfill a pious duty and the ethical 
commitment to socio-economic stewardship in Islam. 
Muslim non-profit charities promote a normative 
discursive model for American Muslims to construct and 
enact charitable activity, which adapts Euro-American 
humanitarian rights-based logic and neoliberal development 
practices into religious ethics. Muslims are simultaneously 
directed to purify their wealth and assist the needy for 
the sake of God while also called to protect the human 
rights of beneficiaries, maintain political neutrality, and 
fund neoliberal development projects tied to individual 
“empowerment” and economic growth (Mittermaier 2014). 
The commitment to humanitarianism is bolstered by 
mainstream American beliefs in self-reliance and capitalist 
free enterprise—enhanced by tax write-oﬀs—where the 
structural nature of indigence is acknowledged but second 
to individual-focused assistance and assessment. 
And yet, adoption is not necessarily imitation. While 
Muslim charities’ use of humanitarian logics and optics 
can be a means to find acceptance and reinforce dominant 
American values, they also often challenge its semiotic 
limits to what constitutes human suﬀering or moral truth. 
Organizations serving abroad subversively insist on the 
value of Muslim life in a global order where they are not 
grievable – existing only as “potential combatants” or 
collateral damage—and also proclaim Muslim values 
as worthy and admirable in the service of all people, 
regardless of race, citizen status, or creed (Butler 2004). In 
the United States, Muslim charities have quietly brought 
attention to poverty, including the greater burden poor 
Muslims bear of surveillance and criminalization as 
“potential extremists” (Beydoun 2016). Moreover, they 
declare a belief in the right to healthcare, food, and shelter 
under a government that outright privatizes services or 
does not guarantee them beyond bare subsistence.
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These charity organizations express interpretive control 
and regulate apt performance of Islamic mandated charity, 
through their social media, publications, and facilitation of 
charitable activity through fundraisers, programming, and 
volunteer opportunities amid less powerful but competing 
religious reasoning and action. Despite incredible 
similarities in oﬃcial publications and programming, staﬀ, 
volunteers, and donors across organizations engage in a 
far wider debate regarding the deserving and undeserving; 
obligations of the privileged; responsibilities of the 
structurally marginalized; and the necessity or danger of 
political mobilization. 
This underlying diversity of thought makes clear that 
charities are not the teleological end to US Muslim 
charitable practice. They emerged from conjunctural 
historical developments including but not limited to 
wealth aggregation, professionalization of preexistent 
practices in a context of what Nancy Khalil describes 
as “authority without people who authorize it,” and the 
need for bureaucratic structures in response to state 
surveillance (Subrahmanyam 1998). Moreover, Muslim 
non-profit humanitarian charities exist in a larger multi-
scalar ecosystem of informal and local small-scale Muslim 
community service and social justice organizations on one 
end as well as the larger fields of American faith-based 
humanitarian charities and global Muslim charitable 
activity on the other. 
The driving question then is why has this particular form—
the humanitarian non-profit—come into dominance 
as a key administrative institution and ritual space for 
American Muslim charity? 
A Strategic Logic to Adopt Humanitarianism
Humanitarianism, born in the 19th century from European 
philosophy and Christian ethos, took earlier forms of 
communal care and transformed them into organized 
non-partial service to human need on a global scale 
(Barnett 2011). Foundational organizations, like the Red 
Cross, in the United States and Europe were nonetheless 
grounded in Eurocentric conceptions of social order and 
morality, including a racialized ontology of the human 
(Weheliye 2014).  Over the course of the twentieth century, 
Euro-American humanitarianism became increasingly 
entwined with nation-states, international organizations, 
and corporations in their respective drives for security, 
development, and profit at the expense of the Global South 
as well as marginalized populations within their borders. 
Even with these critiques of humanitarianism’s ties to 
state violence or (neo)imperial projects of control, the 
humanitarian nonprofit is the most acceptable way to 
collect and distribute charitable funds, in-kind donations, 
and services. When American Muslims began to form 
benevolent associations in the first decades of the 
twentieth century and increasingly faith-based non-profits 
to send funds abroad to assist Muslim majority regions, 
they adopted the humanitarian framework in part to avoid 
what Julien Talpin calls the “less dramatic and non-violent 
forms of repression” of symbolic attacks against Muslim 
transnational financial activity as inherently seditious. Like 
marginalized religious groups in the United States before 
or alongside them, Muslims’ use of seemingly secular 
humanitarian language and the concomitant formation 
of service organizations was a means to enjoy conditional 
acceptance and express religious positions on society 
within the confines of cultural alienation and political 
suppression (Nichols 1988, Corbett 2016). 
In this genealogy of humanitarianism, Muslim populations 
have historically been raced as less human and then 
subjected to domination and violence by Euro-Americans, 
all while being treated as the aggressors. As part of this 
dehumanization, suspicion around American Muslim 
financial and political activity began far before the “War 
on Terror” or even the Iranian Revolution with covert 
government eﬀorts to dismantle the Nation of Islam in the 
1960s because they stood against racial capitalism (Felber 
2017). Therefore Islamophobia was and continues to be a 
dominant external force that makes the outwardly neutral 
moral language of humanitarianism attractive, as a means 
to express a sincere belief in a universal aim towards the 
elimination of human suﬀering. 
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Turning to internal community discourses, mostly non-
black American Muslim communities in the late 20th 
century already gave of their labor and money to construct 
mosques and schools, oversaw strong national fraternal 
organizations, continued to build wealth, and were looking 
to formalize religious charity beyond bundled remittances 
abroad. Those who pioneered these first modern 
humanitarian charities found the legal category of the 
501(c)(3) expedient to their goals and adopted this format 
beginning in the late 1980s. At this time, programs of 
privatized development in place of state welfare was on the 
rise, and Muslims followed other US faith-based charities 
in adopting the economic values of what Mona Atia calls 
“pious neoliberalism” (2013). 
African American Muslim communities are part of this 
story, even as they are often segregated out, but also hold 
longer trajectories of community-based organizations 
for resource building, collective relief mechanisms, and 
entrepreneurial black capitalism to “do for self”. The 
Nation of Islam (NOI) was the largest of these groups and 
commanded millions in revenue in the mid-twentieth 
century at the height of their business and institution-
building—despite covert, illegal sabotage eﬀorts by the 
federal government. Once W.D. Muhammad took the 
mantle of NOI leadership in 1975 and dissolved the 
Nation’s holdings, his new organization, the Mosque Cares, 
preaches pious neoliberalism coupled with nationalist 
rhetoric but retains its message of African American 
communal uplift. 
Contemporary Landscape
By the early 21st century, the incorporation of collective 
acts of religious charity into Muslim nonprofits became 
so widespread and commonplace that large-scale charities 
began to be seen as discrete institutions to regulate 
and oﬀer means for proper Islamic giving and service. 
From the late 1980s to the early 2000s, national Muslim 
humanitarian charities such as Islamic Relief USA, ICNA 
Relief, Mercy-USA for Aid and Development, Life for 
Relief and Development, and the Zakat Foundation of 
America became household names and now collectively 
command over two hundred million USD in donations 
each year. 
They emerged as a ritual service provider, an 
administrative site for religious giving facilitating zakat 
transactions and sadaqah jariyya (continuous charity) 
for e.g. a school in Haiti or prosthesis production in 
Pakistan. But in their presence at national organizations’ 
annual meetings, ads in Muslim publications, and in 
the opportunities they provided for employment and 
volunteering, they also became a dedicated physical and 
discursive space specific to charity, making them not third 
spaces but a new institution altogether. 
Therefore, while making no definitive claim to be 
sources of religious knowledge, presenting instead as 
humble servants to God, American Muslim nonprofits 
are nonetheless sites where authoritative religious 
discourses, aﬀective orientation, and ritualized practices 
are produced regarding charity and the establishment of 
justice in human society (Hirschkind 2006). By reading 
and interacting with online and print media; sending 
donations; attending fundraising events; and participating 
in direct service work as staﬀ or volunteers, American 
Muslims’ moral subjectivities are shaped by their 
relationship to these dominant charities. 
And even for those who do not donate or interact with 
said charities, national Muslim nonprofit charities’ growth 
and financial power has allowed them to develop strong 
brand recognition at major conferences, in pamphlets at 
mosques, or as sponsors at local charitable events. Their 
narratives and methods have a thick theological presence 
not as an inevitable but a powerful normative force 
without direct engagement with an individual. 
Muslim supporters most often invest authority into a 
charity not because they read it as a theology-producing 
institution, but because of its bureaucratic rationality 
(Maurer 1998). This is bolstered by pithy endorsements 
from famous male scholars such as Omar Suleiman, 
colloquially referred to as “celebrity imams,” who are often 
invited to make an appearance for fundraising events or 
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narrate commercials for the larger charitable organizations 
(Kapoor 2013). 
Ramadan charity fundraisers are a particularly potent 
example of an expected, ubiquitous, and highly structured 
ritual activity of charities that demonstrates what Bill 
Maurer calls, “charisma of form”: the legitimization of 
religious authority through bureaucratic form in place 
of theological argument. These events bring together 
Muslims to reaﬃrm shared beliefs and commitments as 
an ethical community that are simultaneously framed by 
the goals of the charity. Religious values are not inculcated 
here by mere cerebral activity, but exist in an epistemology 
of embodiment that demands presence and participation 
(Ware 2014). 
Though not acknowledged in formal material, over the 
last thirty years national charities also obtained greater 
legitimacy through local branches and interpersonal 
networks of staﬀ, their friends, family, and local supporters 
who share WhatsApp volunteering group texts or enjoy 
frequent socializing through service to avoid the loneliness 
of retirement. In this way the charity brand becomes a 
symbol into which local communities can pour their own 
religious meaning and aspirations. This might translate into 
programming specific to local needs or fundraisers run in a 
heritage language of a large local ethnic community.
Broader Complexity: African American Muslim 
Resistant Traditions of Care
American Muslim perspectives on religious charity, 
however, do not fall precisely along demographic lines of 
race and class, which is partially due to matters of faith. 
Moreover, because Islamic charity is a call to duty and 
not paternalistic care, Muslims from all socio-economic 
backgrounds participate in programming and giving. In 
fact, African American Muslims have shown much higher 
rates of community service than other racial and ethnic 
groups regardless of income level (Bagby 2004). 
Participants oﬀer diverse explanations for their charitable 
work that often complicate and sometimes exceed the moral 
horizon of liberal humanism. For example, some volunteers 
portray charity as an act to ensure their spiritual wellbeing 
exclusive to the transformation of society. In other instances, 
participants do not measure their work according to 
development metrics but insist on an “ethics of immediacy” 
where the present moment of human connection is the 
focus of charitable service (Mittermaier 2014). Nonetheless, 
the authoritative theological power of charitable 
organizations dictates the public and dominant explanation 
for Muslim charity in the United States– for now.
Right outside the spotlight is the aforementioned 
longstanding, robust, and yet marginalized tradition 
of collectivist liberatory theology from within African 
American Muslim communities. It is the strongest and 
most visible challenge to dominant Islamic charities’ 
discursive authority even as African American Muslim 
community service work has had to work against both 
anti-black economic structures and Islamophobia. 
Best known through the programs of the Nation of Islam 
but present across diﬀerent African American Muslim 
communities, black epistemologies and practices to 
resist racism in American society and Arab and South 
Asian ethnoreligious normativity are propelled by a 
“loop” of building self-knowledge, developing ethics, 
and acting in the service of social justice (Abu Khabeer 
2016). While African Americans are present across the 
larger US Muslim charity landscape, it is this alternative 
tradition of care and justice that has actively pushed 
against humanitarian and neoliberal objectives centered in 
normative American Muslim charities. 
This historical alternative points to the future of American 
Muslim charitable work, in which these African American 
critiques and collectivist perspectives are finding wider 
circulation, mainly in three camps. It informs Muslim 
charity among more recent Muslim majority refugee 
communities who do not fit the upwardly mobile 
stereotype of American Muslims and also among Muslim 
youth who find rights-based language limiting in its 
critique of American imperialism and violence at home 
(Maira 2016). 
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It also has found wider circulation within multiracial 
Muslim communities at varying levels of the socio-
economic ladder who have grown disillusioned with the 
American promise of universal prosperity and respect 
under the law. This is the case especially as economic 
inequality widens, Black Lives Matter opened new 
conversations on racism, and the War on Terror roars into 
the late 2010’s. It is a transition from what Bogumila Hall 
identifies as a politics of recognition to a politics of refusal. 
This position is best embodied by the Inner City Muslim 
Action Network (IMAN) in Chicago and the recent 
Believers Bail Out Initiative of Ramadan 2018 that uses 
zakat funds to free people from the bondage of bail debt. 
Conclusion
Emboldened, the newest stage of American Muslim 
philanthropy is more horizontal, decentralized, and 
entrepreneurial. It is also decidedly committed to local 
issues and does not shy away from public political 
commitments, protesting unjust wars and policing, or 
working to change state policy on aﬀordable housing. New 
modes of collective charity have emerged in the form of 
crowdfunding, philanthropy foundations, and small-scale 
donation models. As much as resistance-based charitable 
work has grown, so have the dreams of entrepreneurial, 
wealthy American Muslim philanthropists who are inspired 
by Elon Musk to socially engineer communities out of 
poverty. Because of the financial power and community 
trust enjoyed by the Muslim humanitarian charity industry 
from American Muslims, I argue it is still secure as an 
institutional space and administrative force amid these shifts 
in the ways Muslims in the US use their charity to build a 
society they believe pleases God and serves all.
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Art and activism of the ‘war on terror’ generation: 
British Muslim youth and the politics of refusal 
Bogumila Hall, Scuola Normale Superiore, Florence
“I did not intend to allow the white people of this country 
to tell me who I was, and limit me that way, and polish me 
oﬀ that way.”
James Baldwin
In the shadow of the war on terror, British Muslims, and in 
particular Muslim youth, have become the prime targets 
of the UK’s government anti-terrorism legislation and its 
de-radicalization agenda. Perceived as being apart from the 
nation—here but not of here—Muslims have been called 
upon to show their commitment to ‘British values’ and to 
denounce extremism. A poem by a young Muslim slam 
poet, Suhaiymah Manzoor-Khan, captures brilliantly what 
it is like to be on the receiving end of governance that aims 
to delineate the acceptable parameters of “Muslimness”. 
Written in the aftermath of the London Bridge attack 
in June 2017, her “This is not a humanizing poem” is an 
intimate account of how British Muslims are forced to find 
ways to display their ‘conditional’ humanity:  
“write something upbeat for a change, crack a smile, 
tell them how you also cry at the end of Toy Story 3 and 
you’re just as capable of bantering about the weather in 
the post oﬃce queue like everyone, you have no idea 
how to make the perfect amount of pasta, still”1
However the poem, which boasted millions of views on 
social media, is not a mere interrogation of the state-
crafted dehumanization of Muslims. It is also a radical 
statement of resistance to the modes of subjectification 
that construe Muslims as threatening and alienated, 
and demand that they prove themselves otherwise.  If 
1   Suhaiymah Manzoor-Khan, This is not a humanising poem, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G9Sz2BQdMF8 (23 June 2017).
2   Ibid.
3   In Hurd’s rendition ‘governed religion’ is a manifestation of religion authorised and defined by those in power. While this brings into being, and 
circumscribes, new political actors- representatives and spokespersons for recognized faith communities, it also marginalizes “nonestablished, 
unorthodox, nonconforming ways of being religious”, or what Hurd frames as ‘lived religion’ (2015:112).
some Muslim representative bodies and organizations, 
responding to the pressure, have been eager to condemn 
terrorism, prove Muslims’ contribution to British society, 
and challenge negative perceptions of Islam, the young 
poet refuses to consent to the binary identities (moderate 
vs. radical Islamist) imposed on Muslims by the state:
“Instead, love us when we’re lazy, love us when 
we’re poor, in our back-to-backs, council estates, 
depressed, unwashed and weeping. Love us high 
as kites, unemployed, joy-riding, time-wasting, 
failing at school. Love us filthy, without the right 
colour passports, without the right sounding English 
(…) When we’re wretched, suicidal, naked and 
contributing nothing.”2
Her refusal to be constituted from the outside, or to be 
reduced to the narrow modalities of being, brings to 
mind the work of writers and activists of the black radical 
tradition. But it also speaks to the changing landscape and 
idioms of Muslim collective political expression, situated at 
the intersections of art and activism. In this short piece, I 
shed light on a larger milieu of which Suhaiymah Manzoor-
Khan is a part: a young generation of British Muslim art 
collectives and grassroots activists, zine makers, spoken 
word poets, writers and curators, who disavow politics of 
respectability.  This article addresses the social life of the 
art practices, their epistemic production, and their political 
meaning. My focus on the vernacular, the popular and 
the mundane aims to shed light on sites of struggle that 
are too often eclipsed in the accounts that privilege the 
‘governed religion’3 and mainstream engagements with the 
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state by Muslim representative bodies.  The initiatives and 
aspirations I look into are not tied together by a narrow 
identitarian logic, but by a shared insistence on Muslim 
self-aﬃrmation and self-definition, against the required 
self-erasure (Morsi 2018). Instead of relying on the state’s 
validation and proving their worthiness, as they are urged 
to do, young creative Muslims carve out their ‘free spaces’ 
where they can exist and speak on their own terms, and 
not in a mere reaction to dominant discourses.  By doing 
so, they prefigure radical alternatives, and turn their back 
on the state projects of co-optation, while also rejecting 
neoliberal consumerism and individualism.  
From politics of recognition to the politics of refusal 
It has been argued that neoliberalism and Islamophobia 
killed the UK’s radical anti-racist youth movements of 
the 1970s and 1980s and working-class racial solidarity 
(Ramamurthy 2013). Recent research on Muslim political 
participation in the UK has described how faith-based 
activism, the Islamic revival, and mobilization for ‘Muslim 
causes’ have gradually replaced the anti-racist politics of 
previous decades (see for example Elshayyal 2018 ). Others 
have focused on the changing repertoires of action among 
Muslim youth, pointing to the engagements that oscillate 
around everyday politics, horizontal networks and new 
technologies (O’Toole, Gale 2013). Broadly speaking, 
diﬀerent strands of literature tend to understand Muslims’ 
civil and political engagements in terms of ‘politics of 
recognition’, whereby those who have their identities 
demeaned and distorted challenge the demonization 
of Islam, claim their ‘right to diﬀerence’, and demand 
inclusion and representation. Indeed, since the 1990’s 
many Muslim organizations have sought equality through 
the state and managed to secure some gains, such as 
protection from discrimination, government funding for 
Muslim schools, and formal recognition as a faith group 
(Elshayyal 2018). But these are also forms of engagement that 
derive from, and are constrained by, the terms of the governing 
doctrines (Hurd 2015).
While recognition is often construed as a remedy to 
historical injustice, my reading of the milieu of creative 
young Muslims draws attention to another other 
logic of action, which is not driven by the desire of 
acknowledgment by the “white man” (Fanon 2008). My 
analysis is informed by perspectives from indigenous and 
decolonial scholarship, black feminism, and in particular 
Audra Simpson’s (2014) rendition of ‘politics of refusal’. 
Writing in the context of Mohawks’ struggles within the 
settler colonial state, Simpson theorizes refusal as an 
alternative to recognition politics. Rather than seeking 
the state’s validation, refusal is about disengaging from 
state projects, disavowing cooperation and questioning 
the legitimacy of those with the power to recognize. 
Refusal is also diﬀerent from outward acts of resistance 
that articulate claims and presuppose audiences. Refusal 
is not merely a ‘reaction to’—it is a turn inward, rooted 
in oppressed communities’ vernacular and embodied 
knowledges. Carol McGranahan (2016) calling upon 
Simpson, emphasizes that the act of refusal is generative, 
social and aﬃliative, hopeful, and willful—bypassing the 
state, it introduces new political spaces and builds new 
collectivities.
Understood this way, the notion of refusal provides a 
useful lens through which to consider a wide range of 
artistic practices that reclaim unrepresented narratives 
and undermine the state’s presumed authority to flatten 
Muslim lives and fold them into an oﬃcial narrative of 
threat and alienation.   They manifest, as articulated by 
Suhaiymah Manzoor-Khan, Muslims’ refusal to negotiate 
their identities, to justify who they are and prove what 
they are not. This stance could be discerned in the words 
of Madani Younis, artistic director of the London Bush 
Theater, when at an event organized by Khidr Collective, a 
group of Muslim art practitioners, he declared:
“I don’t want to live a life where someone else thinks they 
have a moral authority over me… the government has this 
arrogance to think they have a moral authority over the 
Muslim men and women who live in this country. And I 
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am done with it (…) I am done with accepting the idea that 
somehow I have to barter for my equality.”4
DIY (do-it-yourself) cultures, Muslim art collectives 
and zine5 communities 
While Muslims in Europe are often posited as ‘outside 
of modernity’, determined by their allegedly archaic and 
rigid culture, to which scripts they conform, rather than 
which they actively produce (Mamdani 2002), grassroots 
articulations of Muslim youth culture forcefully question 
these assumptions.  Over the last years, a vibrant scene has 
emerged in the UK of Muslim art collectives, spoken word 
poets, writers, curators and activists, who assert their voice 
as political subjects, aﬃrm Muslim creative expression and 
racial consciousness, and oﬀer new languages and avenues 
to address British Muslim condition. Self-published zines 
by Muslim arts collectives, such as Khidr Collective or all-
female OOMK, have become one of the platforms for the 
young members of the community to express themselves 
and interrogate issues of Islamic faith, traditions, 
spirituality, art, and activism.  In a context where Muslim 
identities and politics are policed and reified, and where 
Muslims’ Britishness is constantly tested, these zines 
are also a testimony to what is usually obscured: the 
lived experiences of Muslims in all their complexity, the 
connections between the colonial past and present, and a 
myriad of forces that shape Muslims’ life trajectories, from 
poor quality council housing and austerity, to everyday 
racism and government counter-terrorism policies such as 
Prevent.6  In what follows, I highlight how young Muslims 
turn to each other to reclaim, celebrate and archive what 
is drowned out in dominant narratives, and how they 
articulate and enact their visions of community and justice. 
4   Opening talk at the Khidr Collective zine launch, Bush Theatre, London, 15 January 2018.
5   Zines are cheap self-published and small-circulation magazines. 
6   First created in 2003, and statuary since 2015, Prevent policy - as one strand of the UK counter-terrorism strategy - charges public sector workers 
with the responsibility to monitor and report ‘signs of radicalization’, expanding surveillance to spaces of state schools, universities, and healthcare.
7   This does not preclude however their contribution to more organized forms of resistance i.e. campaigns against Islamophobia and the war on terror 
led by grassroots organizations such as CAGE and the Islamic Commission for Human Rights (IHRC), or student campaigns against Prevent and for 
the decolonization of the university.
8   Author interview, 11 January 2018, London. 
9   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IcUmlPzbDqs&t=91s&frags=pl%2Cwn
Decoloniality and self-aﬃrmation 
The new generation of Muslim artists refuse to speak in 
language, and on terms, dictated by the outside. Although 
their artwork disrupts dominant narratives, they do not 
necessarily aim to produce a counter-narrative to the 
mainstream Islamophobia. Rather, deeply aware that 
inclusion and diversity are not an end itself, they seek to 
create spaces of living, self-aﬃrmation, and care, where 
Muslims can tell their own marginalized stories, and 
nurture themselves and their faith. This shift inwards 
prioritizes creativity over outward protest7, and aims at 
generating conversations within the community.  As Sofia 
Niazi, speaking of her own OOMK collective, explains: 
“OOMK is more about creating space for people to exist 
within, as opposed to a space for people to be outwards; 
instead of trying to communicate to the world, it’s about 
having internal conversations.”8 In a similar vein, a young 
woman present at the launch of the Khidr Collective’s zine 
called it, “a space for the community just to exist, not to 
have to fight or defend it.”9
Self-exploration and eﬀorts to reclaim their own languages, 
narratives, and subjugated knowledges are central to the 
young Muslims’ cultural production.  For example, the 
second issue of the Khidr Zine focuses on healing and 
restoration (shifaa’) in a way that moves away from the 
commodified understanding of wellness, to think about 
care in Islam, healing through art and resistance, but 
also to address mental health as tied to the larger power 
structures that make Muslims disproportionately at risk of 
vulnerability and living in harm’s way.
These artists also work against forgetfulness, archiving 
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what would otherwise be lost or ignored. They record 
stories of ‘insignificant’ individuals; recall the names of 
young black men killed by the police; celebrate Islamic 
figures and movements from the past; and document the 
quiet histories of immigrant communities in the UK, as 
exemplified by the work of the Numbi Arts collective, 
which unearths historical presence and heritage of British 
Somalis in the East End of London. By excavating what is 
buried in silence, these initiatives contribute to a re-writing 
of historical narratives from below, in ways that re-center 
marginal (often female) voices, cultures and faith, and 
which articulate an alternative vision of nationhood and 
belonging.
Prefiguration and new networks of solidarity
The ethos of DIY, zine culture, independent publishing, 
and autonomy is central to young British Muslims’ art 
practices, standing in opposition to mass-produced and 
commodified forms of cultural production. Whereas 
the DIY scene in the UK, stemming from the anarchist, 
feminist and punk movements, has been traditionally 
predominantly white and secular, in recent years there 
has been a growing number of initiatives organized 
by, and giving a central place to, communities of faith 
and color. These events, such as small print workshops, 
festivals and zine fairs, oﬀer material spaces for collective 
experimentation, exchanges, and personal encounters, 
emphasizing the collaborative aspects of art production 
and consumption. With a scant online presence, they 
also act as free spaces where discussions are held away 
from the gaze of the state, which, through policies such 
as Prevent, aims to contain Muslim civil dissent. For 
example, the annual DIY Cultures Festival10--alcohol free 
and including a praying space—brings art and grassroots 
activism together to interrogate power structures 
in creative ways and to build solidarities that extend 
beyond the timeframe of the festival. But the festival also 
enacts utopian alternatives in the present, as it defies 
10   DIY Cultures Festival has been held every year since 2013, with a break in 2018.  It is a one- day festival composed of exhibitions, talks, workshops 
and zine fairs, co-organized by Sofia Niazi, Helena Wee and Hamja Ahsan.
11   Author interview, 10 January 2018, London.
the logic of neoliberal capitalism and its celebration of 
professionalization, consumption and individual success. 
With talks given by the unemployed and introverts, and 
discussing issues such as disability and mental health, the 
DIY Cultures Festival praises knowledge from the margins. 
In this vein, the festival does not invite solely Muslim 
audiences, but racialized communities and other subaltern 
voices more broadly. As the co-founder Hamja Ahsan 
explains, zine fairs like this are driven by the “demand for 
friendship, things that are not based on competition but 
cooperation, things that are not profitable…”11, and as such 
signal the world their participants want to live in. 
Conclusion 
If the politics of multiculturalism and Islamophobia have 
encouraged narrowly understood identity politics, and 
to a large extent stabilized boundaries between groups 
emphasizing their distinctiveness (Ramamurthy 2013: 
184), British Muslims involved in the DIY art scene teach 
us about modes of solidarity and community formation, 
which do not have to be framed in narrow religious 
terms.  Articulating class, race and religion together, 
these artists and activists recognize broad commonalties 
among those at the bottom of the system, those whose 
voices and histories have been erased, and whose skills and 
knowledges are deemed of little value and disposable.  The 
communities they envision thus are not distinct, unified 
or bounded, but based on cooperation, exchange, and 
common experiences of marginalization. 
Although not necessarily making demands on the state, 
these young British Muslims scrutinize oppressive 
power structures, create inclusive platforms for building 
collectivities, and through their creative expression, recast 
the meanings of ‘Britishness’. Thereby, they invite us to 
expand our understanding of the margins, not as mere 
markers of Islamophobia, racism and dispossession, but 
also as sites of creativity, resilience and faith.  
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